TIP shows a Thai-US alliance under strain

TIP shows a Thai-US alliance under strain

A boy paints the national flags of Thailand and the US on a US embassy wall to mark the 180th anniversary of relations between the two countries.  (File photo by Patipat Janthong)
A boy paints the national flags of Thailand and the US on a US embassy wall to mark the 180th anniversary of relations between the two countries.  (File photo by Patipat Janthong)

That Thailand has remained on the United States' Tier 3 in Trafficking in Persons list is unsurprising. Even the government of Gen Prayut Chan-ocha has accepted the Tier 3 designation with resignation in the hope of an upgrade in future. What is more interesting is the trend in Thai-US relations over the past decade.

Thailand is a treaty ally of the US but this alliance is under-performing. What both sides need to accept is that the bilateral relationship will never be the same compared to its heyday during the Cold War and need to come up with new rationales  to reboot the alliance for 21st-century demands for mutual benefit.

On the TIP report, three dimensions are at work. First, it is an arbitrary assessment established by US prerogatives based on international rules and practices on human rights. The TIP designation is similar to another US trade policy instrument known as Section 301 and its priority categories against trading partners deemed unfair for violating intellectual property rights. Applied through the lenses of America's human rights standards on Thailand's booming but illicit and unregulated labour industry that is regionally integrated, Thailand can hardly get a passing grade.

Migrant labourers of myriad backgrounds work in Thailand and transit through the country for work in neighbouring economies. So far there is no regional framework that governs this opaque and corrupt labour market which is exploited by those in local power for private gain. In absolute terms, a country like Thailand could be labelled as Tier 3 indefinitely.

Yet in relative terms, it depends on which countries Thailand is measured against. Juxtaposed next to Malaysia, whose labour rights and human smuggling records are not stellar, Thailand's lower ranking understandably raises suspicions of favourable treatment for ulterior motives. The politicisation of the issue and linkage between Malaysia's upgrade and its role in the Trans-Pacific Partnership are to be expected. Under criticism from American legislators, the White House still does not have a convincing explanation for the differences between Malaysia and Cuba on the one hand and Thailand on the other.

Thailand's own measurement against its own track record of whether its human trafficking has improved compared to the past seems clear. As a military government with all kinds of baggage and attributes, the Prayut administration has placed human trafficking as a national priority, including actual arrests of senior officials involved.

It does not help the government that local agencies — the navy in this case — has chosen to persecute journalists working for the Phuketwan website that exposed several people involved in the smuggling of Rohingya migrants two years ago. With generals in charge and popularly elected representatives absent, current Thai leaders also have difficulty finding receptive ears in Washington. But overall, judged against its recent past, Thailand's current efforts against human trafficking are more progressive with demonstrated resolve and commitment.

In a broader frame, the TIP tension is part and parcel of a Thai-US relationship in limbo. Among the US' five formal bilateral alliances in Asia — Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand — the Thai-US axis is evidently the most under-performing, owing to major changes and shifts at interactive domestic, regional and international levels besetting both countries.

To be sure, the relative decline in Thai-US ties in the early 21st century was partly inevitable because of structural changes in the region and in the international system more broadly. The Cold War provided an enabling environment to shape and solidify Thai-US relations. Thailand has long been famous for its ability to navigate the treacherous waters of colonial expansionism and the two world wars by playing off and balancing the major powers. But when it came to communist expansionism in the Cold War, Bangkok bit the bullet and firmly took Washington's side.

The conclusion of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath in the late 1980s and early 1990s left Thai-US relations adrift in search of new bearings. At the same time, domestic political changes within Thailand impinged on the bilateral alliance.

After Thailand's Cold War decades of sustained economic development and democratisation had gained momentum and reached a critical juncture in the mid-1990s when it appeared that Thai democracy was on its way to consolidation, even though Thailand's economic prowess came to a halt in 1997-98 as the epicentre of the Asian financial crisis.

The ensuing years of China's rise and resurgence and America's pre-eminent but challenged staying power in the wake of the post-9/11 Global War on Terror (GWOT), also spelled changes for the neighbourhood. America was no longer the paramount power in absolute terms, as it was in the past. China was coming up, and so was Asean. The uplift of Thai democracy culminated with the electoral supremacy of Thaksin Shinawatra, a former police officer and consummate politician with a telecommunications empire and extensive networks in business and the bureaucracy.

Under Thaksin's rule, which began with immense electoral popularity but later tainted by corruption and abuse of power, Thai-US relations appeared to have found a new footing. As the GWOT got underway, the Thai-US alliance kicked into gear, and rose to a new-found understanding in October 2003, when Washington designated Thailand as a Major Non-Nato Ally in view of a clutch of agreements to boost US security objectives and lift trade ties. But this new promising hope for the bilateral relationship was short-lived as both the GWOT and President George W. Bush's presidency waned in tandem with anti-Thaksin protests in Bangkok.

By the time the Thai military staged a coup on Sept 19, 2006 to depose Thaksin, the bilateral alliance was back in adrift mode, despite the efforts of the US ambassador in Bangkok at the time who led relatively mild coup criticisms from the State Department. The US' forbearance was not enough, however. The domestic setting in Bangkok had soured against Thaksin so much that it irreparably politicised Thai-US relations, deepening the distrust against Thaksin as much as the Bush Administration had confidence in his rule.

There was little American officials could do through subsequent ambassadorships in Bangkok and the State Department's outreaches, to put the relationship back on an even keel. Thai domestic politics dominated bilateral relations. By 22 May 2014, when a sequel coup was carried out in Bangkok contrary to Washington's political outlook and preference, the alliance was not just adrift but became fully lost at sea. Washington was much harsher in its criticisms and punitive measures were imposed this time because American officials felt they were misled on the belief that 2006 was just a time-out for democracy not a long suspension as happened in 2014.

How the Thai-US relationship fares going forward depends more on Thailand's domestic political outcomes than those of the US. The Thai domestic sphere is increasingly contentious during the current transitional period, with rising stakes and all to play for. Thailand's political order that grew out of the Cold War, anchoring around the monarchy, military and bureaucracy, is untenable and in need of recalibration to be compatible with growing demands and expectations spawned by economic development and democratisation.

Following Thailand's two coups in eight years, in 2006 and 2014, Washington's repeated calls for the restoration of elections and democracy have further deepened the bilateral estrangement between Thailand's ruling military regime and the US government.

As a result, the Thai-US alliance has under-performed as Thailand is stuck in a domestic holding pattern. The geopolitical implications are far-reaching as Thailand's military regime has found succour in Beijing's recognition and support.

Thai-US relations to a large extent were never going to be as staunch as in the Cold War era but they still can be a solid and mutually beneficial relationship for Thailand's traditional policy of balancing between the great powers and for the US in its geopolitical engagements in Asia.

This is a reality that both Bangkok and Washington have to come to grips with beyond the TIP controversy.


Thitinan Pongsudhirak is on leave from Chulalongkorn University and is the Sir Howard Kippenberger chairman at the Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Senior fellow of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University

A professor and senior fellow of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science, he earned a PhD from the London School of Economics with a top dissertation prize in 2002. Recognised for excellence in opinion writing from Society of Publishers in Asia, his views and articles have been published widely by local and international media.

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