Successful political reform in Southeast Asia has tended to be crisis-driven. Established elites have been reluctant to reform unless forced to do so by sustained popular protest and upheaval. This was certainly the case in Indonesia, where popular protests forced the resignation of President Suharto and ended more than three decades of authoritarian rule in May 1998. In the relationship between reform and crisis, there are perhaps some lessons for Thailand today.
Thailand and Indonesia are, of course, very different countries, with different histories and political traditions. But back in 1998, they had a lot in common, for both countries had experienced financial and economic crises.
The difference was that Thailand had just completed an exhaustive process of political reform that culminated in the liberal 1997 constitution. Indonesia was still under authoritarian rule. Because of the reforms undertaken here in Thailand, this government responded to the crisis with harsh but responsible policies with reasonable care and attention to popular concerns; in Indonesia there was chaos.
However, coming out of the financial crisis, Indonesia embarked on root and branch political reforms. Sadly, the impact of the financial crisis in Thailand was to effectively ease the pedal off the reform accelerator, as many people felt the priority post-crisis was to recuperate financially.
Today, Thailand looks a little more like Indonesia in 1998. The demands for political change are much greater because, even without the financial crisis as a driver, there is a severe political crisis.
Much like Thailand today, the protests of May 1998 in Indonesia forced politicians and the powerful military to confront the need for far-reaching change. The student-led protests that forced Suharto to resign continued after his fall in order to pressure the political elite to reform the system.
In the end, the reforms themselves were far-reaching and were produced for the most part over a short period from 1998-1999 ahead of the first free elections in almost 40 years, and then afterwards from 1999-2004, during which time the constitutional and legal framework of government was radically changed.
There was sufficient consensus on the need to begin the reform process before elections, and then carry on the task afterwards.
There are three main points to make about the reform process: first, it was largely driven by appointed bureaucrats and legal experts; second, there was very little popular consultation, and the reforms passed as laws through a national assembly that shaped and modified them in the spirit of compromise to reach a consensus; third, initial changes to the electoral laws and structure of local government were later significantly revised and adjusted.
It is hard today to underestimate the extent to which Indonesia feared a meltdown in 1998. With the assurance and security of authoritarian, military-backed rule gone, there were widespread fears of anarchy and fragmentation. The popular protests of 1998 unleashed ethnic and religious conflict and it was widely feared that Indonesia as a country would fly apart.
This did not happen. Politics was fraught with tension, and two presidents were removed from office by 2002. But despite the turbulence, the reform process proceeded smoothly and enjoyed considerable buy-in from across the political sector.
President BJ Habibie, who succeeded Suharto in 1998, appointed a team of seven bureaucrats and legal experts to overhaul the electoral system. The man who led the so-called “Team of Seven”, Ryaas Rashid, was a US-educated bureaucrat. The team operated under the supervision of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Their initial drafts were radical and envisaged moving towards a directly elected parliament. The draft political law was then submitted to the national assembly, which at the time was composed of a mix of elected, non-elected and military representatives.
In effect, it represented political elite interests, and as a result the laws were revised to reflect these elite interests, meaning that a proportional representation system was eventually agreed upon.
The next challenge was to decide on the relationship between parliament and the head of state. This involved significant amendments to the 1945 constitution. Indonesia, unlike Thailand, has tinkered very little with its bedrock constitution. Initially, as a reaction to the authoritarian Suharto years, there was an impulse to strengthen the role of the elected parliament over the power of the presidency, but again as the draft reforms were debated after the country’s first free election in more than 40 years held in 1999, the feeling was that the president’s powers should be retained to ensure stability. As a result, the single most important reform was the direct election of the president, who in turn can only serve for two consecutive five-year terms.
The third major reform challenge was decentralisation. No sooner had the transition to democracy got under way than it became obvious that regional aspirations for autonomy across the archipelago would need to be addressed before they developed into full-blown separatist conflict. It is therefore significant that the Habibie government, again driven by crisis, swiftly framed a wide-ranging law that devolved effective government to the district and provincial level.
This big-bang approach was again a largely bureaucratic process, involved little or no feedback from the regions or the political sector, and was passed with little fuss. However, it must be remembered that the laws were framed in an atmosphere of national crisis.
Also, the political elite saw the advantage of regional autonomy as a means of growing electoral support in the more open democratic context. The military put up little resistance because it genuinely feared the challenges of dealing with separatist sentiment.
What are the lessons to be learned from Indonesia’s political reform experience? First the process itself was lean and efficient, driven by small teams of experts with some outside advice, but mostly kept within the bureaucracy. Second, the reforms did not take long to frame — from November 1998 to February 1999 in the first instance. Lastly, the draft laws produced by the team of reformers were subject to debate and amendment by the political sector so that compromises were reached and implementation was not challenged.
And, all the reforms have been subject to subsequent revision to reflect the more settled political environment.
Not all reform processes can share the same characteristics. Indonesia’s circumstances were unique. The country enjoyed stability and prosperity under the years of authoritarian rule, and the elements of the system that needed reforming were mostly to do with politics and governance. The objective of the reforms was mainly to give meaning to the country’s aspiration to be a modern, democratic and pluralistic state. Although not defined as a federal state, the scope of decentralisation in some instances exceeded broad federal definitions.
However, the legal system was not thoroughly overhauled, even though later a constitutional court and a powerful anti-corruption commission were put in place. In hindsight this neglect of the judiciary enabled the survival and entrenched status of old political elites, and the pervasive culture of corruption. For while the political elites learned to benefit from new electoral laws and decentralised government, they were reluctant to support root and branch reform of the judiciary, which would have meant an end to their power and privileges sustained by corruption.
Michael Vatikiotis is Asia director of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. The article is derived from a presentation to the Reform Now Network in Bangkok on Feb 27, 2014.