GLOBAL VIEWPOINT
True tolerance begins only after the prior and adamant decision to exclude any form of discourse proffering hatred, discrimination and murder as acceptable speech
Bernard-Henri Levy, France's most well-known philosopher, spoke recently with Global Viewpoint editor Nathan Gardels about the controversial ideas in his recent book Left in Dark Times: A Stand Against the New Barbarism. Levy's responses have been translated from the French by Bill Weber.
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| French philosopher and author Bernard-Henri Levy smiles during an interview in Paris. |
Nathan Gardels: ''Tolerance could be the cemetery of democracies, while secular concepts are their crucible,'' you write in your book Left in Dark Times. Wow. That is quite a provocative thesis. Do you really mean that?
Bernard-Henri Levy: Of course, in saying this I mean an extreme form of tolerance, one that prompts us to accept the notion that all opinions, absolutely all, without any distinction or limits, deserve our respect. Where does that leave the opinion of the racist, the fascist, the rapist or that of anyone who, in the name of some ideology or other, calls for mass murder or the assassination of those who offend them?
In the minds of the fanatics of tolerance, all these opinions deserve respect; and in their eyes the fanatics themselves expect to be treated equally and with dignity.
This leads to crazy situations like those we observe in England, in the Netherlands and in the rest of Europe, where the discourse of the assassins of Theo van Gogh in the local mosque, as well as that of the killers who were earlier sent out to track my friend Salman Rushdie, become acceptable.
True tolerance begins only after the prior and adamant decision to exclude any form of discourse proffering hatred, discrimination and murder as acceptable speech. Tolerance is not synonymous with an absolute principle of freedom of expression, which, etymologically speaking, would be unlinked from any and all transcendental mandate. To accept such an unlinked principle would render us speechless, for example, when confronted with the assassins who are in pursuit of Ayaan Hirsi Ali.
Gardels: You say that secularism is the crucible of democracy. How does that apply across the West when Europe is largely a post-religious society but America is quite religious?
Levy: When I talk about secularism, I have in mind a threefold principle. Firstly, political authorities should have absolutely nothing to say about what our spiritual needs should be. Secondly, the task of the state is not to deal with churches, mosques or religious organisations, but rather with each citizen individually, as pure subjects of the law. Thirdly, in the event that the state should deal with religious institutions, it should do so from the outside, in a neutral manner so to speak, on a purely material level, and with the sole objective of creat ing a public space where those who are religious, atheist or agnostic can all have an equal chance to meet with their followers and provide them with a message of their choosing. This is true secularism in its exact meaning. It also makes the distinction between the United States and Europe less clear-cut than the usual cliche suggests.
With respect to France, we are witnessing an attempt to reintroduce religion into the public sphere. It manifests itself in the Muslim organisations who, during the affair of the Mohammed cartoons in Denmark, attempted to force public opinion, as well as judges and even the legislature, to take religious law into account in the drafting of civil law. It became apparent during the riots in the outskirts of Paris in November of 2005 when some proposed sending the imams to restore order where the police of the Republic could not. Lastly, it also manifests itself when President Nicolas Sarkozy incessantly invokes what he calls an open secularism, thereby intimating that secularism can be closed or negative, or that it could even ruin the social fabric.
I must underline, however, that on the American side, things are less simple than caricature suggests. When Thomas Jefferson talked about building a wall between the political order and the great religious dogmas, he actually recommended nothing other than rendering unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and rendering unto God that which is God's. In other words, he issued the most basic secular recommendation.
Where is the evidence that Jefferson's modern successors, those who incessantly invoke God in their speeches, are really that unfaithful to his principle? When President Bush invokes God, is he really doing anything more than affirming a space where all religions are able to express themselves on an equal footing? That is a pretty good definition of secularism.
America has really always steadfastly upheld this principle. Each time you have had a debate about prayer in schools, the decision favored a secular solution. Each time the so-called creationist question came up, you have had some quite idiotic positions, some sterile and absurd debates, but the actual dividing wall was never dismantled.
