A lack of respectability and legitimacy in leadership will be tough challenges for any future conservative or liberal government to overcome as and when they come into power.
The military regime has been vocal about not wanting to lose the impetus of its putsch, but its tendency to resort to authoritarianism instead of fostering a shared future and fair rules will see Thailand prolong its run of lost decades.
Controversies about amendments to the national health security bill and the Thai-Chinese train project offer a glimpse into the type of legacy the junta will leave.
It is no exaggeration to say there is widespread agreement that both projects are necessary. Of course, there are those who oppose the ideas no matter what but there are definitely more who are willing to listen.
Atiya Achakulwisut is Contributing Editor, Bangkok Post.
The messy situation regarding both projects is a tell-tale sign that despite its near hegemonic control over state power and mechanisms, the junta has not yet established legitimate leadership.
The national health security bill, which paved the way for the highly popular universal healthcare coverage, also known as a 30-baht scheme, is emblematic of the country's political conflicts.
This is not just because it was launched a decade ago by former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who became a polarising figure after he tried to establish a hegemonic executive branch that was beyond the power of democratic institutions.
It's also because some upper-class elites, technocrats and medical professionals are aghast at the scheme's principle of giving free and equal access to health and hospital care to more than 40 million people -- the majority of the population.
Not only do they believe this freebie system has overwhelmed the country's hospital resources and medical personnel but they are also confident that at a cost of 170 billion baht a year and rising, as the population ages, the scheme is not financially sustainable.
The poor, however, love the scheme and would not like to see it modified by the draft law, which includes a clause stipulating the possibility of co-payments instead of it being free.
Also overlaid in this policy mix are the diverse interests of groups who do not feel an affinity for either Thaksin or the military or what they stand for. There are people who may like Thaksin but oppose the universal healthcare scheme. Equally, there are those who hate the former PM but approve of his policy.
If the junta were aware of the complex views on the universal healthcare scheme, which are inherently tied to the entrenched political conflicts and social rifts gripping the country, it could suggest a need to change the healthcare law in order to cultivate a new agreement -- a new political deal, so to speak, in which people from all sides contribute to improving the welfare scheme.
As it turns out, the junta was too wrapped up in its own conservative agenda and chose to carry out the amendments in secrecy. That is why all four public hearings to gauge opinions from society ended up failing, with participants either protesting against the events or walking out altogether.
And it's not clear how the proposed amendment will be regarded by the National Legislative Assembly after such a strong boycott. If the amendment is passed into law, how will the next government tackle the deep resentment?
The same problem of leadership without authority is evident in the Thai-Chinese train project, which has subjected the government to heavy criticism for allegedly giving too many benefits to Beijing while failing to ensure the maximum advantages to our own country.
Again, a lack of transparency, which should be a hallmark of the country's politics, administration and development policies no matter which side becomes government, has unsettled the project before it has even started.
Instead of giving confidence to the public with information about the train project -- why it is worth the hefty price tag of almost 180 billion baht and why China should be the best partner deserving of its incentives, the government has chosen to keep many details about the partnership secret.
Using the authoritarian Section 44 as a shortcut to enable the project to get off the ground not only makes it more controversial but will sabotage the junta's own legitimacy, or lack of it, in the future.
The military regime is here today because it successfully destroyed the moral leadership of career politicians and the value of democracy. Without the ability to galvanise a new working order after three years, the future looks bleak.