GUEST COLUMN / BURMA
As the referendum on the junta's proposed constitution approaches, the model of elite-driven transition loses relevance and the calls for public action become louder, writes MIN ZIN
The notion of political transition initiated by a country's elite has been a dominant discourse in Burmese politics since the late 1990s. The model advocates that a peaceful transition could be facilitated by negotiations between the regime's "doves" and opposition moderates. It would involve the opposition initiating a concrete proposal to the military in order to persuade the latter to sit at the negotiating table. This political strategy gained currency in the early 2000s since it coincided with the political ascendancy of former Intelligence Chief Gen Khin Nyunt. At the time, talks between opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta seemed to offer a glimmer of hope. Simultaneously, the opposition movement was losing its strength in "people power" campaigns such as unsuccessful Four Nine (September 9, 1999) Mass Movement campaign, and in ethnic armed resistances.
Optimism in Burmese politics is never sustained for long. Military-backed "thugs" even attacked Suu Kyi and her supporters in 2003. However, the transitional model remained popular as the only way out for the Burmese people. Proponents claimed there was "No alternative!"
"Many diplomats who we met always encouraged and even pressured us to initiate a proposal to the regime," said Nyan Win, a spokesperson for the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD). "In fact the party has always called for dialogue and has always been ready to negotiate."
In early 2006, the NLD proposed a transitional plan that urged the junta to convene parliament with winners of the 1990 elections in return for recognition of the regime as an interim power holder. Though the party's call for a negotiated transition was rejected by the regime, the opposition - including the 92 MP-elects from the 1990 election and notable veteran politicians - continued to offer flexible transitional packages to the junta. None of them worked.
The proponents of the transition model often downplay the role of public action and mass movement. Some believed it would not happen because more than 20 percent of the population had been born since the uprising in 1988 and were therefore unaffected by the people's power movement of those times. Others worry the mass movement could be counterproductive to a possible negotiated transition as the crowd usually gets out of control and threatens the careful process of negotiation. They all reason that the Army doesn't respond to public pressure.
Then, all of the sudden, the September protests broke out. The so-called "experts" and "policymakers" failed to see it all coming. In the wake of the crackdown, UN-led mediation efforts were revived and Snr-Gen Than Shwe and his generals, once again, were called on to sit at the negotiating table. And once again they declined.
The question now to advocates of the elite-driven transition model is what to do when the regime refuses to negotiate with the opposition? What it is to be done when the military insist on a referendum to approve a constitution that will allow the perpetuation of military rule in the country?
THE YOUNGER JUNTA
Almost all supporters of the model say the people of Burma must accept whatever offer the junta makes. They say "something is better than nothing." Some suggest using the generals' flawed model of democracy as a starting point from which to pursue a more acceptable long-term solution.
"We must give consideration to possible generational change within the military," said Harn Yawnghwe, a well-known lobbyist and director of the Brussels-based Euro-Burma office. "The new blood of the Army must have options available on their table when their time comes. This constitution and referendum, though there are flaws, can give reform options to a new generation of military officers. It will create a new dynamic for the country to get out of the current deadlock."
That's why many advocates of the elite-initiated transition advise the Burmese public to accept the constitution in the May 10 referendum; they hope it will lead to amendments for the military's gradual withdrawal from politics.
Tun Myint Aung, a leader of 88 Generation Students group, disagrees. "It is such disgraceful advice. The so-called experts and policy makers are pushing our people to live in slavery," he said from his hideout in Burma. "We do not accept the military's constitution; not because we don't want gradual transition, but because the constitution is too rigid to make any change possible. The military holds a veto over any amendments."
However, the military's control over the issue of constitutional amendment does not surprise supporters of elite-driven transition. "Once I accepted the military veto, meaning the absolute control, the way forward happens to be whether if we can or are willing to convince the individual who's going to be the commander in chief at a time," said a well-known magazine editor in Burma on condition of anonymity.
Some analysts in exile echo similar views. "Instead of saying that we (i.e. the opposition) end up in receiving whatever offer military gives us, the issue here is who we are responding to - hardliners or moderates within the regime," said Tin Maung Than, a well-known Burmese writer and analyst in exile. "Of course, I will personally support for vote no in referendum but whenever we talk about mass pressure we have to remember it must be accompanied and coordinated with political programme that prompts the emergence of moderate forces within military."
However, critics said it is now clear - after a series of rejected proposals from opposition groups and the UN - that rather than political carrots, it is much more likely that effective public action will compel the new military generation to take a reform path.
"Unless a mass movement challenges the corrupted military leadership, divisions within the military will not surface," said Kyaw Kyaw, head of the Political Defiant Committee under the National Council of Union of Burma, the umbrella opposition group in exile. "Besides lacking local and international legitimacy, the corrupt leadership is now losing its loyalty from within military ranks since the September protest. In a historical Burmese context, public action, or mass movement, has played a decisive role ever since the struggle for independent to the 1988 democracy uprising to the monk-led protests last September. It will continue to be so until we gain a genuine resolution."
A NEGOTIATED TRANSITION
In fact, only when mass movement with strategic leadership rises up against a handful of the current military top brass, the elite calculation, regime defection and international pressures will become relevant in facilitating a negotiated transition.
In other words, political transition is not likely to take place within the framework of proposed constitutional means. Even the amendments of the constitution with the hope of gradual reform will not be possible within military-dominated parliamentary debate. It will happen only when the critical mass challenges the status quo with public pressures.
However, although mass action is believed to be necessary to bring about change in Burma, its inherent dangers mean the possibility of its success remains a big question.
"The calls for public action are getting louder since the prospect of elite-initiated negotiation became impossible," said Nyan Win. "If the regime rigged the referendum result, it could spark mass protests."
A recent history of democratisation shows that vote-rigging and stealing elections create favourable conditions and the opportunity for the outbreak of a democratic uprising or, in a worst case scenario, violence.
In fact, vote-rigging might not only trigger public outrage in Burma, but also test the loyalty of the regime's staff. It could create divisions and weaken the standing of Than Shwe, who is solely responsible for the decision to move ahead with the unilateral implementation of the current political process by ignoring the UN's call for inclusiveness.
Whether public action will lead to a negotiated transition depends on the opposition's leadership. No democratisation has involved pure society-led uprising. But it would be shortsighted to exclude the role and power of the people, while elite-driven transition is no longer relevant in Burmese political context.
Min Zin is a Burmese journalist.
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