As its political environment remains murky in the wake of the Constitutional Court’s ouster of Yingluck Shinawatra, Thailand now stands at a dire crossroads with deepening rifts and growing risks of turmoil and mayhem.
The Democracy Monument is partially hidden by a national flag, punctured with a hole at an anti-government rally. Mass mobilisations by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee and the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship have raised fears of political violence. Panumas Sanguanwong
In the short term, Thailand will either have a problematic election that will be fraught with controversy, or it will end up with an appointed government of questionable contrivance. Along the way, the military’s role in politics is likely to widen as violence becomes more deadly, frequent, and uncontrollable.
There is certainly no smooth, cure-all exit from the current quagmire. The least worst outcome lies in the electoral process because it carries popular mandate and democratic legitimacy. Political instability will likely persist, both with and without an election. But an appointed government without a poll is likely to elicit more instability because it would be undemocratic.
Protests against an undemocratic government would appear more legitimate. The rest of the world, which matters substantially to Thailand, would be less supportive of an appointed government than of an elected administration equipped with a popular will of the electorate. This is a reality that may not be readily perceived and received by Thailand’s seemingly irreconcilable polarisation, where reason and logic have given way to emotion and prejudice. It is as if we Thais are increasingly becoming possessed and spellbound by one side or the other.
Going forward, one or a combination of the three main variables — comprising a military coup, an appointed government of some kind or an elected government through the ballot box — appears in the offing.
As far as the military is concerned, it has repeatedly declined opportunities and demands to stage a putsch, most recently provided by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee-led protest movement. Yet at a minimum, the military already has been compelled to maintain law and order. A case in point is the ubiquitous military presence in Bangkok where camouflaged bunkers dot downtown areas.
Beyond this, the military may come under pressure from the PDRC-led columns to enforce an unelected outcome if an appointed government does come into place. This could involve military operations against pro-government red shirts under the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship who have prepared for an uprising against an appointed, unelected government.
The maximum for the military would be an outright seizure of power in the familiar fashion with which we have become accustomed over the years. Such a full assertion of military power in politics already would have taken place in the past. But this time the army’s high command has been restrained because the stakes are high and post-coup risks and challenges would be difficult to manage.
The military, however, is not under as much pressure to ensure elections are held on July 20 as planned. But with or without the polls, tension and turmoil stemming from the confrontation between the PDRC-led coalition and the pro-government UDD will probably deteriorate, dragging the men in green into Thailand’s precarious political arena.
On the other hand, polls scheduled for July 20 appear to be going nowhere. After another day of violence when three of its followers were killed and many more injured in a night-time attack, the PDRC maintained its brinkmanship by effectively breaking up a meeting between the Election Commission and the government to discuss poll details. The poll is now likely to be further delayed. The longer the election is delayed, the less likely it will take place because of the PDRC’s accelerated drive for an appointed government.
If an election is not in the offing and an outright military coup is unlikely in the near term, then an unelected outcome will grow in likelihood. In the absence of a lower house, PDRC secretary-general Suthep Thaugsuban is working with appointed and elected senators to produce an outsider prime minister whose name would be forwarded to the King for counter-signing based on Section 7 of the constitution that empowers the monarch to appoint a government if a political vacuum arises.
Whether a political vacuum exists is fiercely debated, however. The post-Ying-
luck caretaker government under Niwattumrong Boonsongpaisan insists on having the authority to govern and oversee the electoral process. Mr Suthep’s manoeuvre is risky. It puts pressure on state agencies to comply, and may place the onus on the King for the counter signature. As Mr Suthep and the PDRC press this brinkmanship game, their success would exacerbate the wrath of the red shirts, thereby raising political risks inexorably.
For his part, Thaksin made a poor choice in Mr Niwatthamrong as interim caretaker prime minister. He lacks stature and is seen as a Thaksin lackey, making him an appealing target of attack for the anti-government coalition. Again Thaksin showed that trust and control trump merit and compromise. A post-Yingluck cabinet holdover like Pongthep Thepkanchana would be more suitable at this critical time.
While the red shirts have been demonstrating, they are likely to hold their ground for the time being as long as their Pheu Thai Party-led government remains in office and an electoral outcome is in store. But if there is an outright ouster of the caretaker administration and an ensuing unelected outcome, another red-shirt uprising akin to 2009-10 can be expected, perhaps more severe this time.
Key to the immediate path ahead for Thailand is whether Mr Suthep’s PDRC gets its way or not, and whether the opposition Democrat Party re-enters the electoral fray. If Mr Suthep does not win and the Democrats join the eventual poll, then an electoral outcome can be expected and a way out may be found. This is the least undesirable outcome under the circumstances. If Mr Suthep wins and a royally appointed government takes shape, Thailand’s political environment will degenerate and descend further into volatility and turmoil.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is associate professor and director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.