There is angst concerning the authoritarian direction Thailand is taking as well as uncertainty regarding whether the reform process and draft constitution constitute a roadmap for a normative democracy in post-2016 elections. Even Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha has not ruled out further instability.
But why should further coups occur given the mobilisation of the entire security apparatus via a surveillance state? The answer is that reconciliation is still not primarily aimed at the systemic causes of social injustice in Thailand - the class- and ethnic-based disparities in quality of life and access to opportunities.
The main responses to the injustices which underpinned the 2010-2014 mass protests have been a weak inheritance tax, hyper-nationalist propaganda, and the creation of oversight mechanisms designed to neuter Thai politics - thus chiefly addressing symptoms, not causes.
This response is why socio-political stability is still not viable, why the economy will still be victim to feudal-style populism, and how the military will justify continuing authoritarianism.
Yet the importance of social justice has been recognised before. There is already a vision which appreciates the danger of inequity and addresses it. It is, in fact, a comprehensive reform plan - the National Economic and Social Development Board's 11th National Economic and Social Development Plan, covering 2012-2016.
The 11th plan provides a long-term structural view of public governance and represents a shared consensus produced by Thailand's most adept technocrats. It comprises a situation report, a vision statement, and detailed strategies. It provides guiding principles to the bureaucracy and to political parties - both roles now taken by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). In other words, it is the plan.
Furthermore, it is one of a series of plans which have, in certain sectors, worked. From the first plan in 1961, improving public health was a priority. It was agreed that lifespans should be lengthened, diseases combated, nutrition improved, and infant mortality lowered. Though there continue to be regional disparities, people now live longer and are healthier.
Social welfare was introduced as early as the first plan, and by the second plan, reducing regional disparities, improving local education, and providing a welfare net had been incorporated. The 11th plan continues this developmental tradition and highlights structural inequalities, unequal opportunities between groups, disparities in social services between the rural and urban, and inequalities in access to justice.
In particular, it notes the high absolute poverty in the agricultural sector and the "huge income gap between groups, reflecting a disparity in economic and social opportunity, access to resources, fundamental rights and bargaining power", pointing out the Northeast and rural areas are especially disadvantaged, with landless farmers posing a challenge.
Regarding labour rights, it observes the majority still have no guarantee of social welfare, and in education, huge differences between Bangkok and the Northeast are again noted.
Moreover, the plan acknowledges chronic corruption in the public sector combined with a lack of transparency and fairness in both political and economic institutions, leading to Thailand's poor performance in the Global Peace Index, which measures stability.
The plan endorses reducing poverty and securing incomes for farmers by means such as redistributing land via land banks; improving and enforcing labour rights via regulations, which implies unionisation; making voluntary social security nets in private companies feasible or legislating mandatory schemes; undertaking reform of the tax system to redistribute income and wealth; and supporting a cradle-to-grave social security system.
It also promotes police and judicial reform based on accessibility, equality and fairness. It calls for transparency in private management - which must include obligatory corporate adoption of social and environmental responsibility - and in public administration, as is sorely needed in organisations such as the Government Lottery Office. Further, it provides a mandate for statutory decentralisation by devolving to local administrations and community groups, involving civil society in government and development partner activities in a way that inevitably creates opportunities for genuine, deliberative and participative democracy.
In justice reform and other areas, the military is groping its way towards targets. However, advantages exist in explicitly recognising the 11th plan's framework and to deriving from it transparent goals and implementation pathways. In essence, the plan emerged from a democratic process, resulted from both private and public sector consultation, and involved development partners such as the UN.
Political parties have, periodically, partially attempted to implement the plan. Unfortunately, the Democrat Party's legitimacy was tarnished by the means it last came to power, which overshadowed the vision of its people's agenda. But the agenda's recognition of the poverty crisis should still be foundational. Its attempt to solve the unity crisis nonetheless failed both because of political machinations and because it could not become a true "unity in diversity" model without recognition of minorities.
Nevertheless, unity in diversity is necessary if Thailand is to progress past deadlock. Legal acknowledgment of the country's diverse ethnicities is dictated by common sense and human rights. With this step - and a perception of the historical disparities in opportunity - will come social healing via mechanisms such as devolution. However, the military's institutional memory and hyper-nationalism may mean it cannot accept this approach, despite it recognising the importance of the ethnic issue - which it calls "local identity" - as in its campaign for local clothing.
Thus, to address Thailand's polarised politics, the conditions must be created for a principled, centrist strategy. This necessarily requires mainstream Thais to understand and become tolerant of ethnic- and class-oriented political, philosophical and economic theories. Then, the middle ground can create a more social form of democracy by forcing parties to become democratic structures.
The prime minister's recent suggestion for a national reform assembly to replace the National Reform Committee is unnecessary. Combined with additional layers of bureaucracy embodied in the draft constitution, it implies the birth of an unaccountable, permanent, military-dominated shadow government which is incapable of reconciliation. The country already has a roadmap in the 11th plan. The government's job is to implement it.
John Draper is Project Officer, Isan Culture Maintenance and Revitalisation Programme (ICMRP), College of Local Administration (COLA), Khon Kaen University. Peerasit Kamnuansilpa, Phd, is founder and former dean of the College of Local Administration, Khon Kaen University.