China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has set up three camps inside Bhutan’s territory, the Times Now news channel reported last week, citing an internal note by an Indian intelligence agency.
Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Thinley greets Indian Premier Manmohan Singh at a SARRC summit in Thinphu in 2010.
This begs a question about China’s interest in a country that is 250 times smaller in size with a population of just over 700,000.
The intelligence note says PLA personnel are in the Sakteng area in the far eastern district of Trashigang, and in the Pang La area in the northeastern district of Lhuentse, and they also carried out patrols at those locations.
A former Indian army lieutenant-general, D.V. Shekhatkar, told Times Now that a key interest of China in Bhutan is the latter’s proximity to Bangladesh. The distance between Bhutan and Bangladesh is less than 40 kilometres and the two countries are separated by a narrow stretch of Indian land called the Siliguri Corridor, known as the “Chicken’s Neck”. Shekhatkar said Bhutan could be a gateway to Bangladesh for China.
However, there is much more to the China-Bhutan border issue than China’s trade with Bangladesh. More than anything else, China is known for creating border disputes with its neighbours to pressure them to come to the negotiating table, whereby Beijing can barter its claim to the other country’s territory with its own strategic interests.
China’s border dispute with Bhutan is no exception.
Last June, when then-premier Wen Jiabao met with Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Thinley on the sidelines of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro, China’s foreign ministry issued a statement claiming the two leaders expressed willingness to establish formal relations as well as to “resolve the border issue between the two nations at an early date.”
The statement effectively told Thimphu to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing if it wanted an early resolution of issues related to the 470-kilometre, undemarcated border between Bhutan and Tibet.
The “offer” was perhaps loud and clear to Bhutan. A policy paper, “Security of Bhutan: Walking Between the Giants”, published in The Journal of Bhutan Studies in 2004, stated: “It became evident from the very first that China was more interested in developing direct relations with Bhutan than resolving border issues.”
It went on to cite the second round of talks over border issues in 1985, when “China talked of expanding contact, saying that it has diplomatic relations with all SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] states, but not with Bhutan”.
The author, Dorji Penjore, a researcher at the Centre for Bhutan Studies that was established in 1999 through an executive order, added that China was clearly seeking to target India. During the 11th round of talks held in Beijing in 1996, “China proposed to exchange an area of 495 square kilometres with an area of 269 square kilometres in northwest Bhutan”, which “would seriously undermine India’s security by shifting the Bhutan-China border to the south”, the author wrote.
China’s interest in establishing relations with Bhutan can be seen against the backdrop of Beijing’s “string of pearls” policy to diplomatically encircle India. Although India is the de facto leader of the SAARC, China has gained dominance in India’s neighbours, barring only Bhutan.
Therefore, New Delhi was concerned when the Chinese foreign ministry statement quoted Thinley as saying: “[Bhutan] is willing to establish formal diplomatic relations with China at an early date. ... Bhutan resolutely pursues the One China policy and has the strong desire to strengthen understanding and friendship with China.”
A month after the Wen-Thinley meeting, Bhutan showed interest in Chinese goods. In July, Bhutan Post Corporation procured Chinese buses – previously, Bhutanese government agencies would buy vehicles from India.
The following month, in August 2012, Fu Ying, the Vice Foreign Minister of China, visited Bhutan for the 20th round of border talks. She followed up on the Wen-Thinley meeting, making a similar pitch.
“We are willing to work with Bhutan toward early establishment of diplomatic relations,” she was quoted as saying. “The border dispute between the two countries does not cover a wide area.
“The two sides should speed up border talks in the spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation, with a view to arriving at a fair and reasonable and mutually acceptable solution. ... We are ready to encourage Chinese businesses to expand their exports to Bhutan and welcome more people-to-people exchanges and tourism, which will help increase the mutual knowledge and friendship between our two people.”
These developments raised eyebrows in India, the largest trade and development partner of Bhutan.
While Thinley’s office was quick to say that the Chinese foreign ministry’s statement “misreported” what the two leaders talked about in June 2012, New Delhi expressed discontent, though discreetly.
It was perhaps no coincidence that India’s ambassador to Bhutan, Pavan K. Varma, resigned from the Foreign Service four months later, after his request for an extension was rejected. Varma was widely admired in Bhutan.
To its dismay, Bhutan is increasingly realising that an independent foreign policy is not a luxury that a tiny nation can afford.
Worse, it might already be too late to make a “correction”, as China is not likely to let go of its strategic interests in Bhutan, now that Thimphu has raised Beijing’s hopes by making tacit overtures.