The 2017 constitution requires police reform within a year. With such a short time-frame, those working on the reform should take a look at recommendations made by the 2006-2007 Police Reform Committee (PRC) which are noteworthy, compared to the present version that suggests weak ideas including transferring the RTP to the Ministry of Justice, and blanket pay rises for all grades.
According to Transparency International, the RTP is one of the least trusted institutions of the Thai state. Academic research by the RTP itself reveals it is permeated by patronage networks, permitting both formal abuses of power and corrupt informal influence, often at the beck and call of various godfathers.
As Pol Gen Vasit Dejkunjorn, PRC chairman, noted when reporting on the RTP's state, "The Royal Thai Police is an inherited product of the country's age-old feudalist governing system. It is strongly centralised, with a powerful commissioner-general at the top reporting directly to the prime minister. Originally connected with the Royal Thai Army, the RTP is vaguely regarded as 'the fourth branch of the armed forces'." As such, the RTP is a feudal empire in its own right, "constantly criticised for negligence, bias, abuse of power and brutality".
The Vasit Committee was of its time, commissioned by Gen Surayud Chulanont, and Mr Vasit had been chief of the Royal Court Police for several years. However, if Thailand is ever to truly reconcile, no administration can ignore the reform attempts of yesteryear and re-invent the wheel, and the previous PRC report was praised both nationally and internationally. Further, as shown by police reform in other countries, a lack of political continuity is the worst enemy of substantive reform.
The PRC arose as the result of a coup. However, it was reasonably legitimate. There were, and still are, evident interconnections between the police and politics, an agreement by the RTP itself to undertake reform, and widespread public distrust of the RTP. In addition, there was a high level of expertise within the PRC and a truly national consultation process. Therefore, the recommendations of the PRC report were of high quality. Moreover, Mr Vasit himself was a relative outsider and an admired police officer.
The 2007 PRC recommendations were presented in two stages. Stage one involved decentralising the RTP to metropolitan, provincial, and other police bureaus, including devolving the budgets, personnel administration, transfers and promotions systems. Public participation was to be enhanced through police policy committees, specialised multi-stakeholder task forces governing the development of policy in areas such as drugs enforcement or drink driving in a way that protects against political involvement. In addition, the report called for an Independent Committee of Complaints (ICC) rather than an ombudsman, to provide some form of charter for public oversight of police performance, instead of the present committee for complaints, which is part of the National Police Authority.
The RTP generally supports these measures as procedures flagged through RTP headquarters involve laborious and lengthy paperwork. The RTP is itself active in lobbying for reform in areas such as drugs policy, and a well-funded ICC would be rapid and could protect officers from unjust accusations.
As a form of checks and balance to reduce the influence of station chiefs, the PRC also envisaged moving all investigative procedures to an elite central investigative directorate staffed by re-trained detectives and interrogators. This would reduce the risk of the existing police culture harming investigations through quasi-legal or illegal interrogation methods such as torture.
As part of the second stage, non-police functions were to be transferred to other state agencies. In this regard, the present recommendation to move the RTP from under the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of Justice is sensible. However, this means little unless reform involves instituting an independent prosecution service, as in the UK's Crown Prosecution Service, another PRC recommendation.
Another 2007 recommendation was reorganising stations to develop autonomous, community-oriented policing. To increase civilian oversight, elected Police and Crime Commissioners could be introduced for police areas, as in the UK's Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. These positions were introduced to prioritise local public requirements for police priorities, via the responsibility to produce transparent "police and crime plans", including allocation of budgets. Such a move in Thailand may offset criticism of local police oversight boards established under the 2004 Police Act, ie, their manipulation by station chiefs to build networks and obtain financial contributions.
The 2007 PRC also recommended developing police recruitment, education, and training. This requires substantial investment in police cadets nationally, including cross-training with forces in more developed countries and inviting trainers from other countries, as in the FBI's present work training officers in countering human trafficking. The current committee's recommendation for improvements in basic salary was also made in the 2007 report.
However, without professionalising the RTP, including the use of digital cameras for arrests and recognition of achievements linked to transparent career progression which is subject to public scrutiny via transparency websites, as recommended by Transparency International, little concrete progress will occur.
To address the fact that the RTP evolved out of the Royal Thai Army and is still essentially a paramilitary force, the 2007 PRC report recommended eliminating military ranks for non-commissioned officers, fundamental for civilianising the force. Also essential is a flattening of the police hierarchy, as undertaken in the reform of the New Zealand police, thereby dismantling the quasi-imperial nature of the RTP.
Long term, holistic "joined up" police reform would be achieved by establishing an Office for Police Reform, responsible to a more progressive and less abusive National Police Commission. Given the available timeframe, the regime would be wise to enact these more comprehensive recommendations rather than avoid its responsibilities.
John Draper is a member of the Project for a Social Democracy and a director of the Social Survey Centre at the College of Local Administration (COLA), Khon Kaen University. Peerasit Kamnuansilpa is a founder and former dean of the College of Local Administration, Khon Kaen University.