Radicals react to losses by growing hydra-like heads

Radicals react to losses by growing hydra-like heads

Many believe that killing the leaders of terrorist organisations like the Islamic State could change the course of events in Iraq and Syria. Like the cutting off of a snake's head, eliminating the chief of a terrorist organisation is assumed to deal it a fatal or near fatal blow. The US government, for instance, has often boasted about eliminating major al-Qaeda leaders, and viewed such assassinations as a clear mark of progress in the "global war on terror".

Yet there are reasons to question the premise that killing terrorist leaders implies progress. Indeed, rather than cutting off the head of a snake, killing off terrorist leaders resembles the decapitating of a hydra, the mythological monster reputed to replace severed heads with multiple new ones.

Admittedly, in some cases assassinating or arresting a major terrorist leader may paralyse the organisation for years to come. Such was the case with Abimail Guzman, the philosopher-leader of the Peruvian Shining Path organisation, and with Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdish Workers' Party, both of whom have been imprisoned for years. Fathi Shaqaqi, the founding chief of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, was assassinated by Israeli security forces in 1995, which disrupted the organisation for a number of years.

In all these cases, however, the disruption was temporary and sooner or later the groups in question recovered their resolve and resumed the fight.

Moreover, major terrorist organisations have cleverly adapted to the loss of their chief honchos. Eliminated leaders are typically replaced by others waiting in the wings. In addition to this, some organisations respond to assassinations by loosening their hierarchical structure and allowing local leaders greater freedom. This reduces their dependence on select few figures at the top and spreads their risk.

Palestinian organisations adopted this tactic in response to targeted killings of their leaders by the Israelis. So did al-Qaeda, which dispersed power that was highly concentrated in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region to a worldwide network of affiliates carrying the al-Qaeda banner.

In defence of this Western strategy, some would respond by saying that terrorist leaders are in short supply. They posit that sooner or later their numbers will be exhausted, thus causing severe degradation of the organisations' fighting capacity.

Available evidence does not unequivocally support this claim. If the group boasts a wide appeal, its supply pool of leadership talent may be large and able to replenish itself.

It is important to remember that the killing of Osama bin Laden, though of symbolic importance, didn't seem to offer the US an appreciable strategic advantage in the fight against al-Qaeda, nor did it appreciably alter the status of war against jihadist terrorism.

Occasionally, the "replacement" leader might actually be more adept and dangerous than the chief whom he came to replace, so one needs to be careful what one wishes for.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq was a formidable enemy, but not as formidable as his replacement, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Mr Baghdadi is the current leader of the Islamic State and is widely proclaimed to be one of the biggest threats to world security.

Similarly, Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, the current leader of Hezbollah in Lebannon is considerably more dangerous to Israel than Abbas al-Musawi, the former head of the group who was assassinated in 1992.

That said, there is no question that the pressure of killing campaigns significantly degrades the organisations' operational capability. Targeted leaders are forced to spend significant portions of their time looking over their shoulder and protecting themselves.

Their ability to communicate with subordinates is hampered, they are compelled to frequently change locations, and are often forced to remain invisible for long stretches of time. Not to be underestimated either is the psychological toll on leaders who are constantly on the run.

The Palestinian leaders' reactions to targeted killings attest to the impacts of such campaigns. Time and time again, they have demanded that Israel end the policy. Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin's successor as head of Hamas, conceded that the killing campaign posed significant hardships for his organisation.

All told then, targeted killings have their place and remain a useful tactical tool in the kit of counterterrorism strategists, if only for the constant pressure they bring to bear on terrorist organisations.

However useful they are in the short run, however, they are unlikely to bring an end to terrorism. They are a vehicle, not a panacea, and the billions of dollars spent on their implementation might not be worth it after all.


Arie W Kruglanski is distinguished university professor in psychology at the University of Maryland, and a senior researcher at Start, National Centre for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism.

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