That Thailand’s planned purchase of three attack submarines from China has raised eyebrows is to be expected. Over the past decade, marked by two military coups in Thai politics, relations between Bangkok and Beijing have become closer than ever. If the submarine deal goes ahead, it will substantially bond military-to-military ties between the two countries and crucially shift Thailand’s geopolitical posture from its traditional hedging among the major powers to a lopsided embrace of Beijing.
The military government’s deportation of Uighur asylum seekers over the past week only complicates Thailand’s international standing and reinforces the Bangkok-Beijing axis at the expense of the country’s long-term geopolitical balance.
To be sure, there is a valid argument to be made for a costly purchase of submarines. Yet leaders of the Thai military and government are not making it. Instead, they are using the opportunity of being in power to ram it through without transparency and accountability.
If Thai admirals and generals were to make a case for submarines, they might point to the need for "deterrence", a security concept Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha vaguely alluded to - as krengjai - without elaboration in one of his stern comments to journalists. If Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam have or plan to have submarines, why not Thailand?
The obvious difference is that these Asean members, unlike Thailand, are fundamentally maritime states in need of seaborne military power. As largely maritime states of different shapes and sizes, ringed by long coastlines, submarines are critical to their military capabilities and national security. Moreover, by insisting on having submarines to deter maritime neighbours, the prime minister has betrayed the Asean spirit of community-building.
On the other hand, Thai leaders can rationalise submarines on the grounds of rough "parity", arms modernisation, and general submarine proliferation due to the spread of technology and declining costs over time. If members of the neighbourhood possess a roughly similar range of weaponry in a transparent fashion - air, land, and sea, as well as cyber and space - such comparable military strengths would prove a safer bet for regional security than disproportionate gaps in military capabilities.
As all states must bear arms for adequate self-defence and pursuit of national interests, weapons modernisation is always a priority. In addition, to militaries, submarines add a prestige factor and offer commissions and kickbacks through procurement deals in countries where corruption is strong and the rule of law is weak. Modernisation and weapons-upgrading incentives are reinforced by technological proliferation and improved cost considerations, as older and cheaper submarines are available and brand-new ones provide better value than in the past.
Most important, the shape of global conflict to come may be moving from land to sea. The major conflicts of the 20th century happened during World War I, World War II and the Cold War. Most of it was based on land: the two world wars on continental Europe, with the Pacific theatre fought on sea and in the air. The Cold War was largely land-based in Europe and the developing world in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, characterised by proxy battles between the United States and the Soviet Union in third countries.
But the 21st century may be more like the distant past with resurgent sea power. Military prowess on land is still important, as we can see in parts of eastern Europe bordering Russia and in the Middle East and North Africa. But in East Asia, tensions and age-old conflicts are taking place in the East China Sea and South China Sea. While it is a land power, Thailand has considerable interests at sea.
It should not aim for a "blue water" navy with faraway power projection but it does have blue-water interests, especially in the Indian Ocean. Many have noted that submarines are less useful in the relatively shallow waters of the Gulf of Thailand. Foreign submarines there would be easy picking in anti-submarine warfare. However, beyond the Gulf of Thailand and in the Indian Ocean on the west side of Thailand’s southern peninsula is where submarines could be strategically deployed in the future.
The costs would be huge and require commitment over many years. If the military is interested in offsetting costs and shoring up its submarine argument in the public discourse, it could offer to sell some of its vast prime landholdings to the government. A fraction of military-owned land is worth billions of baht, and the military could essentially pay for its own toys and arms of necessity and prestige. The government can then develop the military’s land for public use and private sale, recouping the purchase costs.
While it has not made a convincing argument for submarines, the Thai military has made matters worse by not explaining why China is the producer of choice for submarines. Other bidders include Sweden and Germany. Sweden would offer interoperability, as the Gripen is now Thailand’s front-line fighter jet. Germany has an illustrious history and proven track record in submarine warfare dating back to World War I. If Thailand is to acquire submarines, why not buy from established and recognised producers in Europe instead of China, which is not known for its submarine technology?
Buying submarines is a long-term and deep undertaking. It entails not just the purchase price but the training, equipment, spare parts, add-ons, and endless after-sales considerations. And how would we know if the Chinese have planted intelligence devices in their mega undersea products?
Considering a purchase of submarines is one thing but committing to purchases from China is something else. China has been a close friend of Thailand harking back centuries to when Siam was part of the Chinese tributary system in Asia, thanks to the fact that Thailand is near China without a shared border. The only blip in the bilateral relationship was during communist expansionism in the Cold War, but it went away by the mid-1970s and the Bangkok-Beijing axis was fully restored by December 1978 when Vietnam invaded Khmer Rouge-controlled and Beijing-backed Phnom Penh. By then, Thailand and China were on the same side fighting the Soviet-backed, Vietnam-supported Heng Samrin regime.
But moving too close to China and putting too many eggs in the China basket is inadvisable. At minimum, getting too cozy with China reveals government weakness and desperation for superpower recognition after the Thai military’s two coups in a decade. Sending the Uighurs back to China to accommodate Beijing while Thailand incurs international opprobrium merely shows the military’s craven willingness to sell out Thailand’s traditionally masterful and clever foreign policy pragmatism on the rough-and-tumble global canvass.
Thailand's leaders should make a persuasive argument as to why submarines are needed, how they might be financed, and why the purchase is not being considered from more established submarine producers. Doing so would enable our leaders to steer Thai foreign policy directions back into a moving equilibrium, neither too much towards China nor too much towards the other major powers.
The writer is on leave from Chulalongkorn University and is currently the Sir Howard Kippenberger Chair at the Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University, New Zealand.