A popular development story in Asia features Myanmar, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. Back in 1960, their economic bases were roughly on par, their development prospects uncertain. Mixed fortunes awaited them as they scaled contrasting trajectories owing to a combination of leadership, economic planning, external challenges and varying luck. More than five decades on, they have ended up in different destinations that are instructive for struggling democracies in the region and elsewhere.
South Korea was the least likely to succeed in 1960. It had gone through a bitter civil war, became divided between north and south, was ravaged by poverty with dim prospects for economic success. Thanks to its alliance with the United States and the constant threat of attack from the North, South Korean elites squabbled only up to a point and relented under military dictatorships, first led by army strongman Park Chung-hee.
Like Thailand at that time, South Korea’s army delegated economic management to policy technocrats, insulating them from the cut-and-thrust of politics. It was not a smooth ride but South Korea’s macro-economy surged and brought with it bottom-up pressure for political liberalisation. The ruling elites resisted but eventually succumbed to pro-democracy forces. The point of no return for South Korean democracy was in 1987 when pro-democracy demonstrators triumphed in the streets. Democracy in South Korea has since consolidated, crossing its own Rubicon where a military coup is neither viable nor considered. Seoul still sees regular street protests, especially by strong labour unions, but they are confronted by almost an equal number of policemen. And the protesters typically go home after making their point.
The Philippines underwent a similar catharsis in 1986 when more than a decade-long dictatorship under Ferdinand Marcos was spectacularly brought down by a "people’s power" street movement. Dictatorship gave way but a broad-based democracy was still far off due to an embedded and corrupt oligarchy, concentrating both power and wealth in a few hands. Like their neighbours, the Filipinos navigated topsy-turvy terrain to emerge now as a solid, if fragile, transitioning democracy. Its democratic prospects depend on sustaining economic growth, broadening and sharing power and wealth, and keeping oligarchs at bay. If its democratic rule under the internationally popular President Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino can deliver better livelihoods, its democracy will stand in good shape, if still a long way from consolidation.
Myanmar and Thailand increasingly show a reversal of political fortunes. Myanmar, formerly Burma, also came under military dictatorship in the early 1960s but, unlike South Korea and Thailand, military rule was insular and closed to the outside world. Myanmar’s economy practically became autarkic, with little integration with the world economy. It was known as the "Burmese way to socialism". But even without economic development, bottom-up pressures for political liberalisation came to the fore time and again from the late 1980s, and were duly suppressed by the military dictatorship.
Luck and leadership changed over the past few years. Since mid-2011, political reforms and economic restructuring have been put in place. Myanmar is like any other country where elites squabble, bicker and stab each other in the back in competition for political power and its attendant benefits. Yet it is different than other countries, particularly Thailand, in two crucial ways.
First, Myanmar’s leaders have not and are unlikely to take their country to extreme brinkmanship again. For example, its iconic opposition leaders Aung San Suu Kyi is keen to run in national elections next year, where her National League for Democracy Party is almost sure of emerging as the winner. But the military-contrived constitution bars her from becoming president because she has family members who are foreign nationals. Yet the NLD is likely to still participate in the electoral process even if its leader is kept out of top office.
It is as if Myanmar’s leaders from President Thein Sein and defence chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to Parliament Speaker Shwe Mann and Aung San Suu Kyi have seen the bottom of the political pit and they don’t want to look down there again. Their shoddy and cruel pasts have become their parameters and rules of the game.
Second and more importantly, the Myanmar people have a collective sense of having left themselves behind for five decades. They all want to move ahead, hungry to learn and develop and eager to rejoin the outside world. Their political future is uncertain after elections next year, and the 50-year disconnect from development and democracy poses daunting challenges as they try to fill missing gaps and organise moving parts to make their political system and economy viable and attractive. But their trajectory is generally pointing upwards for the foreseeable future, although from a low base and notwithstanding bumps and detours along the way.
Thailand is just about the opposite. It has come admirably far in its economic development. If only its democracy can consolidate, to the point where a military coup is unimaginable (and even unwelcome), its economy and people have the potential to expand beyond middle-income status. Thailand is a country with G-20 potential that performs now like a Third World basket case. Unlike 17 years ago, when Thai democracy was building up and Indonesia’s was crumbling, Thai politics is now stuck in a holding pattern. This is a country so complacent in its forward path that it has been shooting itself in the foot at a standstill. Each side of the divide believes it can win it all and is willing to go to extremes to get its way.
Thailand hit bottom last time in May 1992 when pro-democracy protesters in Bangkok overcame a disguised military rule. A broad-based consensus for reforms led to a new constitution but all that has been lost over the past decade or so as Thailand descends into a political freefall and becomes a regional laggard.
At issue now are the opportunity costs of the ongoing political crisis in Bangkok and whether this protracted confrontation will become structural and intractable. Judging by current trends, the prospects are not promising. Thai people need to look outside their Bangkok-based bubble to see the moving world outside. It can provide incentives for them to look for parameters and backstops before descent leads to disintegration.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, associate professor at Chulalongkorn University, is current a visiting faculty at University of Yangon’s International Center of Excellence.