Coup-makers must lead by example

Coup-makers must lead by example

Every military intervention is costly and the current one is no exception. It costs a lot of money to keep soldiers on the streets, and their presence spooks tourists and investors, and interrupts the process of democratic development.

The costs will be even greater if the end result is a repeat of the 2006 intervention which — after succeeding in preventing an imminent bloody clash between the forces supporting the government and those opposing it — failed miserably to prevent the same group of corrupt politicians from coming back, in many respects, even stronger. Their subsequent corrupt practices and disregard for civility are the key factors contributing to the sustained street protests that led eventually to the current military intervention.

As in 2006, this coup came amid what appeared to be an imminent bloody clash between the forces supporting the government and those against it. The present group of generals apparently has learned something from 2006; they have, therefore, not boxed themselves in by specifying the length of the transition period leading to the next parliamentary elections.

It may take more than one year for an interim government, a constitution drafting body, and a reform council to work on solving short-term problems and laying a firm foundation for long-term reform and development.

The military has given people a chance to exhale. It has also stopped the violence perpetrators and the hatemongers as well as disrupted the flow of weapons destined apparently to be used against the protesters.

The generals also have unblocked tens of billions of baht needed to pay rice farmers whose livelihoods were put in jeopardy only because they participated in the ousted government’s rice-pledging scheme.

The cheers, however, could turn to grumbles very quickly, as seen recently when fuel prices rose under a previously-scheduled tariff hike. The grumbles show that people can be highly unreasonable and expectations are exceedingly high. Such expectations will create intense pressures, which may lead to perpetuation or even expansion of populist schemes.

The quick rollback of the fuel price prices after only one day is a case in point. It once again proves that a populist programme is easy to launch but very difficult to stop. In Argentina, even the military leaders that overthrew the president who brought populism to the country ended up doing the same thing.

Complaints of a more fundamental nature involve the appointment of 10 advisers to the junta: Five are retired military officers; one was minister of commerce during the period leading up to the 1997 economic crisis; two were key figures in the Thaksin administration; one resigned from the position of deputy prime minister when the post-2006 prime minister appointed one of the just-mentioned pair as an adviser.

People rightly question what kind of expertise the five retired military officers bring. And if three of the other advisers were indeed closely associated with the failures of earlier governments, then what makes the generals think their advice will lead to success now?

During the events leading to the current military intervention, all sides agreed that the country badly needed reform but differed greatly as to what constituted reform. The soon-to-be appointed reform council will presumably settle these differences.

Whatever it decides upon, the most fundamental aims should definitely be the reduction of corruption — the root cause of just about everything that is wrong with this country — and the prevention of corrupt politicians from getting elected.

This is a very tall order indeed, and it may very well be the last chance for preventing the country from becoming the next sick man of Asia. A test may come soon, in the rice-pledging scheme and at state enterprises. The rice scheme has allegedly lost some 500 billion baht and failed to account for close to 3 million tonnes of milled rice.

People expect to see the speeding up of judicial proceedings by which the individuals responsible for these losses are duly punished.

In the case of state enterprises, their boards are full of friends of corrupt politicians. If these board members are replaced with largely military officers or friends of the military, the public will quickly lose trust in the generals, making what they need to do next even more difficult.

So far the generals have done quite well, but the appointments of advisers and the quick rollback of fuel prices have made me less than optimistic about their overall work on laying a solid foundation for reform leading to sustainable development of the country.

And if they do indeed come up far short of expectations, most sorely disappointed will likely be the protesters, many of whom slept in the streets for months and shed sweat, tears, blood and even lost their lives over the past nine years trying to oust the corrupt politicians. These protesters will again come out to occupy the streets of Bangkok, but this time they may not be as peaceful as in the past.

The ball is in your court, generals. Play it well and prove me wrong.


Sawai Boonma has worked as a development economist for more than two decades. He can be reached at sboonma@msn.com.

Sawai Boonma

Writer

Former Senior Country Economist at the World Bank and now a freelance writer.

Email : sboonma@msn.com

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