For most of the past 75 years, Thailand looked to the USA for financial, military and political support. But with the more recent shifts of global influence, supply chains and new geopolitics, these once close friends may be drifting apart, as Thailand seeks a clear and prosperous path into the future.
As the United States strives to maintain its grip as the self-perceived economic, moral and democratic global leader, and China’s economy and foreign interests continue to grow, the rivalry between the two countries has become ever more rhetorically charged, leaving Thailand in a challenging position.
Thailand has also been an ally of the US since 1818, and particularly since World War II. The country’s relationships with each offers many benefits, but there is increasing pressure to “choose a side” or at least show a preference. Thailand’s geopolitical position makes it a natural ally of nearby China. Diplomatic relations officially began in 1975, though there had been friendship treaties and relations stretching back through centuries.
Though Thailand’s interests and exports are far flung, China and the US are neck and neck as its biggest trading partner, with about $45 billion each in two-way trade.
Exports (and foreign direct investment) aside though, Thailand has a longstanding military treaty with the US and on paper is bound by The 1954 Manila Pact of the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Thanat-Rusk communiqué of 1962, and most recently, the 2020 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defence Alliance. So, Thailand’s leaders have evidently decided to maintain the US as a military partner – with its financial, training and hardware benefits.
However, Prime Minister Prayuth also announced similar plans to boost military cooperation with the Chinese government around the same time. Prayuth, who is also Minister of Defence, unveiled the plans in separate meetings with US Secretary of Defence Mark Esper and Chinese Defence Minister Wei Fenghe. Some would say that was well played.
As with modern trade, modern military alliances quite often appear to overlap, seemingly precluding the possibility of any armed conflict if they were all adhered to.
Thailand’s foreign policy, at least where more powerful countries are concerned, has been and is today formed more reactively than proactively. The country has had to adapt to the larger powers that are not going to adapt to them. At the same time, Siam-cum-Thailand has been consistently fervent in its independence and unafraid of making quite strong demands of its much more powerful allies.
Thailand has been sandwiched between powerful rivals in the past and has demonstrated an uncanny aptitude for simultaneously cooperating and resisting – sort of applying the brakes even while moving forward. And somehow, it always seems to sufficiently appease the multilateral demands while overall maintaining its core of independence.
In the late 19th Century, France and Great Britain had Siam surrounded from Burma (Myanmar) to the West and French Indochina to the West (Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam). To the south was British Malaya (Malaysia). There was a danger that Siam would be carved up between the European powers.
An eleven-week war with France in 1893 and considerable diplomatic efforts at playing Britain and France off each other resulted in Siam maintaining its highly prized sovereignty – at the cost of considerable sacrificed territory. But Siam had managed the feat of being the only Southeast Asian country that was never colonised.
Similarly, during World War II, Thailand struck a deal with the Japanese to allow occupation in exchange for control over its internal affairs and military – and a Japanese promise to help regain lost territories from the Western imperialists.
Japan increasingly treated Thailand as a conquered country, and the Free Thai movement secretly collaborated with Britain and the US. Thailand swung towards the “winners” on multiple fronts and was not punished by the victorious allied forces, but rewarded with US-sponsored infrastructure, military protection and direct foreign investment, modernising Thailand and its economy.
The US received territorial access and other concessions for decades – including considerable assistance during the “Vietnam War” (known in Indochina as the “American War”).
As China has grown exponentially in just a few decades, its regional economic relationships have obviously grown with it, with Thailand becoming a major trading partner in multiple sectors, and an increasingly important strategic partner to China.
Neighbours once considered a threat are now ticking over relatively peacefully and developing at their own paces (with the exception of Myanmar, which still poses no military or ideological threat to Thailand). So, America’s “protection” is not as essential as was once thought, though it would certainly be unwise to alienate the US.
Given its history and common sense, it is a certainty that Thailand will continue to accord influence and respect to both the US and China while striving to maintain national interests and diplomatic flexibility. Indeed, pressure from either of the two superpowers may be turned to Thailand’s advantage – providing a viable excuse for less than full compliance with one side or the other.
But if the US is trying to make better friends of Thailand, it has made some gaffes along the way. Most recently, the US announced a virtual “Summit for Democracy” for 9-10 December of this year, hosted by President Joe Biden. In the course of making up the invited list of 110 countries, many were left out, such as two-thirds of ASEAN, including Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and even Singapore, while inviting Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia.
The irony was not missed that the selection process for a summit promoting democracy and transparent processes was unilaterally decided in a completely undemocratic and opaque manner. This while on a separate channel, the White House has sent teams of visiting diplomats to the region to bolster cooperation.
In the current situation under the global pandemic, hosting the "Summit of Democracy" is not useful for international cooperation against COVID and can possibly split the world apart
Given that the US has claimed it wants closer relations with ASEAN, driving a wedge of preference through the its member countries seems an odd way to go about achieving that goal – particularly during a global pandemic that requires multilateral cooperation.
Many Thai commentators took the omission as a slap in the face from the Biden administration, though Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-o-cha and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai put on brave faces and insisted the Thai government is not taking it personally, dismissing the summit as unimportant (which in the end, it probably will be).
Nonetheless, the slights appear chaotic and destructive to US-Thai relations among others, and will not soon be forgotten. If the US is seeking to send a message of support or punishment to various countries, it potentially sets up its own competition with China as an old-fashioned battle between democracy and authoritarianism, forcing countries like Thailand to take sides or suffer the consequences. This will not endear anyone. It appears that President Biden, who is after all 79 years old, is falling back on Cold War thinking: “You are for us or you are against us.”
In the end, it is mainly about the money. Keep things peaceful and trade with everyone who will buy your goods and don’t concern yourselves with political ideologies. In the case of China, Thailand stands to benefit enormously, becoming a transit hub as part of China’s enormous “Belt and Road” project. If the plans all pan out, high-speed rail will carry goods between China and Thailand and back (via Laos where the railway is already built), and to a major seaport on the Gulf of Thailand, with rail and road connections fanning outward, supplying Thailand’s ASEAN neighbours. Thailand would become the regional hub for international trade – even between the US and China.
It seems inevitable that for better or worse, the old-world order is gone. There are two major power centres on opposite sides of the earth and they will naturally exert the strongest influence over their physical neighbours, who will tend to lean into that influence, though not exclusively. There is no iron or bamboo curtain anymore.
Thailand will find itself more strongly allied with China while still balancing things out with the US. On top of the practical reasons outlined above, about 40 percent of all Thai people have some Chinese blood, while about 15 percent consider themselves to be ethnic Chinese – even though they consider themselves to be Thai. Those people are disproportionately represented at the highest levels of Thai businesses. There are cultural commonalities, much shared language with the Thai Chinese, resulting in the “Bamboo Network” connecting China with the ethnic Chinese of Southeast Asia.
America may be Thailand’s good friend, but China is Thailand’s older brother, and it looks like in the region’s geopolitical future, blood will still be thicker than water.