Amnesty has again been raised as a circuit-breaker to ease Thailand's continuing cycles of political conflict.
Protesters demonstrate against the blanket amnesty bill in November last year. The protests eventually led to street violence and the May 22 coup. Any new attempt to introduce amnesty should take into account the failings of previous bills. PAWAT LAOPAISARNTAKSIN
In Thailand, the very idea of an amnesty is increasingly seen as tainted and stigmatised, and for many the military government and National Reform Council's recent suggestion they would revisit the plan
was met with incredulous scepticism. Although controversial, an amnesty of some sort is not without merit. But any new amnesty that is proposed must ensure it is guided by several key principles to avoid encountering the same pitfalls as previous attempts.
The amnesty included in the 2007 constitution was solely focused on shielding the military from prosecution after the 2006 coup. In parts of Thai society this amnesty was deemed as one-sided and illegitimate, and grew as a focal point of derision and division in subsequent political conflicts.
The blanket amnesty bill introduced by the government of Yingluck Shinawatra in November 2013 was misguided at best and deliberately deceitful at worst. Its botched implementation was roundly criticised and sparked what metamorphosed into an anti-government movement that culminated with the coup on May 22.
Anek Laothamatas, chairman of the national reform sub-committee of the Constitution Drafting Committee, has again suggested that amnesty be granted to people who have taken part in political unrest since 2005. If this proposal becomes another non-negotiable blanket, it will only serve to reopen old wounds and reignite tensions. However, as specifics of the plan are yet to be finalised, it remains conceivable that an open, beneficial and acceptable amnesty be proposed.
To be effective and legitimate, any amnesty must be the product of genuine and honest negotiations among all of the key stakeholders associated with the conflict. Dialogue between the parties must be open and transparent.
Amnesties are not supposed to cover up or whitewash infractions; they should not target the exoneration of specific leaders, and they should not be forced or sprung upon a society still reeling from conflict. The current government must learn from the 2007 and 2013 amnesties which failed on these counts.
Amnesty must not be used for political or personal gain. Under no circumstances should the goal of an amnesty be used as a cover-up, to absolve the responsibilities of specific individuals for their actions, or to gloss over crimes. Targeting an amnesty to create specific winners and losers will be seen as illegitimate and ultimately deepen divisions. Amnesty should not be the goal of a reconciliation or reform process, but may be one of crucial enabling conditions that conduce a peaceful outcome. It should be a means to an end, not the end itself. At the heart of any amnesty, there should be an unequivocal need to protect the rights of victims to pursue and know the truth about the crimes that have been committed. This must be delicately balanced with the need for a society to learn from and move towards forgiveness of violations committed in the past and putting in place a foundation for future peace and stability.
East Timor, South Africa and Northern Ireland, among others have adapted these core principles of amnesty with relative success. They have also added conditions to their amnesties where there may be sets of actions or penances that must be met by the perpetrators if amnesty is to be accorded.
For example, during the conflict over the policy of apartheid in South Africa, both the government and opposition groups had been responsible for committing ever-escalating reciprocal acts of violence and abuses of human rights over a period of more than 40 years. A core part of the reconciliation process was the opportunity to apply for amnesty from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC only granted an amnesty in cases strictly connected to the political conflict and only on the condition that the perpetrator had truthfully disclosed all of the facts.
From the outset of the reconciliation process, it was communicated that amnesty was not being used to absolve or ignore the crimes of perpetrators, but it was used to diffuse tensions in society and to lay down the foundations for enduring peace while also creating closure for the victims by giving them the right to truth.
In the Northern Ireland peace process, amnesty was granted with the condition of disarmament and non-recidivism, as well as public confession. It was in effect a suspended sentence dependent on future behaviour.
Whatever conditions are attached to the amnesty, or whether a conditional amnesty is even appropriate, should be the outcome of extensive consultation, negotiation and agreement between the relevant stakeholders in society.
This emphasises the fact that every conflict is unique; the spectrum of crimes the contexts under which they were committed is largely dependent on the circumstances of the conflict and the perspectives of the participants. There is no cookie-cutter guide as to how a credible and legitimate amnesty can be created and implemented. Hence, the scope of amnesty should not be decided by either the perpetrators or victims. The time period concerned, severity or types of crimes which would be covered, the individuals or groups who could apply for amnesty needs to be tailored in open and transparent forums for the circumstances of each conflict.
The current government is seemingly sounding out the extent to which the public would resist another amnesty attempt. But if they are sincere about the process, they must also engage in open public discussions to determine whether an amnesty would benefit society as part of a wider reconciliation process, how it should be negotiated and implemented, and, crucially, how far up on all sides of the divide the amnesty should extend.
Jacob Hogan is a research fellow at the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.