For
Thaksin Shinawatra, 2001 was to be a year of change, a chance
to implement his sweeping visions for fundamental change of the
economy, of politics and of the very roots of society.
At the start
of the year, hopes and public confidence rode high that Mr Thaksin,
armed with the biggest electoral landslide since Thailand adopted
democracy in the 1930s, would be able to lead the country into
a new phase of prosperity.
The campaign
philosophy of his Thai Rak Thai Party relied on several key
pillars aimed at tapping into the resentment of rural voters
to what they felt was years of neglect. Development policies
would no longer be structured at entrenched power groups in
the cities _ universal, low-cost health care, a farm debt suspension
plan and new support programmes for small businesses were promoted
directly at the lower rungs of the economic ladder.
Yet by the
end of the year, hope had turned largely to disappointment,
as implementation of the government's programmes were stalled
by political infighting, bureaucratic inertia and a slowing
domestic and global economy.
THINKING
DIFFERENTLY?
Most observers
do give Mr Thaksin and the new government credit for rapid progress,
by usual standards, in translating out his campaign promises
into policy action.
 |
Mr
Thaksin...sweeping
visions |
Within days
of forming the Cabinet in February, Mr Thaksin had launched
the first of what would be numerous "workshops" _ brainstorming
sessions attended by senior technocrats, industry leaders and
government ministers to identify existing problems, discuss
solutions and implement timeframes for action.
But dogging
Mr Thaksin and his ability to implement change for much of the
first half of the year was his asset declaration case before
the Constitutional Court. A guilty verdict would have meant
political limbo, with Mr Thaksin potentially banned from office
for five years.
After the
case ended in August with a controversial 8-7 decision acquitting
Mr Thaksin, the government's wheels began to move more rapidly,
with Thai Rak Thai given a free hand to use its huge parliamentary
majority to push through the legal and administrative changes
needed to accomplish its policy priorities.
Top executives
at the Bank of Thailand, state banks and state enterprises were
changed to bring in "team players". Two respected civil servants,
central bank governor M.R. Chatumongol Sonakul and commerce
permanent secretary Krirk-krai Jirapaet were removed for failing
to see eye-to-eye with the government.
The Thai
Asset Management Corp was formally established, tasked with
restructuring over one trillion baht in bad loans. Even so,
banks remained reluctant to lend into an uncertain economic
environment.
To compensate,
policymakers directed state-owned banks, led by the Government
Savings Bank and Krung Thai Bank, to ramp up their lending activities,
including community-targeted programmes such as the People's
Bank microfinance scheme and loans to new graduates and unemployed
workers to finance new business start-ups.
The village
investment funds programme, which establishes a one-million-baht
revolving fund for 70,000 villages nationwide, was also launched,
positioned as a capital source to finance local business and
development programmes.
Other high-profile
policies such as the 30-baht national health-care programme
and the "One Tambon, One Product" scheme were also implemented,
although results remain mixed.
With most
of the programmes unlikely to show any genuine change for several
years, the government also established a 58-billion-baht emergency
spending programme to help jump start the economy in the face
of a rapidly deteriorating external environment.
Funds would
be aimed directly at creating new jobs, enhancing labour skills
and ultimately increasing the country's competitiveness in the
global market.
Exports,
the main engine of growth since the float of the baht in 1997,
are predicted to contract by nearly 7% in 2001, a sharp reversal
from the 20% growth posted the year before.
Economic
slowdowns in the US, Europe and Japan helped reinforce the government's
focus to build up the domestic economy. Even so, the global
economic downturn, falling exports and depressed commodities
prices dashed any hopes by the government of a rapid recovery.
Overall,
economists agree that the Thailand is set for growth of just
1.3% in 2001. Rising unemployment, estimated now at nearly two
million people, has put further pressure on social programmes
and economic activity.
SEPT
11 The events of Sept 11 only reinforced the challenges
faced by the government. The terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the subsequent military action in Afghanistan
led to a shock for the tourism industry, one of the country's
largest sources of foreign exchange earnings.
Before September,
policymakers had placed high hopes on boosting tourism to help
compensate for the decline in exports. But with the global aviation
industry in full retreat, tourism revenues for the fourth quarter,
the industry's high season, look unlikely to be bright, despite
government efforts to promote Thailand as a "safe" destination.
One administrative
change within the Cabinet following the September attacks was
the elevation of Finance Minister Somkid Jatusripitak to deputy
premier.
The changes,
which also included the transfer of the education portfolio
to deputy premier Suvit Khunkitti, made Dr Somkid the sole arbitrator
for economic affairs.
Going into
2002, the main priorities are in implementation, whether it
be in state enterprise privatisation, budget planning and disbursement
or in programme fine-tuning.
State enterprise
privatisation was launched in the fourth quarter with generally
positive results, with initial public offerings for both Internet
Thailand and PTT Plc well oversubscribed by investors.
For 2002,
at least six state enterprises are scheduled for privatisation
and listing on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, including the
main telecom agencies, the Telephone Organisation of Thailand
and the Communications Authority of Thailand.
Successful
privatisations not only represent a key component of the state's
broader aims to liberalise key sectors and improve efficiency
in basic services, but also to raise revenue to offset the growing
public debt.
The fiscal
2002 budget, which started in November, calls for a historic
200-billion-baht deficit on spending of 1.03 trillion baht.
Six consecutive years of deficit spending, coupled with the
costs of financial sector reform, have led the public debt to
jump to nearly 60% of gross domestic product, making maximising
values of state assets crucial for medium-term fiscal management.
But efforts
to privatise two other major state enterprises, Thai Airways
International and Krung Thai Bank, were both sidetracked owing
to external factors as well as internal complications.
THAKSINOMICS
Entering
2002, the disappointment _ or impatience _ of many with the
slow pace of recovery has led to increased scepticism and questioning
about whether Mr Thaksin's philosophy of "Think New, Act New"
will actually lead to sustainable growth or represents a high-risk
strategy which could ultimately bankrupt the public purse.
Even so,
the process of translating the premier's visions into concrete
actions leading to clear signs of improvement will continue.
Most forecasters expect signs of recovery to show by mid-2002,
as stimulus programmes take effect and the US economy begins
to turn around.