Order 13/2559, issued by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) which grants police powers to the military, to investigate certain crimes without due process, is tantamount to an admission of failure.
In two years, the NCPO has been unable to implement, or even commit to, comprehensive police reform, despite this being the public's most earnestly desired reform and despite it being a precondition to tackling corruption.
To tackle corruption at the core it is necessary to first reduce the level of corruption in the Royal Thai Police. For this to happen, Thailand needs to emulate the most successful structural police reform in the history of modern policing, the reform of the New South Wales Police Force.
In the face of rising allegations of corruption, in 1995 a Royal Commission was established to investigate the NSW police force. A Royal Commission is a major public inquiry, common under a constitutional monarchy, with quasi-judicial powers greater than that of a judge.
To prevent abuse, it is restricted to a specific issue and has carefully framed terms of reference. In this case, special police and investigative powers were granted, including the use of electronic surveillance and a penalty of six months imprisonment for perjury.
The NSW Royal Commission, under a senior judge, operated between 1995 and 1997. One of its first acts was to interview the most senior NSW police officer, the commissioner. The commissioner provided a map upon which were marked places with little to no corruption together with corruption hot spots. Remarkably, the infamous King's Cross area of Sydney was marked entirely corruption free.
It was this area the commission targeted, with the aim of "turning" one of the officers at the heart of the web of corruption. They were successful, and the officer was voluntarily placed under electric surveillance.
Over six months, the amount of data collected was sufficient to launch investigations into senior officers in King's Cross. After the officers denied any knowledge of corruption, the commission presented them with the evidence from the electronic surveillance. They cracked.
When these officers, widely seen within the force as untouchable, were broken by the Royal Commission, it was inundated with hundreds of calls from officers seeking to make deals. The scale of the collapse was such the commission instituted a conditional amnesty process.
Unable and unwilling to prosecute every case, the amnesty process involved officers providing full accounts of the corruption they had been involved in, in exchange for which they were allowed to continue to serve, or, in more serious cases, resign. These full accounts of corruption in turn led to hundreds more resignations, as well as criminal proceedings in serious cases, and provided a clear indication of the scale of corruption and its causes. By forcing the resignation of hundreds of officers, the commission laid the foundations for the rebuilding of the NSW Police Force.
Crucially, one of the main players in the rebirth of the force, the new commissioner who was recruited specially for the task, Peter Ryan, was an outsider, a senior police chief from the UK. He was granted wide ranging powers to fire police officers.
Mr Ryan, supported by the Royal Commission's personnel and extensive reports on the scope and causes of corruption and the improvements needed, implemented wide-ranging reforms. Drug and alcohol testing of police officers and integrity testing, complete with financial declarations, were implemented.
Thus, potential police corruption is now investigated using integrity testing, investigations, and intelligence and review processes, with all investigators directly responsible to the commissioner. Police integrity training, for preventing corruption, is supervised by a policy, research and education unit. This provides special training for officers in how to handle potential inducements to corruption, whether from criminals or fellow officers. These include the means to report allegations while receiving special protection and internal witness support.
Because it was recognised that guaranteeing police ethics is a constant requirement, the Royal Commission created its own permanent successor, the Police Integrity Commission, which has the same power as a standing Royal Commission.
The reforms also involved the disbanding of the Surveillance and Special branches after both had been discredited during the investigation. Both branches were completely rebuilt with new officers. Extensive use is now made of electronic measures, such as the use of video and audio during the execution of search warrants, to prevent corrupt officers from planting drugs and framing suspects.
Moreover, to protect the public, a police action line and police complaints case management system were introduced. A new service charter and code of conduct were introduced and the public was informed about the service they can expect. Finally, the command structure was flattened, through the retiring of senior officers, to create an efficient, transparent command structure.
As Thailand becomes an established militarised police state, basic liberties and rights are being lost at the expense of an arbitrary system of law enforcement which can, at best, only serve to increase the levels of societal fear and uncertainty and harm the rule of law under a civilian judiciary. Granting police and judicial powers to the military and issuing a list of "influential figures" to be targeted is not a recipe for systemic reform but for a free-for-all. It discredits both the Royal Thai Police and the legal system.
What Thailand needs instead is a standing Royal Commission under a senior judge, backed by the political will to see through structural reforms to professionalise the Royal Thai Police.
In the absence of such will, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha has stated significant police reform will have to be deferred to the next elected government.
In this light, the targeting of influential figures through enhanced military powers appears to strike a note of desperation. Gen Prayut has unwittingly created a police state, which will only make it more difficult for the next government to tackle the problem of corruption in the country.
John Draper is project officer, Isan Culture Maintenance and Revitalisation Programme, College of Local Administration, Khon Kaen University. Peerasit Kamnuansilpa Phd is founder and former dean of the College of Local Administration, Khon Kaen University.