Full circle in five years

Anuraj Manibhandu and Saritdet Marukatat

Successive governments after the baht crisis in July 1997 have taken foreign policy full circle in their efforts to pull the country out of deep trouble in a world of cold competition.

FOREIGN POLICY After taking a wider international perspective under the previous government, Thailand has returned to a more nationalistic Asia-first focus on priorities in world affairs

Under three very different prime ministers, foreign policy has gone from being tied largely to neighbours including China, to being friendly to international society, only to return to today's more pro-Asian approach.

The eagerness to warm up to China eased from a high under Gen Chavalit Yongchaiyudh's government (Nov 1996-97) to a moderate position under that of his successor Chuan Leekpai (Nov 1997-Feb 2001), before peaking again under the Thaksin Shinawatra administration.

Relations with the United States have progressed the other way, from low to high to low, while ties with Europe have warmed and cooled, albeit in a less dramatic fashion.

The fall from "economic miracle" status which dented the country's political and diplomatic clout compelled the heads of government to adjust. The adjustments varied according to their different work experience, political beliefs, levels of exposure to international diplomacy, and diverse self-perceptions, as well as the circumstances of the day.

The focus of the Chavalit government on neighbours and China was traceable to the general's history as a career soldier who had to deal with aspiring hegemonists, dedicated nationalists, minorities and drug warlords on the country's borders. He did so in his characteristic "big brother" fashion that was not always welcome.

Surin Pitsuwan, right, then the foreign minister, meets North Korean counterpart Paek Nam Sun prior to a bilateral meeting two years ago. North Korea later made its first appearance at an Asean regional forum.

The general contended with the Vietnamese forces in western Cambodia in the 1980s, a dispute with Laotian forces at three villages in Phitsanulok province, and the Burmese minorities and drug armies who continue to test military commanders and the government today.

As army chief, Gen Chavalit also initiated links with China that led to deals on "friend-to-friend" terms for military hardware, and the first military assistance package from Beijing in 1996 worth US$3 million.

But it was the general's accommodation with the widely condemned top brass in Rangoon, dramatically shown in late 1988 when he repatriated, in cold blood, Burmese students who months earlier had sought shelter in this country, that stays etched on the record, marking him as a man who ranks interest above charity.

The Chuan government's more internationalist approach in part reflects what one analyst described as the "liberal democratic" beliefs of the prime minister and his Democrat Party which, by coincidence, matched those of the Clinton Administration in Washington.

But Mr Chuan was a trained lawyer, did not have the "big brother" character of his predecessor, and left the task of diplomacy to his foreign minister, Surin Pitsuwan, whose Western values did not endear him to conservatives brought up in the Asian way.

Mr Thaksin's assertiveness in diplomacy reflected an attitude different from that of Gen Chavalit, because it was civilian-based and essentially commerce-driven. His government's initiative for an Asian Co-operation Dialogue showed a tradesman's instinct for survival as it promoted alliance-building in a cut-throat business world.

Beyond the influence on government strategies of leaders' experience, ideals and character was the circumstance that challenged all three governments and shaped their calculations: the "ripple effect" of the economic crisis on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

"The crisis left everybody in Asean shell-shocked," said Thitinan Pongsudhirak, of the International Relations Department at Chulalongkorn University. Asean did not react collectively because key members were preoccupied with their own economic problems, he said.

Malaysia delayed participation in the tariff-free timetable under the Asean Free Trade Area (Afta) for the auto sector, hitting hard Thailand's hopes of becoming a regional hub. The Philippines and Indonesia contemplated similar protection of their rice and sugar.
Even affluent and organised Singapore fell into an economic slump, its finance sector badly torn.

Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi walks with friends and family as she visits the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon. Her release from house arrest was intended to ease pressure on the ruling junta.

As Singapore struggled to break free through bilateral free trade agreements outside the region, some Asean states tried to lure more foreign direct investment by pushing for the acceleration of tariff reductions under Afta.

In early 2000, Asean began to come to its senses and consider ways to avert a re-run of the crippling blows.

To this end, original Asean members, then attending the Asian Development Bank's annual meeting in Chiang Mai, agreed to engage in a series of currency swaps with China, Japan and South Korea.

Suthipand Chirathivat, the dean of the economic faculty at Chulalongkorn University, said the Chiang Mai Initiative, which he stresses is sound, became the catalyst of the Asean-Plus-Three process that was unveiled in Singapore at the end of the year.

But alas, as talks on the sidelines of a recent ADB meeting in Shanghai found, age-old wariness among neighbours has impeded progress on information sharing and monitoring plans that the swap schemes need in place to function effectively.

Asean-Plus-Three, meanwhile, is seen to be stuck on political rivalries among the three Northeast Asian powers. Kobsak Chutikul, the deputy chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, said there was a linear development of linkages between the Asean members and China. But the line had "not become a circle" because ill feelings persisted between China and Japan, Korea and China, and Japan and Korea.

That Asean has bid to bolster its position by forming a free-trade area with China in the next 10 years has triggered misgivings, as some Asean members continue to hold reservations about the intentions of the dragon, while others see it as preoccupied with the need to put its economic house in order.

As economics are hardly divisible from politics, many Asean members also cracked up politically in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, causing variously destabilising effects around the region.

