From a promising period of de-politicisation in the late 1990s to a manipulative re-politicisation in the early 2000s, Thailand's military has come full circle.
Army commander Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha presides over a ceremony marking the 64th anniversary of the founding of the 21st Infantry Regiment in Chon Buri on Aug 21, the day he was voted in by the National Legislative Assembly as prime minister. Pattanapong Hirunard
The logical conclusion of its re-politicisation is the relative militarisation of the Thai state and overall political life. The cradle of political power in the current phase of military rule is a fraternal cohort of senior army officers, known as the "tiger soldiers", who hail from the 2nd Infantry Division (Queen's Guard). Never have the former commanders of this division held so much power in Thai politics. Understanding Thailand's new rulers and the sources of their power requires knowledge of the regimental cradle that bred them.
It does not seem long ago that Thailand embarked on wide-ranging reforms to make the military more accountable and professional. The high point of reforms to impose civilian control over the military took place in the late 1990s under then prime minister Chuan Leekpai, who doubled as defence minister.
Mr Chuan gambled and appointed Gen Surayud Chulanont from an obscure advisory position to the army commander-in-chief position in 1998. For a few years, it looked like Mr Chuan and Gen Surayud were going to remake the army into a professional fighting force, trying to do away with conscription, reducing the top-heavy number of generals, and scaling down the size of the rank-and-file.
Not only civil-military relations were revamped to de-fang the top brass and keep them in the barracks, but Thailand's overall security sector, that covered all internal and external security-related agencies, was considered for a broad overhaul.
All that came to naught after the electoral rise of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in January 2001. He shunted Gen Surayud aside in 2002 in favour of an army loyalist. In 2003, Thaksin made his cousin, Gen Chaisit Shinawatra, the army chief.
To monopolise politics and stay for the long term, Thaksin had to take risks by bringing the army under his control. His re-politicisation of the army became more entrenched with appointments of his military preparatory school classmates and loyalists. Ultimately, Thaksin's army meddling partly paved the way for his demise with the military coup in September 2006.
Thus began the rise of the 2nd Infantry Division. In the Thai system, the 1st Division (King's Guard) is inherently the most politically powerful because it is mostly headquartered in Bangkok. With its 1st, 11th and 31st Regiments, the 1st Division — its official name did away with the "infantry" designation and is sometimes also referred to as the "Wong Thewan" faction — has always been the centre of action in Thai politics.
Time and again, it has led the army's regular seizures of power in recent decades. The 1st Division commanders more often than not have risen to take over the 1st Army Region command, which comprises the 1st, 2nd and 9th infantry divisions in the main. First Army Region commanders usually found their way into the chief-of-staff of the army and assistant or deputy army chief jobs before finally taking over the top army post.
But after the 2006 coup, the 2nd Infantry Division rose to prominence. Its most recent commanders all became army chiefs, from Gen Prawit Wongsuwan in 2004-05 and Gen Anupong Paojinda in 2007-10 to Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha in 2010-14. Gen Udomdej Sitabutr, the new army chief, also emerged from the 2nd Infantry Division.
But there is an even purer concentration of fraternity and power within the 2nd Infantry Division, whose officers are sometimes referred to as the "eastern tigers". This Queen's Guard division consists of three regiments, namely the 2nd, 12th and 21st, all associated in number with Her Majesty the Queen's birthday on Aug 12. While all "tiger soldiers" are Tigers of the East, only officers under the 21st regiment are tiger soldiers. This regiment is under the direct patronage of Her Majesty the Queen.
And the 21st regiment did not rise to prominence without merit. Of Thailand's four main armies — the first dealing with the western and lower-eastern fronts on the Myanmar and Cambodian borders, the second in the Northeast vis-a-vis Laos, the third in the North, and the fourth in the South — the real action after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia on Christmas day in 1978 came down to the 1st Army Region's 2nd Infantry Division.
It is easy to forget now, but communist expansionism from Indochina and from the local Communist Party of Thailand in the 1970s was virulent and contagious, likened to falling dominoes.
By early January 1979, battle-hardened Vietnamese forces had occupied all of Cambodia, having rooted out the Khmer Rouge, and were poised for action on the Thai border. Thai people today old enough to recount that period would recall the communist expansionist chill. A Vietnamese invasion of Thailand was a clear and present danger, and for several ensuing years, Vietnam frequently intruded into Thai territory along the Cambodian border, regularly shelling Thai positions.
The three main regiments of the 2nd Infantry Division bore the brunt of the fighting in defence of Thai territory in the early 1980s. Regular skirmishes claimed lives on both sides. A key battle in April 1982 brought Gen Prayut to fame as a company leader who came to the rescue of the 2nd Battalion commander of the 21st Regiment who had been outflanked and isolated on a hilltop by Vietnamese forces. Gen Prayut eventually received the Rama medal for battlefield valour for his efforts and was promoted to command the 2nd Battalion. Gen Udomdej was in the same vicinity in that battle.
Accordingly, Gen Prayut's line of ascent is practically linear from 2nd Battalion and 21st Regiment to 2nd Infantry Division and 1st Army Region, followed by the high command as chief-of-staff, deputy army chief before taking charge of the army. Gen Anupong is similar, except he rose up from 1st Battalion and also commanded the 1st Division in addition to the 2nd Infantry Division. It is Gen Prawit's rise that is interesting from a political perspective.
On the face of it, Gen Prawit never commanded the 21st Queen's Guard Regiment. Yet he is a true tiger soldier, perhaps even more so than Gen Prayut and Gen Anupong, which would explain why Gen Prawit is both deputy prime minister and defence minister, the most powerful cabinet member after Gen Prayut.
In fact, the three generals all began in the 21st Regiment. After the failed coup in April 1981, Gen Prawit as a deputy battalion commander was seconded to take over the 2nd Regiment because it had taken part in the coup. Thereafter, he commanded the 12th Regiment as well, before ascending in a similar line to the top army post. This is why he is the big brother to both Gen Anupong and Gen Prayut.
Going forward, it is likely that the relatively more insular Gen Prayut will be the all-powerful front man of this coup government and military regime. But, in the back, the most powerful player will be Gen Prawit because of his wide-ranging networks in politics and business.
The three most coveted cabinet posts for a coup government — defence, interior and prime minister — belong to this fraternity of three tiger soldiers spawned within the 21st Regiment. They have gone beyond re-politicisation to a growing militarisation of Thailand in its transition period. Much is instructive from a country that has gone from the cusp of democratic consolidation and civilian control of its military to a runaway military and virtually authoritarian rule in less than two decades.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is associate professor and director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.