Three yearsdownthe road, Thailand is at a crossroads

LET IT BE

Tomorrow marks the third anniversary of the Sept 19, 2006 coup d'etat that overthrew the government of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

The military coup sent Thailand back in time by tearing up the so-called people's constitution of 1997 and into another round of vicious confrontation that existed since the kingdom changed from absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy in 1932.

After the revolution, power grabbing between various political groups became the norm in Thai politics. Alliances between the ever-influential military, businessmen, aristocrats and politicians shifted and changed in accordance with the ambitions of personalities at each period of time. The people at the grassroots were left on the sidelines to watch the fait accompli changing of the guard of their political masters.

Thai governments swung between democratically elected regimes, no matter how imperfect, and dictatorial ones, which started off trying to be perfect but ended up as corrupt as or even more so than the government they had ousted.

Political parties were just convenient vehicles to power and, with the exception of the Democrat Party, most became dormant after a period in power. In the 77 years of Thai democracy there were only two popular uprisings that brought change and short-lived democratic governments - in October 1973 and May 1992. The people spoke. But the structure of power has never actually changed.

Another thing worth noting is that once the personalities in power lost the political struggle that ended with a coup, they rarely were able to return. Most accepted their fate and faded away quietly. This is due to the fact that past Thai premiers derived their power from military positions they had held before or the authority vested in the office. Losing the position meant losing the power to dictate and hence the means for a comeback.

To cling to power, many had to hold on to their army commander post as well as political office, a practice that ended only recently by a prohibition written into the constitution.

An exception again, is the Democrat Party, as they could manipulate the twists and turns, allying with the elite of the Establishment - represented in the bureaucracy of ministries, state enterprises, public organisations, large companies, and financial institutions - and thus becoming the only political party to send four of its leaders to the premiership, including the current Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, and in the 1990s, twice brought Mr Chuan Leekpai to the top job. But the coup of Sept 19, 2006 and subsequent events demonstrated that the norm may be changing.

First, the fugitive Thaksin remains a threat to the new regime three years after being overthrown. His "fighter" attitude is one factor, but it is also because Thaksin's base of power is like no other.

He did not obtain his influence from being in the Establishment or through collusion with it, even though he began by amassing his immense wealth through mobile telephone and satellite government concessions.

His business is modern, the operational model new. Through the stock market, he could raise funds at a larger and faster rate than any other business people.

And it was Thaksin's management skills both in business and politics that allowed him to build an organisation with a life of its own.

The combination of wealth and power furthered his clout within the government bureaucratic structure, many members of which continue to support him till now, despite attempts by the coup leaders and present government to dismantle his extensive network.

Second, as the threat of communism receded during the last two decades, democracy began to flourish.

Public consciousness in Thailand increased over time and the so-called grassroots demanded more participation. They wanted to become stakeholders, not to be ignored. Democracy also entailed economic opportunities.

Thaksin played to the tune of the times perfectly. His Thai Rak Thai Party was able to effectively address the complex political and economic issues of the country. Its populist agenda solidified support among the poor and less opportune. For them, Thaksin offered hope and an alternative.

Thaksin's success also reflected the third factor of change, that is the failure of Thai bureaucracy in addressing the people's demands. Its archaic attitude and corrupt structure alienated the general population.

The system was deemed a "double standard" and tilted in favour of the privileged. Bureaucrats became complacent. The system also suffered from a "brain drain" syndrome in which the most effective technocrats left the public sector to join private companies for higher pay. At least 80% of the annual expenditure budget went to overhead costs: the remaining 20% investment budget was spread too thinly around the country. Inefficiency together with political trade-offs caused a waste in public money on a massive scale.

With budgetary and administrative innovations, Thaksin drove the bureaucracy to work, with budgets to spend in addressing the immediate needs of ordinary Thais. His slick marketing and public relations programmes reinforced his strong image and "can-do" attitude. This was in contrast with the coup-installed interim government of Gen Surayud Chulanont, who along with top-notch, big-name technocrats, was caught bewildered and stumbling.

These are the reasons why Thaksin has not been eliminated and made to fade out as easily as other former leaders. The ease of communications through modern technology also provides open channels for Thaksin to argue his case and for his supporters to express their dissent - channels that did not exist in the past. Thus it is futile for PM Office's Minister Sathit Wongnongtoey to attempt to clamp down on anti-government rhetoric.

Mr Sathit must learn to understand that comparing programmes introduced by Thaksin and what is being implemented by the Democrats and the Thai bureaucracy will only reinforce the bias.

Of course, Thaksin has his faults, and he is now facing the consequences of the abuses of power he committed. Political pundits agree that even though he may appear to be on the offensive, it will be difficult for him to actually return to power - let alone come back home - considering the numerous political enemies he has made.

But at the same time, the regimes that have replaced him, both the interim unelected one of Gen Surayud and the present Democrat-led coalition, have been unable to beat Thaksin in winning over the general population, as they face questions of democratic legitimacy, of capability in dealing with the economic crisis, and of competence in running the government - as reflected in the recent, and still pending, issue of the selection of the new police chief.

Three years after the last coup which upset the balance, Thailand is again at a crossroads, with choices that could lead to a dead end.

Suranand Vejjajiva served in the Thaksin Shinawatra cabinet and is now a political analyst.

Relate Search: Thaksin Shinawatra, Thai politics, fait accompli, Democrat Party