Pro-democracy forces in Myanmar have launched a new bid to change the country’s constitution. With 18 months left before the 2020 elections, the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) has initiated a process in parliament that it hopes will amend the military-drafted charter — and give the party an appealing campaign issue. It is the latest evidence that the country has been plunged into “Syndrome 2020” in the lead-up to the elections.
Earlier this month parliament voted to establish a preparatory committee to consider amendments to the military-drafted constitution. A total of 397 lawmakers voted in favour with 17 voting against, three abstaining and 187 — comprising all of the military members and 21 others — boycotting the vote.
The current constitution — the country’s third — was overwhelmingly approved in a sham referendum in 2008 and gives the armed forces a dominant political role. Changing the charter was a key election talking point for the NLD in 2015 — along with “rule of law” and national reconciliation.
It was these three pledges that persuaded many ethnic voters to support the NLD in 2015 — and helped it to a landslide victory. But many non-Burmese voters have become disillusioned with the government’s failure to improve their lot and to introduce constitutional change.
“It’s the NLD keeping its election promise,” senior NLD MP, Bo Bo Oo excitedly told Asia Focus after the vote. But he admitted that the expected changes would not affect the military’s central role in the political system. Crucial issues such as the military’s role in parliament will only be tackled after the elections, he predicted.
Myanmar’s military carefully designed the constitution to make changing it immensely difficult. It reserves 25% of the seats in parliament’s lower and upper houses for military appointees, with the remaining members elected. A proposal to amend the charter requires the support of only 20% of lawmakers to be considered, but a 75% majority is needed to actually change the constitution.
This is an almost impossible task given the size and unity of the military voting bloc; thus the armed forces have a de facto veto over changes that threaten their power. Privately, senior NLD leaders accept that this clause needs to be changed before any debate or move to change the constitution can be meaningful — but that is still a distant hope.
The NLD leaders have been plotting their move for nearly six months, according to senior party members. The urgency grew in party’s strategists’ minds after disastrous results in last November’s by-elections that reflected the NLD’s declining popularity, especially in ethnic areas.
But only a very small clique at the top of the party hierarchy were privy to the discussions and strategy. Party MPs were unaware of what was afoot until they actually showed up in the House, but of course they ended up endorsing it enthusiastically.
“This move makes our party relevant again to the people, and reignites our support base, as it reflects the widespread popular feeling in the community: the need for change,” Ye Min Oo, a senior member of the NLD economic committee, told Asia Focus.
He admits, though, that he does not know what parts of the constitution will be targeted.
Military MPs reacted stoically when the motion to form the committee was first introduced, waiting for instructions from above. They stood up in unison when the motion was put to a vote, in protest. They have also threatened to boycott the committee, whose membership will be based on proportional representation in the chamber.
But while the timing of the NLD move may have been highly secretive, top military brass were aware of the plan, according to government insiders. Although no direct talks seem to have taken place between State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and the army commander-in-chief, Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing, there has been a communication channel between them.
In recent weeks there have been signs of a thaw in relations between the army and the civilian government, which augurs well for future relations. The General Administration Department (GAD), which appoints civil servants from the national to the village level, was transferred to the state counsellor’s office in December, putting it under civilian control for the first time. Before that it was under the control of the Home Ministry — one of the three portfolios controlled by military-appointed ministers.
This was not the only sign of the thaw in civilian-military relations. Before the NLD initiated its charter amendment effort, the army chief clearly indicated that the army was not opposed to changing the constitution as such. That view was reiterated by Brig-Gen Maung Maung, a senior military official in parliament, after the vote.
“We don’t say not to amend,” he told reporters. “They can amend but they must do it according to procedure. … What kind of law will that committee analyse? How broad is the authority of the committee?”
Clearly the army is open to some form of change. For the present the military will wait and see what is proposed before they show their hand, said a former senior adviser to the national defence college, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Many western diplomats and Myanmar analysts believe that any NLD move to diminish the military’s political power could upset the current delicate balance and put the civilian government on a collision course with the top brass. But much will depend on the nature and breadth of the proposed changes, and the commander-in-chief ’s assessment of their potential implications for stability.
In fact the amendments proposed are expected to have broad agreement across the political spectrum. Some NLD MPs have made it clear that the party does not want to confront the army in the run-up to the elections. Thus the suggested amendments are not likely to be disruptive.
Informed government sources suggest the key amendment will be to increase decentralisation or devolution to the states and regions. That would give governments in ethnic areas increased autonomy, including allowing the regional parliaments to directly elect their chief ministers after 2020.
This will certainly appeal to the ethnic communities, and while it will have broad if not unanimous support in parliament, the NLD hopes to take credit for the idea and boost its waning support in these regions. But it is a far cry from federalism, which is the ethnic communities’ main demand. Moves in that direction will certainly be deferred until after the elections.
Aung Suu Kyi has long spoken of the goal of reforming the constitution and returning the army to the barracks as part of a democratic transition after more than 50 years of strict military rule. “The completion of our democratic transition must necessarily involve the completion of a truly democratic constitution,” she said during a forum in Singapore last August.
But the military has for decades seen itself as the only institution capable of preventing the disintegration of the ethnically diverse country, and has stressed the importance of its constitutional oversight of the political system.
Many twists and turns remain on the road to a more democratic constitution. Now seems to be a parallel process: in parliament involving the MPs and the peace process involving the government, the military and ethnic rebel groups. The long-term hope is that the military will accept these popular demands for a democratic federal state.
But the 2020 elections will determine when and how that progresses. Clearly national reconciliation and constitutional change will dominate the electioneering, and form the basis of the NLD’s campaign pledges. In the meantime, Syndrome 2020 will dominate everything until the elections.