If three Asean members -- Indonesia, Myanmar and the Philippines -- have led the way in shedding their authoritarian past, three others -- Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia --have gone the other way. After 50 years of ups and downs in domestic politics and governance, Asean has seen a resurgence of authoritarian practices. How this trend is manifested, and whether it intensifies or reverts to more democratic characteristics, will determine how Asean's regionalism takes shape over the next few decades.
Evidently, the three countries on the debit side of Asean's democracy ledger are Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia. While Thailand's three core institutions had long been the military, monarchy and bureaucracy, institutional reforms under the popular reform-oriented 1997 constitution established a clutch of democratic institutions, such as an election commission, an anti-corruption agency, and a constitutional court. Emulated by Indonesia at the time, these bodies brought Thailand to the cusp of democratic consolidation. But they later ran up against Thaksin Shinawatra and his political party machine.
A telecommunications tycoon, Mr Thaksin built the most formidable political party in Thailand, named Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais), which together with its two offspring have won all Thai elections since 2001. But Mr Thaksin's election victories were at the expense of the nascent democratic institutions. He soon penetrated and captured the election and anti-corruption commissions, which leaned to his side. The Constitutional Court controversially acquitted him even though he hid his unreported wealth under the names of his household staff.
Mr Thaksin's conflicts of interest and abuse of power paved the way for two coups in 2006 and 2014. But the military leaders who took over turned back the democratisation clock by weakening democratic institutions and returning to the military-monarchy symbiotic relationship that was borne out of Cold War exigencies to fight communism, complemented by a bureaucracy that did the handiwork to uphold a stable and successful political order in the latter half of last century.
This traditional order was subsumed under the immense moral authority and aura of King Bhumibol Adulyadej who reigned for seven decades before passing away on Oct 13, 2016. Thailand's conundrum after the royal succession that saw King Maha Vajiralongkorn ascend the throne is to come up with a new consensus and understanding that reconciles democracy and monarchy in a workable moving mix.
This means a constitutionalised monarchy and accountable and effective democratic institutions that can keep both corruption by elected politicians and putsches by self-appointed generals at bay while meeting popular demands and grievances. It is a tall order for Thailand. Failure may make it a basket-case country that had immense potential but squandered it all due to internal squabbles, whereas relative success at compromise and mutual accommodation will mean Thailand can again be a bright star among developing democracies and a leader of Asean.
Malaysia has been beset with similar personalisation of politics at the expense of democratic institutionalisation and the rule of law. Even though he had ballot-box legitimacy from one-dominant-party rule under United Malays National Organisation (Unmo), former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad governed in an authoritarian fashion that subverted accountability-promoting institutions like the judiciary and marginalised opposition and dissident voices. The fabric of democracy has further corroded under Prime Minister Najib Razak, who has been accused of corruption and abuse of power. Although Mr Najib has proved resilient, Umno's dominance and longevity cannot be taken for granted in view of the electoral gains by opposing parties. Keeping its growth story on track while satisfying the electorate and maintaining workable ethnic relations with the significant and more electorally empowered Chinese population is the tricky challenge for Malaysia going forward.
Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia has harassed and harangued opposition figures in a similar fashion, intent on passing the reins of his Cambodian People's Party (CPP) to one of his sons. The opposing Cambodian National Rescue Party has gained electoral ground and could edge out the CPP in the 2018 general election. Cambodia's national politics are likely to be nasty and polarised for the foreseeable future as Hun Sen's reign fades while he refuses to go away. As with Myanmar and Thailand, Cambodia will need a compromise between government and opposition, perhaps facilitated by a popular and likeable but politically weak monarch in King Sihamoni.
Apart from authoritarian resurgence in Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia and democratic transitions in Indonesia, Myanmar and the Philippines, the other four Asean regimes matter just as much. While Brunei is a tiny sultanate, Laos and Vietnam are anomalous regimes still under communist party rule. At best, they can be like China by delivering growth and standards of living while maintaining authoritarian control. But they will have to be more repressive along the way. Democratisation as we know it is nowhere to be seen in these three authoritarian holdouts.
Singapore may resemble the democratic median in Southeast Asia's neighbourhood. It features more than 50 years of ruling government under the People's Action Party (PAP) and one family dynasty, elected but somewhat authoritarian. Yet the island state passes for a democracy with electoral legitimacy. In the 2015 general election, the PAP regained its lost ground from opposition parties. Notwithstanding their detractors, Singaporean leaders keep a hold on power because they are responsive and accountable, with integrity in a merit-driven society. Despite recent tensions in the ruling family after patriarch Lee Kuan Yew's passing, Singapore's democratic institutions are sufficiently embedded to underpin a workable transition into the era after the Lee's dominance.
That may be the future of democratisation in Southeast Asia. Leaders can rule the way they like -- in shades of authoritarianism or democracy -- as long as their people find enough reasons to put up with them. It is ultimately about the people, as regional regimes have found -- and will find out.
The penultimate lesson from Asean's experiences in domestic political interplay and governance may be that established regimes that are unwilling to adjust and adapt under prevailing winds of newer demands and grievances, partly fuelled by technology and changing international expectations, are bound to face more tension and potential turmoil. At the same time, economic development and rising income in Asean countries do not necessarily lead to demands for democratisation. In fact, the middle classes in Asean countries have not been the catalyst for deeper and wider democratisation as one might expect. Perhaps it all boils down to whether and how long-established incumbent regimes deal with popular demands and expectations.
In the case of Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia, entrenched regimes that go back several decades have been intent on hunkering down for the long haul in the face of rising tides of dissent and opposition. On the other hand, when they saw the writing on the wall, ruling elites in Indonesia, Myanmar and the Philippines found ways to release political pressure through democratic means and civil society participation, with warts and all. Brunei, Laos and Vietnam have remained autocratic through absolute monarchy and communist-party rule but economic development and measured repression have kept incumbent regimes in place. As long as the citizenries of these three countries continue to be satisfied with their livelihoods, these three regimes may endure indefinitely. Amid these regimes is Singapore, where its one-party ruling elites have been capable, proactive and responsive.
In turn, domestic politics in Asean countries impinges on regional relations. The more democratic Asean becomes, the more it will be able to promote relations with Western countries. The more authoritarian the 10-member grouping becomes, the more they will likely turn to like-minded major powers, particularly China. This trend was on display with coup-prone Thailand in the first two decades of the 21st century and with the Philippines under Mr Duterte. At the same time, Asean governments are under growing pressure to decentralise and give electoral voice to lower rungs of societies as their incomes and standards of living rise.
Asean has been a mixed creature of politics and governance but this topsy-turvy mix of democracy and authoritarianism is likely to persist indefinitely. It is unlikely that Asean will uniformly democratise with rising income and development as much as Southeast Asia's regional organisation is unlikely to all turn out to be autocratic. Being a mixed bag has long been an Asean trademark. And so it goes with domestic politics and governance within and across Asean societies.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is associate professor and director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. The first instalment of this two-part article appeared in yesterday's edition.