Let's hope this never changes, which is why this year's presidential election is so important. In Sarah Palin, you have somebody, who, for the first time ever, seems set on chipping away at this wall if she enters the White House.
Gardels: Because of the disasters related to religious intolerance, from the Crusades to fascislamism to totalitarian oppression associated with the Communist faith, you argue that atheism is the price of democracy -- the alternative to which is the devil and his legion of murderous angels. So, atheism must go hand in hand with democracy?
Levy: I have nothing against private and personal faith. I am even willing to grant that faith elevates the soul, gives meaning to life, anything you want. Not only will I concede this, but I have often said that the whole concept of human rights is inconceivable without the great wagers of Jews and Christians alike around the notion that the human being is inviolable because he was made in the image of the Creator.
However, I do not wish the prince, or, if you prefer, the state, to invoke any faith in order to accomplish its tasks of governance. I want a state, which is, sensu stricto, atheist or indifferent toward God. I want a state which acts as if Heaven were empty. What is, in the final analysis, the common trait of all the situations and tragedies which you mentioned? They were brought about by people who wanted to bring Heaven to Earth. They are the doings of madmen who thought they were able to build the City of Men in the image of the City of God.
Democracy is just the opposite. Democracy runs counter to this illusion, which was shared by the Crusaders as well as the inventors of totalitarian religions and is presently shared by the supporters of Muslim fundamentalism. Democracy is against the idea that it would be not only desirable but also possible to copy a social order from some sort of divine design. Atheism, in this sense, is the politics of democracy.
Gardels: As you come to this conclusion, Tony Blair has converted to Catholicism in his political afterlife and started his Faith Foundation for religious literacy because you can't understand the modern world if you don't understand religion. His political experience has taught him that religion can be a force for the good.
Levy: I agree with the idea that you cant understand the modern world if you dont understand religion. My only problem with this concept is its transfer into the realm of politics.
If Blair had made the same statement when he was in power, and if he had drawn consequences from it for his government, that would have been a problem. What consequences could he have drawn?
First, he could have said that society should espouse and emulate this religious link, whose grandeur I, Blair, have just discovered. It is very unlikely that Blair, even touched by Grace, would have gone that far, as this would have opened an expressway to pure and simple totalitarianism.
Secondly, he could have drawn the conclusion that the best contract with the subjects of society is one that deals with the churches or mosques en bloc, almost as a flock, looking for us at the church doors by seeking out the bishops or imams who are supposed to speak on our behalf.
This opens the door not to totalitarianism, but to communitarism, which, in my opinion, is hardly better. Blair, however, did not do this, as far as I know. Instead, he recruited Tariq Ramadan and relied on him for his reflections on political Islam, which, granted, was not particularly brilliant. However, he never fell into the anti-secular trap.
Gardels: You mentioned Sarkozy. Let me return to that point. Nicolas Sarkozy argued, during the Pope's recent visit to France, that rejecting a dialogue with religion would be a cultural and intellectual error. He called for a positive secularism that debates, respects and includes, not a secularism that rejects. What is your view on this intervention?
Levy: It was not up to Sarkozy to say this. In doing so, he exceeded his prerogatives and his role as president of an authentically democratic Republic. Once again, what is democracy? It is uncertainty about the ultimate purposes. It is the continual elusiveness of truth. Once again, it is the empty Heaven. In other words, it is not up to the president of the Republic to comment on what religions tell us about the ultimate purpose of our actions. He is free to believe whatever he wishes, but he should not tell us about it. This is none of our business.
Gardels: Jurgen Habermas, the German social theorist, has suggested of late that what we need is not atheism but a post-secular society in which the religious and secular mentalities are no longer segregated under some outmoded idea of modernity. Believers and non-believers alike must learn from each other in order to establish a shared citizenship. Isn't this completely the opposite of what you are arguing?
