So far in the 21st century, political fortunes in Southeast Asian states have been mixed. As the world's only region that harbours all political regimes from absolutism in Brunei and authoritarianism in Thailand to thriving democracy in Indonesia and communist one-party rule in Vietnam, Southeast Asia's political future will likely be sandwiched between a rule by the few and government by the majority. The determinant of future regime pathways in this region may well be the performance of China on one hand and India and Japan on the other, the largest and most consequent major powers in the neighbourhood.
If China eventually succeeds in having a centralised one-party state in control of the world's largest market economy, the chief lesson to others will be that authoritarian regimes can have it both ways with an economically successful and authoritarian regime. But if China's currently challenged economy leads to political disruptions within, and contagious turbulence beyond, the damning outcome will be that authoritarian states may be able to govern and guide the market only up to a point, beyond which centralised controls inevitably accumulate internal distortions that cause an implosive reckoning.
Thus, the cementing of ties between Japan and India is crucial. Tokyo and New Delhi are global economic heavyweights with pluralistic societies and democratic regimes. If the world's largest and Asia's wealthiest democracies remain resilient in the face of China's economic turmoil, then other states in the region will see the value of pluralism as the successful lynchpin of economic performance. While Japan and India have trumpeted their democratic values and open-society orientation in tandem with their Asian-ness, their efforts have been mostly rhetorical. Hard interests have mattered more than democratic values for the two countries as they have focused mostly on infrastructure investment, defence technology, and nuclear energy cooperation.
How democracy and authoritarianism fares in Japan, India and China is highly consequential for Southeast Asia. For example, Myanmar has taken a democratic turn, whereas Thailand has gone back to its military-authoritarian past. After its landmark election that catapulted democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy party to a spectacular triumph at the expense of a half-century military government, Myanmar is poised to reap the dividends of better human rights, transparency and accountability, notwithstanding deeply embedded challenges of ethnic conflicts, environmental degradation, and income inequality.
Myanmar's democratic outcome was a loss for China and a win for democratic movements elsewhere. In turn, Myanmar's viability in the longer term is crucial for Thailand and other political systems that intend to re-enter the democratic realm. If Myanmar's democracy is derailed it will set a bad precedent for Thailand and developing democracies more broadly.
On the other hand, Thailand's twin coups in 2006 and 2014 have been a boon to China, as the ruling generals in Bangkok have openly sought superpower succour from Beijing. As Western criticism of Thailand's repression and authoritarianism have hit a brick wall erected by Bangkok's pro-coup coalition, louder Asian voices for democracy from Japan and India, and even South Korea, would go farther in making a difference towards returning to popular rule in the nearer term.
Malaysia and Cambodia have been illiberal parliamentary democracies with growing authoritarian tendencies, marked by suppression of dissent and intimidation and persecution of the opposition. The longstanding incumbent regimes in these two countries resist giving more space to opposition parties and dissenting voices. Averse to greater political pluralism and openness, these two regimes prefer authoritarian means for survival.
To its credit, the glaring exception is Singapore, where the entrenched power holders have proven themselves at the polls ahead of rivals through merit-based mobility, appealing policy ideas and responsive governance. Singapore's ruling regime has been smart in having its cake and eating it, too. But its leaders have earned it in a hard way with continuing vigilance at the expense of complacency.
Indonesia and the Philippines are edging more firmly into the democracy camp. But Indonesia will need to keep delivering and catering to popular demands and grievances to keep its hard-won democracy on track. It must also fight Islamic extremism and global jihadist movements, such as the Islamic State, effectively as it did a decade earlier against al-Qaeda. Jakarta is surely not eyeing China for an authoritarian future but is coming up with its own brand of democracy, enabled by moderate Islam, steady economic growth and tolerant politics where rules are observed and electoral players wait their turn to contest for a popular mandate.
While it is vulnerable to democratic setbacks as another election looms this year, the Philippines has locked horns with China over South China Sea territorial claims and will likely lean on the US and Japan as a matter of national security. For this reason, democratic rule in the Catholic-predominant archipelago state may regress but it is unlikely to fall for Beijing's authoritarian draw.
Southeast Asia's long-term authoritarian holdouts, namely Laos, Vietnam and even Brunei, will want to follow the Chinese model of top-down control with fruitful growth results. But inexorable modernisation and globalisation will only lead to mounting pressure from below. China's performance is thus critical to how these regimes will evolve in coming years.
Southeast Asia's future between democracy and authoritarianism will be decided less by Western democracy-promotion and more by Asian democracies encompassing Asian values of communitarianism and social harmony together with human rights and basic freedoms that are compatible and consonant with popular rule. Discredited by hypocrisy and misadventure in the Middle East and constrained by fiscal debt and political dysfunction at home, Western countries can spout democracy all they want but it does not go as far as in the past. The fight for democracy in Southeast Asia may soon be confined to Asian states themselves. If countries like as Japan, India and South Korea can succeed where China stumbles, they can inspire more democratic pathways with Asian attributes.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is associate professor and director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.