The Suharto regime collapsed in Indonesia. Malaysia was divided by the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim, the country's deputy premier and finance minister. Governments in Thailand and the Philippines changed hands. Even one-party Laos came to be confronted with a student protest in late 2000.

To cope, the Chuan government chose to incline closer to the West, by showing likemindedness in defence of human rights and democracy, and thereby substantiate the argument that it deserved support in terms of aid and expertise.

"Asean had lost its attraction and there were universal values of democracy and human rights that we had to espouse," Mr Surin said.

Moreover, Asean, under urging from Malaysia, had antagonised the Western world by admitting Burma into the fold in July 1997, or the same month that the financial crisis struck.

The US, which had a strong anti-Rangoon lobby in the Republican Party, and many Europeans, thereafter denounced Asean as apologists for an international pariah that gagged a strong-willed but defenceless woman, as well as violated human rights and defied democratic processes.

The crescendo of sanctions that followed is history, and Rangoon's recent release from house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, of the National League for Democracy, shows that the junta wants to be relieved from the pressures they exert on the fragile economy .

The EU further reacted by blocking Burma's entry to institutionalised discussions as part of the Asean-EU dialogue. It took another three years to thaw before the 15 EU countries agreed to let Burma sit in a ministerial conference in Laos in December 2000.

A year after Burma's membership of Asean cast a pall on the group's relations with the West, Mr Surin launched his call for Asean to open up to neighbourly consultations on issues affecting the region as a whole.

His initiative for "flexible engagement", enunciated at the Asean foreign ministers' meeting in Manila in July 1998, did not go down well with old guards, notably in Indonesia, and Malaysia, or one-party regimes in the group, leaving the Philippines the only supporter.

But he believes he was vindicated over two years later, at a summit in Singapore in November 2000, when the 10 leaders held a closed door meeting on Burma.

The US, after weathering criticism for not contributing to the International Monetary Fund's US$17.2-billion rescue package for Thailand, became an outspoken supporter of the Chuan government.

While receiving Mr Chuan in March 1998, the then US President Bill Clinton said: "We obviously have been very concerned about the challenges facing the Thai economy but are very, very impressed with the leadership of this prime minister."

The EU was also "late to help", said Mr Suthipand, but it did come up with the Asem Trust Fund, launched at the Asia-Europe Meeting in London in April 1998, that was intended for financial restructuring and social safety nets. Asians had "not drawn much on the fund", he observed.

The EU, he added, continues to see Northeast Asia as more important than Southeast Asia. Besides China, considerable European investment is going to Korea.

In its bid to secure a place on the world map, the Chuan government was helped by and learned much from the successful campaign, from August 1998 to 1999, to put then deputy premier Supachai Panitchpakdi in the top slot at the World Trade Organisation.

The bid, which led to active personal lobbying by Mr Surin in many world capitals, turned up one disappointment, less than forthcoming support from the US for Mr Supachai's candidacy. But there was strong support from Australia, a staunch ally of Thailand and the US.

In what might be a classic case of neighbourly one-upmanship, New Zealander Mike Moore, who secured the first term as WTO chief due to end in August, partly accounted for Canberra's push for Mr Supachai.

Mr Kobsak, who, as director-general of the Foreign Ministry's Economic Affairs Department, was heavily involved in assisting the campaigning for Mr Supachai, said the triumph was "good for Thailand's stature".

Just over a year later, the Chuan government, in November 2000, took the country into a "partnership for co-operation" with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

On the economic front, said Chaiwat Khamchoo, dean of political science at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand diversified its markets in order to rely less on traditional buyers in the US, Japan and the EU. China became a new target for commerce.

"The change was driven by Thailand's economic conditions," Mr Chaiwat said. "Foreign policy is always a reflection of domestic need."
Apparently by reaction as well as intention, the foreign policy of Prime Minister Thaksin's government has turned away from the internationalist approach, and tried to project a pro-nationalist stance.

The initiative for an Asian Co-operative Dialogue is seen as commerce-driven diplomacy that tries to bolster Thailand's position to optimise the climate for advancing entrepreneurial interests.

While admirers appreciate the initiative's underlying goal of building an Asia for Asians, critics see a racist bent, and stress on cultural differences, as food for a "clash of civilisations" and return to the divisive "Asian values" debate.

Critics also question the sprawling footprint of the region contemplated, as it seems to spread from Bahrain along the Silk Road to Thailand and up to Northeast Asia.
In this connection, Mr Thaksin claimed, during a speech to Asia House in London on May 14, to have secured the support of all 10 Asean states, China, Japan, Korea, India and Bangladesh, to hold a meeting on the initiative in June this year.

Other critics question the eligibility of Thailand _ with its shaky medium stature in international politics, struggling economy, poor rating in transparency, and now limited press freedoms _ as a proponent of a venture that requires leadership by example.

But governments everywhere seek to leave their mark with initiatives of one kind or another and this administration's ACD does have a certain rationale.

Five years after the financial crisis, foreign policy makers have contributed to the push for Thailand's economic recovery by enhancing the country's place on the map, some times necessarily at the cost of losing friends.
Any new initiatives should ensure that past steps forward are not followed by too many steps backward.

 

- Back to top -
© The Post Publishing Public Co., Ltd. 2002
We welcome comments to Webmaster
Advertising enquiries to Internet Marketing