Levy: Well, yes and no. Yes, we must reflect on religions. Yes, they are part of our heritage, both spiritual and moral. But no, this must not interfere with questions related to citizenship.
Gardels: Habermas has come to this conclusion because he doubts that secular modernity is capable of constituting its own values and must rely, as you yourself suggested earlier, on the Judeo-Christian heritage which sanctified the person as made in the image of God, and thus gave birth to the notions of human rights and dignity.
Levy: Yes, indeed. I said the same thing, long before Habermas, in a book entitled Le Testament de Dieu, published in 1979. (It also appeared in the US, published by Harper & Row). Simply put, to say that human dignity is unthinkable outside the Judeo-Christian heritage is one thing. To include this heritage in the social contract, however, is quite another. That is what Pope John Paul II wanted to do in the European Constitution. This is the slippage, the confusion and the misunderstanding that must be avoided at all cost.
In the post-secular society that Habermas conceives, it is vital not to confuse things. To profess that a social contract ought to be reached between individuals who are what they are only as a result of the Judeo-Christian heritage, whose heirs they are consciously or unconsciously, is one thing. I agree with this premise. But to say that the terms of the contract must be based, ever so lightly, on the arsenal of dogmas, rules and articles of faith of the very same Judeo-Christianity, is something else entirely and would constitute a grave error.
Gardels: In your book, a whole chapter is devoted to rejecting the temptation to differentialism, arguing for the universality of rights. I have just returned from China where it is clear that a neo-Confucian sensibility is beginning to define a kind of non-Western modernity. One of the basic principles of Confucianism is a disbelief in abstract universal ideas: the belief that all truths are rooted in concrete local realities, thus the principle of non-universalism.
Levy: So be it. This is a different model of development, based on another mentality. I never believed in Fukuyama's theory of the End of History in which all the world's conflicts resolve into one model. What you are saying gives me one more reason to feel comfortable with my choice.
Gardels: This non-universalism, Chinese intellectuals say, allows China to avoid both a clash of civilisations between universalisms (Islamism or Confucianism vs. the West) and the West's universalist triumphalism at the end of history.
Levy: Yes, that is possible, but in that case these Chinese intellectuals must explain to me how they can, from this starting point, this desire to avoid the West's universalist triumphalism, create something that is similar to human rights.
The West's universalism is a meaningless concept. As the term indicates, universalism is universal. It is based on principles which are valid, and fortunately so, regardless of their geographical origin. Let us stop this stupidity! We must abandon this idea according to which all ideas are like plants, firmly implanted in their original soil.
Gardels: Rather than geopolitics, the Chinese talk about a geo-civilisational paradigm of the kind, for example, that allowed Buddhism and Daoism to coexist for millennia.
Levy: Granted, but it is not that easy to escape from geopolitics. Look at the great geopolitical choices of China in the last 10 years. Look at its position with respect to the question of Darfur, or Iran, or the development of neopopulism a la Chavez. Geopolitics is a form of metaphysics. We are faced with geopolitical choices, which are always linked to the primordial wagers of metaphysics.
Gardels: Though atheistic, isn't your universalism really a function of the Western idea of modernity, rooted, after all, in monotheism? Perhaps non-universality is the future in a post-American world?
Levy: Of course, my universalism is rooted in monotheism. But where I disagree is when we are told that this universalism is an invention linked to that specific tribe, which is the Western tribe. Since when is monotheism an invention of the West? Since when is Jerusalem, Nazareth or the Sinai Desert in Europe? Come on! Let us abandon these childish views! All right, human rights first appeared in Europe, and more particularly in England. But this proves nothing of their destiny, their desirable area of influence, or the good they will do in non-European countries. Great ideas transcend borders.
Gardels: Maybe the Chinese are the proof of what Habermas doubts: that the Confucian ethics of reciprocity _ do unto others as you would have them do unto you _ is a non-religious, humanistic ethos, universally shared, but differentially employed?
Levy: Perhaps indeed.
2008 Global Viewpoint, Distributed by Tribune Media Services
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