I was in China last week, and one of the most talked-about issues in the country is the ailing relationship between China and Japan.
Chinese nationalists have for over a week now staged nationwide demonstrations against Japan which turned violent in some cities. The two countries are locked in a decades-old conflict over the ownership of a group of islets in the East China Sea, called in Chinese Diaoyu and Japanese Senkaku.
Bilateral ties have been sliding fast since their diplomatic normalisation in 1972. On the surface, the dispute seems to concentrate on territorial claims over the troubled islands. But the real cause lies in the Sino-Japanese competition for leadership in the wider Asian region.
Putting aside historical baggage and the sovereignty factor that has soured relations, one can see that an attempt to defrost the icy relationship has been actively promoted at the non-governmental level. In July this year, Japan hosted the eighth Beijing-Tokyo Forum _ a second-track diplomacy venue where influential figures in the political arena, the media, and in business and culture came together to find ways to improve Sino-Japanese ties.
The annual event, jointly organised by the China Daily, Peking University and Japanese think-tank Genron NPO, moved to Tokyo this year _ its first-ever meeting was held in China in 2005. With the theme Future-Oriented China-Japan relations in a Global Perspective, the forum is open to ideas and proposals on removing the obstacles in bilateral relations. This year, the gathering was more significant, because China and Japan are marking the 40th anniversary of the normalisation of diplomatic relations. Both sides believe mutual trust and benefits are key elements to the development of Sino-Japanese relations.
Over the past years, the China-Japan relationship has become increasingly significant to peace and prosperity in Asia. Asia has much to grapple with, ranging from the political uncertainty in North Korea, an economic crisis, rising debt levels, surging interest rates, poverty, natural disasters and the risk of transnational diseases. It is therefore unfortunate that Chinese and Japanese leaders are unable to sit in a room together to chew things over.
Statistically, in 1980, 78% of Japanese people had a positive attitude toward China, but the rate has dropped to only 32%. In China, only 15% of the population now feel positively toward Japan. The shocking figures represent an urgent need for the two countries to come to terms with their enmity in order to pursue peaceful development.
While much resentment is mutually felt between Chinese and Japanese leaders, the Beijing-Tokyo Forum has re-emerged as a symbol of the common aspirations among the two countries' peoples. More than 90 officials and scholars from China and Japan who participated in the event agreed that direct exchanges at the public level are essential and will serve as a foundation to rebuild trust, particularly during this critical time in their relations.
They were cautioned of the possibility that frosty political ties might hamper the two countries' vibrant economic activities. One of the main recommendations was to take advantage of the cultural dimension in pushing bilateral relations forward. Indeed, cultural contact between the two peoples has long been an important element of Sino-Japanese relations.
For example, more and more Chinese students are studying Japanese as their first foreign language. The forum thus suggested that "public diplomacy" be developed as a new way to invigorate bilateral ties. This public diplomacy refers to contacts between the two countries "beyond diplomatic channels", such as exchanges between non-governmental organisations.
Exchange visits at the private level are considered to be a useful mechanism in bringing down the wall of misunderstanding. Regrettably, a recent survey showed that only 13% of Japanese respondents had been to China, while 1.2% of the Chinese surveyed had visited Japan. Of all respondents, about 43% of the Japanese chose not to visit China because of the poor relationship, and 60% of Chinese had no intention of travel-ling to Japan.
The Japanese government, a few years ago, decided to invite 1,200 Chinese high school students to Japan to stay with local host families in order to have the best possible experience of the country. Tokyo hopes that youth exchanges will help promote long-term friendship with China. Despite this public diplomacy, many still doubt whether Chinese and Japanese leaders are serious about mending their ties. Political obstacles and emotional stiffness remain powerful factors that could potentially overshadow efforts at the people's level.
The current Sino-Japanese tension over the mutually claimed islands is now being felt throughout the region. The battlefield is no longer limited to Northeast Asia. Tension has led to intense competition between China and Japan, as reflected in their "business war" in Southeast Asia, the fight for energy in the South China Sea and beyond, and the assertion of soft power to win allies, particularly among their Asean friends.
Thailand's decision to promote the Chinese language in its high schools has made Japan rather uncomfortable. Suddenly, Chinese teachers have arrived in Thailand in large numbers. Similarly, Sino-Myanmar energy cooperation has in some ways compelled Tokyo to forge ties with other Asian countries, most notably with Singapore, in the development of liquefied natural gas.
These examples are sufficient to attest that the scope of Sino-Japanese rivalry goes far beyond its bilateral context, and that the work of second-track diplomacy will have to be even more strenuous, given the cooling of relations at the state level.
Pavin Chachavalpongpun is Associate Professor at Kyoto University's Centre for Southeast Asian Studies.