In the wake of a deceptive calm following the military coup on May 22, prospects for next year are characterised by anxiety and apprehension over what is to come.
A group of soldiers stand guard during a street protest against the Yingluck administration before the coup. Patipat Janthong
Thailand's virtual lockdown since the coup is likely to be maintained in this transitional period where a resurgent but outmoded political order must come to terms with new power arrangements.
The hitherto elusive balance between old powers and new politics, between Thailand circa 1960s-1980s and its offspring in the early 21st century, will continue to underpin and determine political outcomes next year and thereafter.
Along the way, we are on course to see greater militarisation and securitisation of Thai society and politics where security and order will trump prosperity and liberty.
Thailand's relative lockdown has been as astonishing as unsurprising. With a military regime under the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) ensconced in power after the putsch and governing the country directly as opposed to delegating to technocrats and policy professionals, it was a matter of time before the ruling generals' mindset, organisational culture and values and preferences would become entrenched.
As a result, Thais are forced to adhere to traditional values and symbols more than ever, and the country has become increasingly militarised.
To be sure, most matters outside political life are still business as usual. Those not engaged in politics will still find Thailand to be hospitable, permissive and forgiving. But the military's role in politics and society will become increasingly salient and controversial.
The military authorities may project a business-as-usual image but the reality is increasingly marked by suppressed scepticism, tension and opposition.
The maintenance of martial law since the coup has unwittingly led Thailand into a martial era. Militarism is now supposed to be cool, and men-in-green are purportedly recovering happiness for the Thai people. A military strongman acts as the prime minister.
No doubt military-authoritarianism has reared its repressive head against the tide of political liberalisation and democratisation in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, which is remarkable in view of Thailand's cusp of democratic consolidation less than two decades ago.
More manifestations of the military's resurgence during the country's grand transition are likely to dominate 2015, with a build-up of consequences spilling over into a reckoning of sorts in 2016. Several trends and dynamics seem clear.
First, the ticking clock for a return to democratic rule by early 2016 will put pressure on the military regime. It is clear now that the ongoing constitution-drafting process will stem from the 2007 charter template, which was drawn up in the September 2006 coup.
Like the current draft that is being debated, the 2007 version was crafted in a top-down fashion and ultimately ended with the same problem of allowing Thaksin Shinawatra's party machine to win the vote.
Unless the authorities and the major players during the coup period accept that Thai politics henceforth will have to be more about the electorate than about the elite, we will keep going around in circles.
The current anti-corruption campaign is a move in the right direction but in the end it must rely on informing voters about their rights and responsibilities and about the consequences of their vote. Another top-down charter, without public participation and inclusiveness, will only spell more political difficulties down the road.
Moreover, the return to electoral democracy after a new constitution will depend on what happens to the political arena. The NCPO is unlikely to hold open elections unless it has a say in the post election outcomes.
The probability of a military-aligned party will heighten in the months ahead, perhaps in combination with a ban on some of the erstwhile elected politicians to level the playing field in the generals' eyes.
Second, the economy will be consequential for the military's legitimacy and support from the pro-coup coalition. If the economy tanks into a recession of any sort, we can expect pro-coup support to erode just as quickly.
The military government's challenge is how to steer an economy when the ruling generals are not trained for the job. Policy contradictions are rife, such as trying to stimulate demand while contemplating raising a string of taxes at the same time.
Enticing investor sentiments has been impeded by nationalist allusions, such as the proposed revision on the Foreign Business Act. The list goes on.
Fundamentally, the military's command-control culture is ill-suited for economic management, and thus we are likely to see more contradictions.
Yet if economic growth in 2015 comes in the 3% range, it is unlikely to sap pro-coup support enough to derail the military government. Third, corruption will be the military's Achilles heel.
Corruption also involves nepotism, collusion, and cronyism, rolled up into downright hypocrisy. For example, we will see if Prime Minister Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha's brother, Gen Preecha Chan-o-cha, is elevated to the top army post from his current assistant army chief position.
It is naive to expect complete integrity and honesty of any Thai government. But if corruption becomes unmanageable without a semblance of accountability, then tension and resistance against the military government will build and come to the fore.
Fourth, if there is going to be outright opposition to the military government, it is likely to come from the pro-coup coalition, particularly the former People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) and its precursor the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD).
The Thaksin side, including the Pheu Thai Party and the leadership of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship, has kept quiet because it has much to lose and little to gain by rising up at this time.
But if the PDRC and PAD feel sufficiently disillusioned with the coup period after all the heavy lifting they did in the past, then the military government can expect trouble. Other civil society groups will also have a louder voice it is but unlikely to be enough to destabilise the military government as compared to the PDRC/PAD overlapping columns.
Finally, Thailand's transitional endgame during this lockdown period will require compromise and accommodation.
The established centres of power and the newly empowered forces of electoral democracy will need to come to terms with new rules of the game that place the electorate at the front and centre of political outcomes. The old centres of power will have to give up some to keep much of prerogative and privilege they have enjoyed, and the newer sources of power in people's representatives must show more integrity and better policy performance.
As in recent years, this compromise is imperative for Thailand to move on. There is no better gift for the Thai people for the coming year than to see glimpses of this compromise.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is associate professor and director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.