The military regime has ordered the release from prison of former terrorist leader, Sama-ae Thanam. Other releases may follow. Now 63, Sama-ae has vowed to help reconciliation efforts and establish peace across the deep South. Once the leader of the military wing of the so-called Patani United Liberation Front (Pulo), he was captured in Malaysia in 1988, extradited and later jailed on terrorism charges in 1997. Authorities not only believe he is no longer a threat but could help peace efforts in the restive southern provinces.
The decision to release such a high-profile leader of violence seems appropriate. The military regime has continued efforts, first launched by the 2006 military coup leaders, to try to bridge the deep divide between Bangkok officials and southern people.
This has sometimes been a case of two steps forward, one back. The release of Sama-ae is a somewhat radical move by the army, which for decades has made no real headway in combatting violent separatists.
Sama-ae is essentially a relic of the early days of Pulo and the southern violence. As a teenager, he was one of the founder members of the group in 1968. In the 1980s he adopted the nom de guerre Ismael Gadhafi, after the then-dictator of Libya, who supplied Pulo with arms, training and cash. Most of the Pulo fighter's exploits are unknown to the general public. Under his leadership, however, the armed insurgents conducted numerous terrorist attacks, including bombings and, on one occasion, an attempt to attack the high institution.
After a total of 27 years in detention, authorities rated him as an "exceptional prisoner". Placed in line for a review of his case, he convinced officials all the way up to Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha he had reformed. He has pledged to do more than simply remain peaceful. He will actively work to try to end the violence and establish a peaceful regime across the deep South.
Gen Prayut and subordinates acted admirably to order Sama-ae's release. But the hard truth is Sama-ae has no known influence over current events in the South, whatever his good intentions. More importantly, the government must prove its commitment through real policy changes if there is to be any reasonable chance of peace.
Gen Prayut's administration is currently seeking to contact and include southern militants in formal peace talks. At the centre of such efforts, however, are former Pulo colleagues and followers of Sama-ae. Other groups, mostly spinoffs from Pulo, are involved. Two elements are missing, and without them, the chances for a peace agreement are slim.
The government will eventually have to deal with the "new breed" of militants behind the current violence.
The violence of the southern insurgents, added to the violence of government forces who oppose them, are serious problems. Neither, however, is the root cause of the troubles. The violence results from the difference between the way the central government rules the Muslim-dominated South and the manner in which the locals there wish to be governed.
It is encouraging to see the junta holding out olive branches to former mortal enemies of the country. The release of the Pulo terrorist shows a willingness to reconcile. However, it will have little if any effect on peace attempts. Negotiations with old or new breeds of militants will not go far unless the central government gives the southern Muslims more say in local administration that respects their cultural identity.