As Thailand’s armed forces fan out across its body politic and economy, the country’s international standing is increasingly challenged.
Supreme Commander Gen Tanasak Patimapragorn, left, gets a hug from visiting Myanmar counterpart Gen Min Aung Hlaing at the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters in early July. Military-to-military links have become more pronounced after the May 22 coup. (Photo courtesy of the Armed Forces Headquarters)
While the post-coup military junta, known as the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), is following through with plan to set up the charter, interim legislative assembly, government, reform council, and constitution drafting committee, Thailand appears dominated by men in uniform. This disguised military-authoritarian rule, perhaps personified by NCPO chief Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha as the likely prime minister ahead of the pledged return to democratic rule, portends dilemmas for Thailand’s dealings with the international community.
The tough responses from Western and some Asian governments are set to remain stiff and perhaps intensify if basic individual rights are further violated and threatened. Thailand under the NCPO is thus likely to recalibrate its geopolitical preferences to suit its domestic objectives, with broader implications for regional relations in East Asia.
Already the Thai coup has generated geopolitical ripples, eliciting different responses from world powers. Western countries, particularly the United States, broadly criticised the coup at the outset but have not ratcheted up their rhetoric since. Asian governments, with notable exceptions such as Tokyo’s initial expression of “grave concern” and similar caution from Jakarta and Manila, have greeted Thailand’s military intervention with a business-as-usual posture.
At issue now, as Thailand is set to be ruled by its top brass at least for the next year, are the coup implications for the geopolitical rivalry between the US and China and for the broader prospects of democratisation in developing Asia.
If Thailand’s military-authoritarian rule entrenches itself, it may embolden other militaries and reinforce the retreat of democracies elsewhere, such as Myanmar. Myanmar’s and Cambodia’s recent defence delegations’ visits to Bangkok and meetings with the NCPO demonstrate the growing military-to-military linkages in this region, possibly at the expense of civilian control of the armed forces in those countries.
In its preceding coup in September 2006, Thailand arguably got off lightly. The US perfunctorily suspended its International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme and chastised the coup-makers to return to elections and democracy as soon as possible. Its telltale response, however, was its chief envoy’s visit to the junta leader just hours after the coup. At that time, the logic and pull of Bangkok’s pro-coup coalition that advocated the overthrow of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra for evident corruption and abuse of power was hard to resist, partly because Thailand had long been a staunch US treaty ally.
This time, the Americans took a different tack after repeated reassurances that a putsch was not on the cards. Apart from the IMET suspension of $4.7 million (150 million baht), Thailand was kept out of the multinational Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise. Senior US officials both in Washington and Bangkok sent strong messages that the entire bilateral relationship was under review pending the restoration of democratic rule and attendant individual rights.
This warning has gone quiet but it is still on the table. Even Cobra Gold, a longstanding annual multinational defence exercise that is the bedrock of the Thai-US military-military relationship, which is the backbone of the overall bilateral alliance, is in limbo.
Australia and the European Union later chimed in with similar warnings, imposing visa bans on junta leaders and suspending a clutch of cooperative programmes and senior-level bilateral visits. Subsequent national day celebrations by the US and France, among other countries, did not include leaders of Thailand’s military regime. As the Western responses converged against the coup, the NCPO looked to Asian neighbours for recognition and support.
Leading the Asian reactions was China. Although Thailand is not China’s formal ally, Beijing is as diplomatically and geopolitically close to Bangkok as any great power.
Thailand has benefited over the centuries for being China’s virtual next-door neighbour without a common border. The Chinese government recognised Thailand’s latest coup, as it did to the preceding putsch in Bangkok, within several working days. Coup leaders officially visited Beijing and have received a high-level Chinese business delegation.
As next year marks the 40th anniversary of Thai-Chinese relations, Beijing has invited former army chief and current president of the Privy Council, Prem Tinsulanonda, for an official visit. Over the years, the Chinese have warmly received Thailand’s royal family, particularly Her Royal Highness Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn.
China’s political stand in contrast with the West becomes more conspicuous when Thailand takes authoritarian turns, as in September 2006 and since May 22. But when Thailand’s democratic rule prevails, Beijing has also been close and supportive. In other words, the Chinese have found ways to be Thailand’s all-weather friend because it carries no democracy-promotion baggage.
For Beijing, Thailand is now a pivotal country in its “geostrategic” outlook. Myanmar’s opening and reforms have led to a loss of Chinese dominance, and Cambodia’s see-saw election in July 2013 weakened the pro-Beijing regime of Prime Minister Hun Sen.
In the maritime domains both vis-a-vis Japan in the east and the Philippines and Vietnam in the south, China’s assertive territorial claims are fiercely contested, somewhat constrained by the US’s military presence. Losing influence in Myanmar and Cambodia can be offset by gaining leverage over Thailand’s resurgent authoritarianism. If China’s southern maritime flank is unstable, its southern mainland tip must be secured. Thailand is thus a key piece of China’s geostrategic jigsaw.
Much of what happens on Asia’s geopolitical canvass will depend on how post-coup Thailand plays out. If genuine democratic rule is restored after a period of pervasive and systematic military control over politics and economy, Thailand may regain its geopolitical balance.
But if authoritarianism solidifies at the expense of democratic legitimacy, Thailand may be forced to increasingly lean on Beijing for regime support and a geopolitical lifeline.
As democratisation and geopolitics are entwined in view of the Thai coup, Asian democratic voices are needed to nudge Thailand towards a geopolitical balance and a democratic future. While Philippine and Indonesian leaders demonstrated their democratic instincts at the outset, other Asian democratic governments, particularly South Korea and India, could make a big difference by standing up for democracy, which happens to coincide with their geostrategic interests in enticing China to play by the rules to deepen regional institutionalisation and architecture-building.
As the local top brass appear resolute in their resolve and commitment, Thailand’s chilling onset of military rule in civilian guises will pose a conundrum for the international community.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is associate professor and director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.