A bloc's top-down and bottom-up in contestation

ASEAN

As the Cold War waned more than 20 years ago, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was said to be at a crossroads. Its raison d'etre as a regional vehicle to contain intramural rifts and thwart Communist expansionism was in search of a new impetus. Economic dynamism and cultural self-confidence carried it through the ensuing decade, underpinned by impressive GDP growth rates and the so-called Asian values exuberance.

No horsing around: In this picture taken yesterday, soldiers speak to a Thai boy and man selling horse rides along the beach lining the hotels where the Asean Summit will be held in Cha-am. Security has been tightened, with 18,000 troops deployed to prevent trouble.

The decade from 1987 also witnessed Asean taking centrestage in a dazzling array of regional architecture frameworks for economic and security cooperation, from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Asean Free Trade Area to the Asean Regional Forum and the Asia-Europe Meetings.

The 1997-98 economic crisis derailed Asean's hitherto momentum, further diverted by the US-led global war on terror after September 2001.

It has taken Asean a decade after its wrenching economic crisis to regain its footing. In its resurgence, Asean has come up with newfound regional cooperation directions in the Asean Plus Three, the East Asia Summit and inchoate aspirations to build an East Asian Community. By all accounts, the thrust of Asean's new horizon now hinges on the Asean Charter.

Indeed, the Charter has been set up as a threshold to make or break Asean's credibility and role in the broader international arena. If it falls short, Asean's relevance and credibility will be diminished, marginalising its role as other regional vehicles have sprung up to eclipse the 10-member grouping.

The genesis of the Asean Charter lies in the imperative of direction, momentum and relevance in the context of a fast-changing international environment. Globalisation and democratisation along with international norms on human rights and civil liberties prompted eminent Asean peddlers to bite the bullet by codifying Asean's ways of diplomacy and regional relations into hard rules. The flowery and promising language of the Charter is premised first and foremost on Asean's inexorable development into a democratising regional entity. It was no longer to be an informal consensus-seeking regional organisation based on the Asean way of non-interference in internal affairs of other members, but a fully-fledged, multi-faceted comprehensive community. It is supposed to manifest in an Asean community in six years on political-security, economic and socio-cultural foundations.

But the Charter has made Asean stuck at yet another crossroads. Its focus on human rights and fundamental freedoms was a bet that has not paid off. It gained international legitimacy but is beset by gross violations among member countries, most conspicuously Burma.

The Asean Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights will have its work cut out as soon as it is formally launched.

Moreover, Asean's focus on socio-cultural promotion and the attendant buzzwords of caring and sharing brought Asean governments face-to-face with their peoples, as represented by Asean Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), in the 14th summit last February. The civil society interface with Asean leaders was designed as a bang to Asean's new directions, but ended up a whimper amidst controversy and acrimony.

Divided between relatively democratic and blatantly authoritarian regimes, Asean leaders from Cambodia and Burma objected to CSO representatives from their countries. A compromise was found whereby the Thai hosts met separately with the barred CSO activists, but the bad taste and ill will had set in. Even for a mere 15-minute meeting that excluded his country's representative, a livid Asean leader could barely contain his disgust at having to be in the same room with the other Asean CSOs.

Despite Vietnam's stated indication at the February interface to regularise the leaders-CSO consultations at subsequent summits, Laos has unsurprisingly suggested that top-level meetings with Asean CSOs should now be optional. It would be equally unsurprising if Laos was put up to this by Burma and Cambodia . Such is Asean's division and dysfunction. Brunei truly does not matter much, whereas like-minded Burma, Cambodia and Laos want the legitimacy and relevance of the Charter without accompanying reforms and adjustments.

Vietnam's turn as Asean chair next year will have much to say about its regime's political liberalisation in accordance with the Charter.

The Charter faces dim prospects on the immediate horizon because Brunei and Cambodia will assume the chair after Vietnam. It is an alphabetic mishap for the Charter to undergo three successive chairs not so keen on human rights and democracy. By the time Indonesia assumes the chair in 2013, the Charter is likely to require a major overhaul. It will be 2015-18, starting with Malaysia, before the next round of chairs is taken up by relatively democratic states. The lofty goal of an Asean Community by 2015 appears unreachable without a revised timetable, unless Asean members intend to put up a quarter-baked facade of integration.

Contrary to the prevailing winds several years ago, the timing of Thailand as chair and host for an unprecedented 18-month span, covering two Asean summits, an assortment of related summits and the initial implementation of the Charter, has not fared well.

Thailand s domestic political maelstrom has constrained its role in the region and beyond. Bangkok will want this summit to come to pass smoothly to delete the bad memories of the fiasco in Pattaya in April, when the 4th East Asia Summit was cancelled due to domestic turmoil. The setback to the EAS is palpable. It has required two years to hold a summit which is supposed to be annual. As an erstwhile top-down intergovernmental organisation, driven by policymaking elites and bureaucrats, Asean is groping for relevance and grappling with its intended role in the world.

It should focus on functional areas of cooperation that sound less grandiose but produce more results, such as education and tourism, even disaster relief.

Unlike its Latin American, African and European peers, Asean is an unnatural creature, sewn together by interests and expediencies rather than congenitally common identity and values.

The Asean Charter provides space for such identity and values to be cultivated and promoted in a bottom-up process via the third-track of people-to-people enmeshment.

Top-down leaderships, governments and bureaucrats will have to bear this in mind if they really want to come up with a regional community of sorts that is a function of the Charter and a way forward for Southeast Asia in the early 21st century.

The writer is Director of Chulalongkorn University's Institute of Security and International Studies, who moderated the civil society dialogue with Asean leaders in February.

Relate Search: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Asean Free Trade Area, Asean Regional Forum, Asia-Europe Meetings