So far in the 21st century, the main narrative of Thai politics has centred on a colour-coded class divide, characterised by an urban-rural chasm along the lines of elites versus the masses.
Recent voter preferences from the military government's successful charter referendum have thrown a spanner into this narrative, providing a window for Thailand to move on if it can capitalise on the referendum's implications without disastrous military missteps along the way.
Until recently, the political forces aligned with self-exiled and ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his clan have invariably triumphed at the polling booth. Elections in 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2011 all produced convincing victories for the Thaksin camp, even while his parties were dissolved by the judiciary twice in 2007 and 2008 and his associated governments overthrown by the military in 2006 and 2014, the latter administration spearheaded by his younger sister Yingluck Shinawatra. Thaksin's political juggernaut would also have won elections in 2006 and 2014 had they not been nullified by the courts. When Thailand had its first-ever constitutional plebiscite in August 2007, Thaksin told his supporters to stand down without opposition to speed up the subsequent election. The result was a 57% voter turnout and as high a percentage voting in favour of the earlier referendum.
Thailand's second-ever referendum last month, however, was the first time this century that Thaksin and his party machine lost a vote. From self-exile, he had staked a position against the military-inspired charter that would set up an appointed Senate under tutelage of the National Council for Peace and Order, handing substantial political power to junta-aligned forces. At home, the leaders of the "red shirts" who had voted for Thaksin's parties mobilised against the military's conservative law of the land. Even a major section of the opposing Democrat Party, which had helped bring down Thaksin's previous governments, stood against the draft constitution.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is associate professor and director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.
Yet it passed. Although the campaign that led to it was not free and fair, when anti-charter protests were quashed and critics silenced or arrested, the vote was clean and its results were clear enough. Social media platforms were used, and anti-charter sentiments, such as the "vote no" movement, were mobilised to reject the draft. Yet on a 59% turnout from roughly 50 million eligible voters, popular support for the military's constitution stood at 61%. Thai voters knew enough what they got themselves into. It was not a vote about constitutional jargon and legal details but a referendum on Thailand's latest coup and the junta's performance in view of the prevailing circumstances.
It used to be that Thaksin's opponents would go into self-denial when his parties won elections. Their excuses ranged from voter stupidity, alleged vote-buying, Thaksin's intoxicating populist policies, and so forth. The Thaksin side, at that time, kept harping on about elections and voter choice as the hallmarks of a popular mandate and democracy.
This time, it has gone the other way. The Thaksin opponents are reveling, almost gloating, in what they see as vindication and triumph when an anti-Thaksin military regime was able to craft a pro-military charter in favour of authoritarian rule at the expense of democratic development. Suddenly, anti-military and pro-democracy advocates suggest that voters were ignorant and did not know what they were voting for, that the pre-referendum campaign was crooked. Some even manipulate the numbers just as Thaksin's opponents did when his parties kept winning. On the latest referendum result, for example, it has been suggested that the "yes" vote represents only 38% of the electorate by counting the "no" votes together with those who stayed at home.
On such logic, President Barack Obama in 2012 would only have won 28% of the popular vote, not 51%, if those who opted for Mitt Romney were counted together with those who stayed home while turnout was 57.5%. For President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, despite trouncing rivals by large margins, his popular vote would have been 30% of the electorate if voters for all other candidates and those who stayed away from the polling booth were lumped together. For Brexit (the United Kingdom's recent referendum to leave the European Union), even though the "leave" side won by just 51.9% on 72.2% turnout from 33.6 eligible voters, the leave side would represent only 37% of the entire electorate. Few can win an election if losing votes are added together with the no-shows.
Thailand's recent referendum result should be troubling for democrats around the world but it has to be respected and counted on a longer-term horizon. For now, the constitutional verdict suggests the Thai people are fed up with endless street protests and want some order and stability even at the expense of putting up with indefinitely military influence over Thai politics. Moreover, many are tired of the corruption and graft among elected representatives over the years. This is not to say that generals are not prone to graft or cannot be corrupted. But over the past 16 years, elected politicians have mostly occupied the seats of power and levers of policymaking, not the top brass.
Equally important, many Thaksin supporters in the countryside may have been softened and co-opted by the military government's own brand of populism, including rural subsidies, cheap agricultural loans, and a rudimentary old-age pension system, among other measures. Voting for the charter means there will be a general election late next year or in early 2018 when the Thai electorate can reassess and have a broader say. In addition, perhaps many Thais subconsciously know that the ongoing royal transition is so sensitive and delicate that a military handling is inevitable. Politicians and political groups have despised the military and opposed its constitution but none of them wants to be in power at this time. The junta also has largely stayed away from the scale and scope of corruption and violent suppression carried out by previous military dictatorships.
All of this could change in the medium term if the ruling generals become abusive of power and engage in graft. But for now, Thailand has a chance to move beyond the Thaksin era and to bridge the fault lines that have divided Thai society like never before. It might not be the way many democrats would like to see it but Thai voters have indicated otherwise for the time being. Pro-democracy forces should not reject voter preferences, not then when the Thaksin side was on top and not now when his opponents have prevailed.