If Thailand were to revert and regress from a burgeoning democracy to an entrenching military-authoritarian rule of three or four decades ago, it would not look so out of place in Southeast Asia's mixed neighbourhood of absolutism, communism, and competitive authoritarianism.
But Southeast Asia has changed dramatically, led by Myanmar's democratic renewal and consolidating democracies in Indonesia and even the Philippines. Just about whichever way one looks at it, Thailand is certifiably the regional laggard, just about falling off the radar screens of major capitals around the world.
Not long ago, Bangkok was at the front and centre of regional action. As communism engulfed the Indochinese states of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Bangkok became the bulwark in the global anti-communist struggle, a frontline domino that never fell.
Thailand was the centre of anti-communist military operations, refugee relief, development assistance and myriad matters that went into winning the Cold War, including the facilitation of Asean's formation and its birthplace. Along the way, economic development set in and became entrenched. By the late 1980s, Japan-led foreign direct investment provided a crucial uplift that enabled Thailand to grow from a backwater village to a gleaming modern nation despite the 1997-98 economic setback.
Back then, many regional roads led to and through Bangkok. Diplomats who wanted to build a career went through a Bangkok posting, sometimes more than once. For journalists, Bangkok was where news bureaus were set up to cover at least the mainland countries, if not Southeast Asia in its entirety. Aid workers and humanitarian assistance missions in war-torn societies had to go through Bangkok to reach the rest of mainland Southeast Asia, as then-Burma was autarkic and the Indochina was communist. Tourism boomed, and tourists who were intent on visiting nearby mainland sights and scenes had to use Bangkok as a base. Aviation traffic made Bangkok's international airport a top global passageway both as transit and destination. Investors in the region had few places to go in mainland Southeast Asia except Thailand. Those were the days.
To some extent, Thailand still benefits from its Cold War legacy. Its tourism sector, aviation traffic, foreign investment, and regional base for development relief are still holding up, if barely. But at the rate of its self-destruction, Thailand may soon become a democratic and developed-country wannabe.
Bangkok is no longer the regional nexus. Aspiring and career-building diplomats now prefer alternative postings because not much can get done at a high-level, as the military government in Bangkok is shunned by much of the rest of the world. There are bilateral and diplomatic accomplishments to be had with more authoritarian countries, like China and Russia, but envoys from democracies can only find crisis-management work in a holding pattern if posted to Bangkok. Moreover, Bangkok is no longer the hub for diplomatic coverage of Southeast Asia, as a host of embassies have been set up in Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia.
Some news bureaus have moved out of the Thai capital. The Economist magazine, for example, relocated its Southeast Asia outpost from Bangkok to Singapore several years ago because its correspondent was harassed and unable to report on protrusive goings-on in Thailand. More regional news bureaus may soon have to follow suit as the Thai authorities are making it harder to obtain journalist visas. Freelance journalists have also faced visa difficulties. The military government is apparently trying to weed them out for unfavourable reportage, putting up only with those from the mainstream wire services.
Aid workers are increasingly stationed where their efforts are needed, especially Myanmar. Tourism numbers are still buoyant but there has been a growing shift of visitors from China in place of traditional higher-spending markets in Europe and North America. And there are now direct flights that criss-cross mainland Southeast Asia without having to stop over in Bangkok.
For foreign investors, Indonesia and Vietnam beckon more than Thailand because of their larger internal markets. Hanoi is also a member of the trade-liberalising Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement while Bangkok dithers on trade policy. So disappointing is Thailand's sliding trajectory that it is easier to imagine another military coup in Bangkok than to see it happening elsewhere in the region, even in previously coup-prone Myanmar and the Philippines. No sign of Thailand's fall from democratic grace is more powerful and poignant than all the daily news emanating from a now-democratic Myanmar.
Thailand still has a lot going for it, and its people are resilient and resourceful. But the feeling that this country is moving to the periphery of major goings-on is inescapable. It will all depend on how long this all takes. If power-mongering and self-interested elites keep going after one another, Thailand's political crisis will not bottom out for some time. This could be a longer period than anticipated where opportunity costs will mount and not as much will be left after the infighting and power struggles reach a critical and exhaustive point. A changing neighbourhood that is broadly on its way up from Myanmar and Vietnam to Indonesia and the Philippines should remind and entice Thai elites to come to terms and mutual accommodation before Thailand slips further away from global and regional attention.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is associate professor and director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.