As the United States' presidential election kicks into higher gear with the upcoming nominations of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump as the Democratic and Republican party candidates vying for top office, Asian countries, and Asean in particular, are concerned about what will happen to outgoing President Barack Obama's "rebalance" (also known as the "pivot") strategy to Asia. The "rebalance" is likely to be a lasting legacy of President Obama's foreign policy accomplishments. It has provided Asian countries from Myanmar and Vietnam to the Philippines with a counterbalance to China's increasing regional footprints. But the future of the rebalance hangs in the balance.
In this context, the prospect of a Hillary Clinton victory appears more appealing than that of her Republican opponent. A Clinton presidency would likely maintain and broaden much of what is known as America's rebalance to Asia, as she was a principal architect of this geopolitical strategy while working as the Secretary of State in Mr Obama's first term. A Trump presidency, on the other hand, would throw America's role in Asia and elsewhere in the world up in the air, serving isolationist and xenophobic ends to no end. Yet it should not be dismissed off hand.
The US electorate is polarised and divided. Hillary Clinton is ahead on almost all counts but she is hounded by personal scandals and an apparent inability to win the hearts and minds of voters, notwithstanding the Democratic party machinery behind her. Asean and broader Asian countries must hope the US presidential result will augur well for Asia's regional stability but they also must be prepared for downside risks.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is associate professor and director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University..
Generally, America's foreign policy orientation is driven by a moving mixture of interests and values, depending on which countries and in what region Washington is dealing with. For an Asian regional framework that is based on Asean's architecture-building efforts, America's interests more than its values are at stake. But when it comes to individual Southeast Asian countries, both America's interests and values are in play.
For Southeast Asia vis-à-vis America, values matter less than interests, although in more democratic countries the margin between the two is less than that among the more authoritarian states where interests often trump values. The US, for example, touts itself as a bastion of democracy and human rights. Its democracy-promotion and human rights agenda are more salient in some regions than others. In Southeast Asia, these have been conspicuous, as evident in Myanmar and Thailand, among others. Even in top-down authoritarian communist-party ruled Vietnam and Laos, Washington does not feign ignorance to human rights abuses. How Washington perceives and is perceived by Southeast Asian countries in view of their domestic political dynamics are thus consequential to Southeast Asia-US relations.
Evidently, Southeast Asia harbours diverse regime types that span the spectrum from rule by a few to government by the majority. The region is akin to a global laboratory for the future of democracy and authoritarianism.
Since the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asian states have experienced mixed fortunes in spawning and sustaining democratisation. Indonesia and Myanmar, for example, have made spectacular democratic gains but with a corresponding reversal in Thailand and erosion in Malaysia.
These dynamics matter for America's bilateral relationships with Southeast Asian governments. The same goes for China. The more democratic states are more tuned in to America's regional and bilateral preferences, while the more authoritarian governments are more susceptible to China's influence. However, the correlation on the authoritarian side is less complete. For example, the democratic camp in Indonesia, the Philippines and Myanmar is more favourable towards America and generally less so towards China, while authoritarian Laos, coup-prone Thailand and Cambodia to a large extent are more cautious toward America in favour of China. But politburo-ruled Vietnam has moved relatively closer to Washington and away from Beijing, as can be seen in its membership in the US-driven Trans-Pacific Partnership and its watershed reception of President Obama's visit in May 2016 that ended the US arms embargo and fully normalised US-Vietnam relations.
In view of the global economic turbulence, including the aftermath of the United Kingdom's vote to "remain" or "leave" the European Union, Asean is a compelling region with a combined market of 632 million people and a collective economic base in excess of US$2.5 trillion (about 88 trillion baht), which is tantamount to being the 7th largest economy in the world. It has favourable demographic profiles, with relatively young populations. Four of the top-20 largest populated countries reside in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand).
The region offers upward growth trajectories in all countries -- ie, no economy in Southeast Asia faces the threat of GDP contraction. Even regional laggard Thailand is expanding at a 3% clip into the late 2010s. Global terrorism by way of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State has not made substantial inroads over the years, although the region is not immune.Subnational conflicts in Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand remain virulent and persistent but they have not engulfed the region into civil strife and communal turmoil like the Middle East and North Africa. Non-traditional security threats from natural and man-made disasters (eg, the haze) to human and drug trafficking and transnational crime have been destabilising and will need mitigation. Yet they have thus far been manageable.
Asean appears to be most at risk from major-power manoeuvres, particularly China's assertiveness in the South China Sea and the Mekong sub-region to a lesser extent. As other major powers engage and enter deeper into the fray, Asean risks being the arena of Asia's great-power conflicts, overwhelmed and ineffective in response.
The domestic political changes and dynamics in Southeast Asian states compound and complicate Asean's challenges and ability to remain front and central in order-creation and regional/architecture-building efforts.
Refashioned under President Obama's rebalance strategy, America's role in Asia has been instrumental for regional security and stability. Asean and most other Asian countries would like to see the rebalance continue under a new US administration in a way that does not lead to great-power conflict but instead enables Asean to maintain its autonomy, economic development, and regional peace and stability.
Meanwhile, America's values should be upheld and promoted for Southeast Asian states and societies but in tailored ways that expand domestic capacities and do not compromise America's promotion of Asean as the central driving force for rules-based Asean-centred regionalism. Accordingly, a Hillary Clinton presidency is preferred in broader Asia, although Asean and other Asian countries must be able to handle and cope with Mr Trump potentially rising to the top by insisting that the logic of a "rebalance" and contours be maintained as much as possible.