WOULD YOU LIKE TO DRIVE THIS? Why our trains are falling apart
Senior rail maintenance technicians say the rampant use of 'copy' parts will lead to more disasters
- Published: 25/10/2009 at 12:00 AM
- Newspaper section: News
Patching up emergency brakes with cheap copy parts, running infeasible repair schedules and borrowing parts from one train to keep another in service are all part of daily life for train maintenance workers on Thailand's troubled rail system.
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While a State Railway of Thailand (SRT) fact-finding panel was quick to find human error was the cause of the Oct 5 derailment at Khao Tao, Hua Hin, which left seven dead and 88 injured, it is the country's ageing train network that is drawing just as many questions and fuelling the powerful railway workers' union stoppage campaign.
Senior maintenance technicians with more than 20 years' experience claim the system is plagued by a shortage of proper spare parts. They said experienced technicians were trying to meet unrealistic demands to keep decrepit trains in service.
The SRT has 209 locomotives to pull passenger and cargo cars with three major suppliers; General Electric, Alsthom and Hitachi. The locomotives have a brake system linked to a driver alert system, or vigilance system, which employs what drivers call a dead man's brake. The system is designed to keep drivers alert _ they must push a button every two minutes otherwise the emergency brake will stop the train as a safety measure.
If the driver suffers a heart attack or passes out, as happened in the Khao Tao tragedy where the emergency brake did not engage, it can be a lifesaver for passengers.
Technicians said replacement parts for the brake system should be genuine, but they claim some parts used for repairs are cheaper locally-manufactured ones they described as ''copy parts''.
One of the technicians learned while participating in a 2004 SRT probe into problems with replacement distributor valves that they were using copy parts. He said the part was a crucial component of the brake system as it helped distribute air which is used to activate the brake after being compressed.
However, SRT engineers told the inquiry panel copy parts were often used as replacements for the originals, and no one was punished accountable.
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''What we learned later was that they often failed to function,'' the technician said. ''Their quality couldn't compare to the original ones.''
The technician said the use of copy parts across the entire maintenance system was common. The technician said original parts were more expensive.
Another technician agreed that only genuine parts should be used to do maintenance and repair work on the dead man's brakes. But as they do not have access to genuine parts, they are forced to strip parts from one train to ensure another is kept on the tracks.
Many of the copy parts are rubber rings which are less durable than the genuine parts, he said.
A document from the SRT's procurement unit dated Dec 2004, shows that 240 rings for the dead man's brake systems were ordered from a local firm at a cost of 57,000 baht.
One of the technicians also said their work had been compromised by SRT management pressuring them to get trains back in service as quickly as possible as there was a shortage of locomotives to meet the demands of the system.
Each day, about 150 locomotives are needed to run the service. But according to the most recent records, records show in 2007 there were 74 locomotives under repair with 138 ready for service.
This equated to about 65% of service availability. The technician said the more pressure that is placed on them to keep trains in service, the more maintenance work is hampered as they cannot properly complete repairs.
''We normally have a list of at least 12 items regarding safety to be checked before allowing the train to be in service, but I have to say that sometimes we can approve none of these, including the vigilance system,'' the source said.
''We don't have enough trains to service. So we have tried to keep the trains [we have] in service and safety issues have become a secondary priority as a result.''
He said the Khao Tao train tragedy highlighted the maintenance problems. He would not say whether the derailed train had gone through the 12 safety checks, but said the system clearly had a problem.
The driver of the train involved in the disaster, Roengsak Panthep, testified to the fact-finding panel, which signed off on its report four days after the accident, that the dead man's brake system was not working.
This was also confirmed by his technician Bowornrat Suatim.
It was found the train sped up beyond its 90 kilometres per hour limit and derailed.
The panel, however, did not comment on this in its conclusion, leading to accusations by the union of unfair treatment of workers. According to the check on his work schedule, Mr Roengsak had only one day off in the month of September.
The SRT has 3,600 staff working on trains, 780 short of the ideal manning levels, the union said. There are 1,143 technicians also short of adequate staff levels.
''We wonder whether it is fair to blame everything on us,'' the source said.
''We have seen the flaws in the work, but this is just beyond our capacity to fix them.
''It's about the organisation's policy making and management that needs serious consideration now.''
SRT management could not be contacted for comment.
About the author
- Writer: Piyaporn Wongruang
- Position: Reporter
