The latest machinations of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) focuses on "making every vote count", possibly by using a hybrid mixed-method proportional system which will see more of the smaller parties winning seats, thereby forcing a coalition government and de-clawing the Pheu Thai political machine.
Meanwhile, over the border in Myanmar, many pundits incorrectly assumed the National League for Democracy (NLD) would not win an outright majority in the recent elections and would be forced into a coalition with smaller, ethno-regional parties. There might be a lesson here for Thailand.
In Myanmar, the NLD won at every level of government, in the House of Nationalities, in the House of Representatives, and in the state and regional assemblies. Nonetheless, in the future the NLD's fortunes could wane, as it won on a wave of idealism and aspirations regarding human rights and reduced corruption, which are likely to prove difficult to meet given the military's entrenched position in key ministries as well as its 25% self-allocated blocs of votes. Moreover, the NLD is beholden to a single charismatic leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, who is 70 years old and does not enjoy perfect health. Ethno-regional parties, while they under-performed, succeeded in winning over 8% of seats across the board.
Of course, Thailand's political and administrative systems are unlike Myanmar's, with its strong ethnic identities serving as centrifugal forces in favour of federalism while Bamar nationalism and the might of the Myanmar military serve as a force for centralised rule. Nonetheless, there are similarities between the Thai and Myanmar militaries, with both concentrating on natural resource exploitation models, notably gold, potash, and natural gas in Thailand and the lucrative jade trade in Myanmar.
Moreover, both are historically well-entrenched at all levels of decision-making, especially regarding industry, foreign policy, and internal security. However, that a long-term resolution to Thailand's socio-political situation could consist of a military party being developed or even being allocated a bloc of seats, as in Thailand's past or in Myanmar, would be seen as a recidivist step. Such a move would be unacceptable to both Pheu Thai and the Democrats, and would lead to the rejection of the constitution presently being drafted.
Without this kind of "quid pro quo", the spotlight must again be shone on Thailand's smaller parties -- those the establishment hopes will be enough to counter Pheu Thai's influence in the next election in the North and Northeast. Yet, while 40 parties ran in Thailand's last legitimate elections in 2011, only 11 won any seats. Even if a pure proportional system is introduced, the number of parties winning seats would at best rise by half a dozen. And of these, only seven parties would really matter: Pheu Thai, the Democrats, Bhumjaithai, Chartthai Pattana, Chart Pattana Puea Pandin, Matubhum, and Palung Chon.
Two of these parties, Bhumjaithai and Chart Thai Pattana, have no clear ideology other than winning seats and ran in the 2011 election in a partnership whose sole purpose was to join with the winning party and extract the maximum concessions from it in terms of cabinet seats and possibly even a 'reconciliation prime minister'.
While both parties are in a sense regional or at least provincial, with Bhumjaithai being led from Newin Chidchob's powerbase in Buri Ram and Chart Thai Pattana being directed by former premier Banharn Silpa-archa from his Suphan Buri headquarters, only the latter has a history of being able to assume the national stage, with Mr Banharn managing to secure the premiership in a short-lived and heavily criticised administration in 1994-1995, in the party's long-gone heyday. And Bhumjaithai has never attempted to capitalise on its ethnic northern Khmer roots to develop principled policies favouring this minority group or to reach out to other such groups.
Of the other parties, Chart Pattana Puea Pandin is another populist party located in Nakhon Ratchasima in the Northeast, again without any policies favouring any local ethnic people, while Palung Chon is again a populist, geographically-bound party centred on Chon Buri, achieving only one ministry in previous elections. This leaves Matubhum, Thailand's only genuine ethno-regional party, led by Muslim general and 2006 coup-maker Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, which has a stance in favour of reconciliation with both the "red" and "yellow" factions as well as of the Muslims and Buddhists in the Deep South. However, it only won 1.2% of the vote in 2011 elections.
Thus, the CDC, representing the conservative order and its superiors, the military, faces a dire socio-political situation. Pheu Thai won 44.3% of the vote in the 2011 elections, while the second-placed Democrat Party is perceived to be unable to distance itself sufficiently from the military government of Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha. Thus, for a reconciliation or national unity government to beat Pheu Thai in the next election, there would have to be a coalition of the second, third, fourth, and fifth-largest parties just to squeak through a majority of only 2-3% under a pure proportional representation system, based on the 2011 voting patterns.
While the hybrid mixed-method proportional system will help smaller parties winning seats to reduce Pheu Thai's power, this would represent a reversion to traditional Thai machine politics given the fact that smaller parties only run to receive windfalls.
There have been attempts to offer alternatives. One, emerging from Thailand's radical left, is the newly-formed Commoners' Party of Thailand, which will contest the next elections. However, its policies, while ideologically principled, will be hard to sell to most Thais after a bout of military-inspired ultra-nationalism. Moreover, the party is itself mainly an intellectual exercise and not resting on a large demographic base. Nor has it solved the problem of the lack of democratic party structures.
Another scenario would be the development of ethno-regional parties like Matubhum, but this avenue requires the military to ease off the nationalism and encourage political decentralisation. Yet, without a major party of the left or significant concessions towards self-determination by the military, Thailand will still face the vicious cycle of constitution, crisis and coup, whatever the CDC decides.
John Draper is Project Officer, Isan Culture Maintenance and Revitalisation Programme (ICMRP), College of Local Administration (COLA), Khon Kaen University. Peerasit Kamnuansilpa, PhD, is founder and former dean of the College of Local Administration, Khon Kaen University.