THAI POLITICS
THITINAN PONGSUDHIRAK
The Constitution Court's ruling against hitherto Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej has complicated Thailand's political impasse, but will not affect the fundamental dynamics of the ongoing crisis. The unanimous 9:0 verdict automatically disqualified Mr Samak from the premiership for having hosted two commercial TV cooking shows while in power, in violation of the Constitution and its provisions against conflicts of interest. His minor infringement of the charter has produced major ramifications.
As Mr Samak has reverted to his MP status, a new prime minister will have to be elected by the 480 members of the House of Representatives. At issue is who will be the new prime minister, what it means for Thai politics, and whether it will prompt the anti-government People's Alliance for Democracy to cease its protests, now illegally based at Government House.
As the ruling People's Power party still holds a near-majority in the Lower House, the new prime minister, who has to be chosen by the Lower House within 30 days of the Constitution Court's decision, is likely to derive from within the largest governing party. If Mr Samak is re-elected by the majority of MPs, including those of the erstwhile coalition partners, then the political crisis will not only remain the same, but will be more intense and volatile.
The PAD will likely step up its demonstrations, fingering Mr Samak's lack of legitimacy and ethical standards to stand as prime minister in view of the Constitution Court's overwhelming decision. To be sure, Mr Samak has engendered his own downfall. As prime minister, he should have stayed away from charter violations, however minor. The text of the verdict was damning and persuasive, involving possible fabrication of documents. If he returns as prime minister, Mr Samak will be haunted by his poor judgement and the consequent legal complications related to the mounting of his defence. Moreover, he also faces other legal charges that could yet derail his premiership again, including his appeal on a defamation conviction whose verdict is due later this month.
A second turn at the helm would be rocky for Mr Samak from the outset, and the PAD would have a field day with him. No better opportunity and timing is available for him to bid farewell. Having been re-nominated by the PPP yesterday, he could decline and choose a face-saving exit at an advance age. It would be a blessing in disguise for Mr Samak to go out on minor cookery charges while staying within the democratic process based on the Constitution. The political torrent on his other charges will likely to subside if he fades away quietly.
But some among the PPP leadership may be tempted to thrust Mr Samak into a second term as a defiant face-off against the PAD. After all, the ruling party does not have any other PM candidate of Mr Samak's stature and seasoned experience. His two unrivalled strengths are a good working relationship with the military and royalist credentials. An alternative PPP prime minister would have a difficult time dealing with the army from the outset, without the perception of palace endorsement and access.
If Mr Samak knows when to call it quits, the internal PPP squabbling is likely to land the premiership on Deputy PM and Finance Minister Surapong Suebwonglee, Deputy PM and Education Minister Somchai Wongsawat, or Justice Minister Sompong Amornwiwat.
Any of these three candidates as prime minister would face the same intensity of protests and personal attacks just as Mr Samak did. As a former cabinet lieutenant and brother-in-law of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, respectively, Mr Surapong and Mr Somchai are particularly vulnerable to the PAD's wrath. As the PAD overtly rejects any PPP-led administration, a PPP prime minister _ either Mr Samak or any of the other candidates _ would intensify and accelerate the confrontation and brinkmanship between the government and PAD.
Other extra-PPP contenders for the premiership feature Banharn Silapa-archa of Chart Thai party and Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Democrat party.
Chart Thai is a coalition partner, and Mr Banharn has insisted that he will support a PPP-led prime minister. Even if Mr Banharn somehow lands the coveted premiership, he would face the PAD's animosity in much the same fashion. Mr Banharn also has a poor track record from the mid-1990s when he briefly served as prime minister.
Untested, the 44-year-old Oxford-educated Mr Abhisit as prime minister may be the second best outcome for the PAD (the first best being its proposed revamp of the political system to an appointments-based representation). But even if his would-be administration could tone down the PAD, Mr Abhisit would likely face the opposing virulence of the pro-PPP United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), the PAD's street-based equivalent comprising mostly pro-government demonstrators from the Northeast.
It is clear now that the PAD will not stop its street protests and illegal occupation of Government House whoever becomes the new prime minister. Mr Samak's ouster this week was a relief for those who still support the constitutional framework and the rule of law. His position appeared untenable, but his departure stemmed from the judicial process, not the the PAD's blatant blackmail. The next prime minister will be hostage to this blackmail from day one.
The best near-term way forward remains a dissolution of the Lower House and new elections, even if the last poll was just eight months ago. But this would require sacrifice on the PPP's part and on its newly appointed prime minister. The party won the last election handily, and going to the polls again would risk further dilution of its numbers due to the potential for its dissolution due to vote fraud and the mounting legal cases against its key leaders. Yet going ahead with another PPP-led premiership and administration would deepen the crisis, posing all kinds of potentially adverse outcomes for not just the PPP, but also for Thailand overall.
The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.
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