Former US presidential candidate senator John McCain, who visited Kabul over Christmas, has warned that Afghanistan faces a potentially major upsurge in Taliban violence in 2015, including the possibility of Peshawar-style attacks on school children. His intervention coincided with the Dec 31 end of the US and Nato-led combat mission in Afghanistan which has lasted some 13 years since 2001.
On Jan 1, the Afghan army took over lead day-to-day responsibility for security in the country with a remaining contingent of about 13,000 US and Nato forces stationed primarily for training purposes (almost 11,000 US personnel). Mr McCain, who is likely to become chair of the US Senate Armed Services Committee in January, asserts that a significantly larger foreign force is needed to help repel the Taliban in 2015, and has warned that Afghanistan risks becoming destabilised in what he called the "same movie" we have seen in Iraq.
The handover of lead responsibilities from the US and Nato comes at a critical moment for Afghanistan on the security, political and economic fronts. Indeed, the country stands at a historical crossroads which could see significantly greater destabilisation, as Mr McCain has warned, or the possibility for preservation of the fragile gains made in the country in the post 9/11 era.
The number one challenge is enhancing security given the Taliban threat. While a continuing foreign force will provide extensive funding and training for the approximately 350,000 strong Afghan police and military forces, the security situation is likely to be rocky in coming weeks, especially after the winter ends when the Taliban has stepped up operations in previous years.
Anticipating this potential challenge, the US administration has already agreed to raise the US troop level in early 2015 by around 1,000 more than previously expected. However, the joint US-Nato force will still be less than a twelfth of the approximately 140,000 combat force it once was in 2011.
Moreover, following the school massacre in Peshawar, Pakistan and Afghanistan have launched a more coordinated offensive against the Taliban. However, it remains uncertain how long this "partnership" will last in practice.
As well as bolstering its armed forces, the Afghan government has not ruled out continuing efforts to seek reconciliation with the Taliban and even a potential peace deal. However, this initiative may drop to the backburner now given the Peshawar attack and the new sense of momentum in the bilateral Pakistan-Afghan offensive against the Taliban.
Perhaps the most positive news in 2014 came on the political front with a landmark power-sharing agreement reached in September to create a "government of national unity". This represents the first democratic transfer of power in the country's history and also marks the end of the post-9/11 Hamid Karzai era.
The agreement between President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, who has been given a de facto prime minister role, follows a contested, controversial election between them in June. Under the terms of the agreement (which resulted in part from heavy US pressure), a new Council of Ministers has been created, headed by Mr Abdullah, which implements the executive affairs of the government. He reports to the president on progress in implementing these policies.
If the power arrangement between Mr Ghani and Mr Abdullah ultimately proves a success, the power and legitimacy of the new government would be consolidated. However, if the government of national unity breaks down, there could be increased division, potentially along ethnic and/or geographic lines, in the country.
A key issue here is that Mr Ghani and Mr Abdullah have different regional and ethnic power bases. Mr Ghani is from the south and part of the country's majority Pashtun community, while Mr Abdullah is from the north and his support base is concentrated in the ethnic Tajik community.
Turning to the economic front, 2015 could be a very difficult period. Since 2001, the fast-growing economy has become steadily more dependent on foreign aid.
However, with the draw down of international troops there has been a fall-off in overall foreign aid levels. In part, this is because US and Nato forces have provided a security umbrella under which some of the aid agencies have operated in recent years.
Another key problem is that there has been only very limited success in economic diversification since 2001. The danger is that, as aid is reduced, the economy becomes increasingly dependent upon drug exports such as opium and heroin.
Taken overall, 2015 is likely to be a difficult year for Afghanistan, but there is a limited window of opportunity for the government of national unity to consolidate its power and legitimacy and preserve some of the fragile gains in the country since 2001.
However, especially in the event of major, successful Taliban offensives in coming months, there is also a prospect of significantly greater security instability in the country which would intensify the pressure on the economy and the new government.
Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He was formerly a special adviser to the UK government.