THAI POLITICS
THITINAN PONGSUDHIRAK
When the military coup transpired in September 2006, the popular and organically crafted Constitution of 1997 was abolished and thrown into the graveyard to join its many predecessors.
Now, however, the ''People's Charter of 1997'' is enjoying an ironic revival.
It is being resurrected by the ruling People Power party (PPP), whose members are seen as proxies and successors of the dissolved Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party and former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra's ousted regime, which did much to undermine the 1997 charter during its tenure in power.
Key members of the current parties in government also opposed the previous charter when it came up for parliamentary approval in October 1997 prior to its passage and promulgation, thanks to intense pro-charter public campaigns.
In a twist of positions, today's opponents of the 1997 charter used to be its most vociferous supporters.
Key members of the anti-PPP People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and segments of the intelligentsia, who now argue against the re-use of the 1997 charter, are in favour of the 2007 Constitution, designed by an assembly appointed by a military junta after it seized power from a democratically elected government.
Such is the state of Thai politics.
Formerly left-leaning advocates of the 1997 charter have turned right, calling for the military-guided 2007 Constitution to stick.
Rightists who were against the 1997 charter have turned left, demanding amendments to the 2007 charter.
This is a tale of two constitutions that signifies a polarised political landscape and the fluctuating and growing stakes of the lead protagonists on stage and behind the scenes.
The PPP evidently wants to borrow the legitimacy and popularity of the 1997 charter to overcome the 2007 charter drawn up by the junta-appointed assembly. The virtually wholesale re-adoption of the 1997, except Sections 1 and 2 of the 2007 version dealing with general principles and the monarchy, would allow the PPP to free itself from straitjacket clauses embedded in the 2007 charter. The symbolic and subliminal significance of this fight over the two charters is inescapable.
The 1997 charter was a five-year, grassroots-driven and widely participatory undertaking, prompted by the May 1992 democracy uprising and consequent bloodshed. By contrast, the 2007 version is a by-product of a coup, supervised by pro-Establishment figures to preserve the status quo and repel the challenge represented by Mr Thaksin and his allies. The battle between proponents of these two constitutions is likely to dominate Thai politics for the rest of the year.
For the PPP, the 2007 charter contains two clauses that could spell its demise. Article 237 mandates party dissolution for election fraud, whereas Article 309 justifies and legitimises legal acts and policies enacted during the post-coup interim constitution.
The PPP is in the dock for party dissolution because one of its executive members has been charged by the Election Commission with vote-buying. Chart Thai and Matchimathipataya parties, two junior coalition partners, potentially face the same but earlier fate for vote-buying.
These two parties want to sidestep Article 237 by amending the Constitution. However, they do not agree with the PPP's attempt to scrap or revise Article 309, a change that could nullify the legal acts after the coup and allow Mr Thaksin and his cohorts from the disbanded Thai Rak Thai party to free themselves from a five-year ban and re-enter politics.
Stuck on this point, the ruling coalition has decided to let Parliament, in which it has a solid majority under the premise that a number of senators are on its side, take up the issue of amendments.
The PPP, Chart Thai and Matchimathipataya all want to avoid dissolution, but the PPP wants to go further by effecting constitutional changes that would favour Mr Thaksin and give the 111 former TRT executives a new lease of life in politics.
If the PPP has its way, Mr Thaksin may well be exonerated in his corruption cases. In addition, the PPP wants to defang the independent agencies such as the National Counter Corruption Commission and the Election Commission. The government's sub-committee on constitutional amendments indicated a plan to put a 180-day time limit on the current sets of NCCC and EC, and to add more members to the Constitution Court to dilute its dominance from the junta period.
The government's sub-committee also presented a clear time frame. Specific amendments are to be agreed this month, for a second reading for two months from June. The third reading is to be finalised and voted in Parliament in September for promulgation in October.
If this timetable holds up, the onus will be on Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej to dissolve the Lower House and hold new elections towards the end of 2008 or early 2009.
However, Mr Samak has been evasive by suggesting that his government could serve out its full term and reserve the new constitution for the next elected government.
Once out, Mr Samak may never be able to find his way back into the premiership again.
As the wrangles over the charter changes continue, the danger is that the proponents of the 2007 Constitution and opponents of the re-adoption of the 1997 Constitution, revolving around the extra-parliamentary PAD and the Democrat party in Parliament, will agitate for a full-scale confrontation.
The just-concluded parliamentary vote to put Chai Chidchob, an octogenarian MP from a hard-line faction within PPP, as the new Speaker of the Lower House increases the likelihood of this confrontation.
Indeed, the PPP appears intent on ramming through its amendments in the face of the PAD's opposition. The ongoing charter amendment process will heighten political risk and instability.
Unsurprisingly, coup rumours have resurfaced, and persist. Thai politics thus remains locked in this polarisation. Finding a way out will require a constitutional make-up that has broad-based legitimacy in the spirit of the 1997 charter, but without serving the interests of its current set of supporters who set the stage for its derailment in the first place.
The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.
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