Lottery overpricing, illegal parking by passenger van drivers and exploitation of migrant workers were the first three problems the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) tackled after the May 22 coup. The rationale was that they were not complicated and straightforward and, therefore, could be resolved without much difficulty.
Public support for the NCPO's moves was overwhelming. When NCPO chief Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha declared in June the retail price of lottery tickets must be pegged at 80 baht apiece, there were resounding cheers from lottery customers.
But their "happiness" was short-lived as reality set in. Gen Prayuth himself appears to have softened his tone and admitted that 92 baht per ticket would be more realistic after complaints from vendors.
Today, lottery tickets sell for a minimum of 100 baht at all stalls. Lottery sets of two up to 10 tickets are also available at more than 100 baht apiece depending on how "beautiful" their numbers are.
The junta attempted to overhaul the lottery system, and terminated quotas granted to the "Big Three" traditional concessionaires, though the changes may not have gone far enough.
The lottery conundrum shows the challenges the junta set out to solve may not be as simple as they look.
Contrary to the widespread perception that lottery overpricing is a straightforward issue which can be resolved just by removing the "Big Three" from the picture and redistributing the lottery quota to the retailers, the problem is much more complicated.
To begin with, the NCPO's decision to print an additional 2 million tickets beyond the 70 million printed for each biweekly draw is an impractical approach.
More lottery tickets will only make more money for vested interest groups in the lottery trade and will not bring down the retail price.
Redistributing lottery quotas directly to the vendors to bypass the wholesalers has created a new Herculean task for the Government Lottery Office.
It means the office must sell all 72 million tickets for each draw to 72,000 retailers or vendors, each with a quota of 1,000 tickets, within three days of issuing the tickets — instead of just to the three big wholesalers.
There is one factor that most buyers and even the NCPO seem to have overlooked — that there are tickets consumers will never buy. For instance, tickets of similar numbers, which are the cost of doing business for the sellers.
These unwanted tickets normally account for 10% of each batch.
Since the traditional policy of the Government Lottery Office has always been not to take any liability and that all the tickets must be sold, it is doubtful the office will bother selling all the tickets directly to the retailers.
Still, the existing quota system which is limited to the "Big Three" must be overhauled and a profit margin must be fixed to ensure a reasonable profit for the wholesalers. To do so, the NCPO must make clear its policy to overhaul the system.
Another pragmatic alternative is to develop an online lottery selling system, which would satisfy consumers and could do away with the overpricing problem once and for all.
Lottery overpricing is not a life-or-death issue for consumers and the NCPO. But it is an important test case.
It will illustrate the NCPO's ability to take on the mafia in the lottery and other murky businesses.
Its credibility will be at stake if it fails to address the problem despite its absolute power.