The new constitution has been approved by Thai voters, giving democratic legitimacy to a renewed effort to prevent "money politics" from becoming the preferred form of modern democracy in Thailand.
But will the new constitution actually succeed in keeping Thai politics free from the intense factionalism, policy irrationalities, abuses of power and corruption brought about by "money politics"?
I find the new constitution admirable both in its clear statement of what it seeks to accomplish and rational in the measures devised to achieve that goal.
The preamble clearly sets forth what the new constitution seeks to achieve:
"Sometimes there have been constitutional crises with no solutions and partial causes thereof were attributed to the people who ignored or disobeyed administrative rules, corrupted or distorted power or did not recognise their responsibility to the nation and the public resulting in ineffective law enforcement. It is therefore of necessity to prevent and resolve these problems by means of educational reform and law enforcement and to strengthen a moral and ethical system."
Stephen B Young is global executive director of Caux Round Table.
The preamble then adds that all the proposed rules and structures are "for the purpose of preventing leaders or officials of no morals, ethics and good governance from taking power in the administration of the country or exercising their power arbitrarily".
This concern for personal conduct is fully in keeping with Thailand's Buddhist beliefs in karma and individualism that goodness in people is a requirement for social progress.
Therefore, of most interest to me is chapter nine of the new constitution on conflicts of interest. This is an unusual article not found in many constitutions. It borrows the basic and time honoured standards and practices of good stewardship from corporate law and applies them to public office. This chapter holds that persons in public office are fiduciaries with duties of loyalty to the state in service to the public.
They hold their offices not as personal property or petty fiefdoms but as agents of a higher cause.
That cause is specifically set forth in chapter five on the duties of the state. This chapter sets a standard that the government is to serve the people and not any phu yai or big boss, political faction or khana, or social class, or region.
Chapter 16 on national reform adds more stipulations as to how the government is to serve the people going forward.
These two chapters align the new Thai constitution with the recommendations of John Locke in 1689 set down in his Second Treatise on Civil Government which provided the human rights jurisprudence for the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and our constitution of 1787.
Locke asserted that just government is a trust to help the people. Rulers who fail in their fiduciary responsibilities through personal corruption or abuse of power lose their legitimacy and must relinquish their offices.
The new constitution contains a third set of requirements which echo Locke. That is, similar to the American practice, the necessity for officials to take an oath of loyalty to their office, to make a personal commitment to rise above selfishness and act as a good steward of the powers of the office and not to sell such powers for personal or family gain.
Now, from another perspective, chapters five and nine and the personal oath requirement also reflect well the basic Thai standard for legitimate government, a Theravada Buddhist one, which is the 10 principles of the thosapit rachathamma.
These principles -- actually not often followed by many Thai public servants or politicians -- are:
Dana or taan in Thai is giving in a beneficial way. This is a form of fiduciary behaviour where we seek how to make life better for others -- our customers, our employees, our communities.
Sila or seen is not breaking norms -- both legal and moral. It is being ethical and of good conduct. It is avoidance of dominion and oppression and exploitation and corruption. It is the essence of governance.
Pariccaga or borijark is putting service before self. It goes beyond giving in taking into consideration the greater good of the whole, the common good. It is the ultimate in agency where we give of ourselves to further a greater good.
Ajjava is loyalty, truthfulness, and honesty. It is the virtue that makes possible the loyalty demanded of every fiduciary as well as the self-confidence to disclose material information to markets.
Maddava is avoidance of arrogance and being open to persuasion. It is not being a narrow-minded "big boss"; in only giving orders to underlings and in not accepting their advice and counsel.
Tapa or taba is diligence. This is the virtue necessary for taking due care in carrying out our fiduciary duties. It is avoidance of negligence or just going along for the ride or just showing up to put in an appearance. Negligence of duty is the enemy of good governance.
Akkodha or agoat is avoidance of anger and self-centred passion. To be angry or self-centred and emotionally vindictive diverts us away from duty, from listening, from wise action. It is putting our worst sense of self in the place of service and collegiality.
Avihimsa is living peacefully without doing harm. It is not disturbing the equilibrium around us. It is another form of service that supports the common good.
Khanti is patience and perseverance. Again, it is a virtue of self-control where we are not over-bearing and domineering allowing others to evolve according to their good and bad qualities. I consider this virtue more individual than corporate. One can be too patient in the face of failure and abuse of power on the part of others.
Finally, avirodha is acting energetically on behalf of ethics and the law. It is taking personal responsibility for seeking that justice is done, that wrong is disciplined, that good is rewarded. It is a necessary quality in any good leader. It is fundamental to practising good governance.
Three years ago in the Bangkok Post, on Aug 20, 2013, I suggested that use of these principles of personal ethics and morality could help Thailand achieve an end to political dysfunction. I am reassured for Thailand that something along these lines is included in the new constitution.
The constitution has many other provisions designed to incubate practices and procedures which will encourage civil servants and politicians to live up to the expectations set for them by the Thosapit Rachathamma. Some of these provisions are well-thought out and will be helpful in practice while others leave me sceptical as to their potential beneficial effects.
Stephen B Young is global executive director of Caux Round Table.