When the NLD civilian government took power a year ago, it was expected that there would be some realignment in the country's foreign policy. Particularly, the increased interaction with the US and the West was expected to loosen China's grip on the country. Instead, far from the expected reversal, Beijing has courted State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi by ensuring its continued influential role as the main economic partner as well as showing its willingness to play a constructive role in Myanmar's peace making process.
Likewise Tokyo has scrambled for a strategic position with Myanmar by pouring in investment, aid and infrastructure projects. All of these scenarios do not seem that much different to what was the case during previous military-led governments. The conduct of international relations by the current administration -- that is formally led by President Htin Kyaw but where real power lies with Ms Suu Kyi -- seems to be characterised by complacency with little broader efforts being made. A preoccupation with national reconciliation, coupled with a myriad of social and economic reform challenges faced in the domestic politics, could explain the relatively reactive diplomatic manoeuvring of the current government.
However, Myanmar was invited as an observer nation to the first ever Leader's Summit of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in Jakarta last month. Thaung Tun, the national security adviser, expressed Myanmar's interest in becoming a fully fledged member of the association which consists of 21 countries surrounding the Indian Ocean. Covering 20% of the world's water, the Indian Ocean is considered "the Ocean of the Future". It is home to some of the most strategic sea routes, and carries half of the world's container ships and two thirds of the world's oil shipments. Myanmar is one of the only countries along the Bay of Bengal that has not yet fully joined IORA. Meanwhile, other countries that lie along the Bay of Bengal such as Thailand, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have joined.
Sitting across the sharp line between South Asia and Southeast Asia, Myanmar has been targeted as a strategic bridge to the Indian Ocean. This is true for China which has been aggressively pursuing connectivity projects under its "One Belt One Road" policy in Myanmar.
Given Myanmar's dire need to improve its infrastructure and human resources, the jostling between China and Japan over various infrastructure projects certainly provide benefits to the country. However, Nay Pyi Taw needs to think: "Would Myanmar be able to reap the full benefits of its strategic relevance if it remains complacent to the interest of external players only in the long term?" There is no doubt that national reconciliation should be a priority, but what is equally important is the visionary planning of foreign policy that could deliver domestic benefits.
It is probably time for the government to seriously strategise its position in the India Ocean through IORA. Formed in 1997, IORA has been a loosely structured association embracing open regionalism. Home to 2.7 billion people from three different continents, the member countries signed the Jakarta Concord earlier this year to strengthen their cooperation in areas of maritime safety and security, trade and investment facilitation, fisheries management, disaster management, academic science and technology, and tourism and cultural exchange. If the commitment found in the Jakarta Concord is to materialise, Myanmar should not miss out on the opportunity to sit at the negotiating table and to ensure it can influence trade or security cooperation agreements according to our national interests. At the moment, this is not happening.
Since the Bay of Bengal is vulnerable to a variety of threats such as climate change, maritime irregular migration, arms smuggling and the rise of terrorism which are all transnational in nature, closer participation in IORA could help address these issues more effectively. Myanmar is already a member of other multilateral initiatives such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative (BIMESTIC) and Asean. While the BIMESTIC cooperation comprises Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Nepal it nevertheless is considered as an inactive body. IORA could serve as an effective alternative which has a wider scope. IORA will complement the current efforts of Myanmar to resume its strategic regional identity and collaboration in a broader aspect with the middle powers of the region such as Australia, India and Indonesia.
Of course, participation in regional cooperation is not always "rainbows and butterflies". The diverse stages of economic development will come with issues of competition that undermine domestic interests. On the one hand, the government should be wise enough to carry out structural reform to provide a better and competitive business environment.
Nay Pyi Taw could also take up these concerns on the negotiating table as soon as the topic first emerges. Even though the member states of IORA have vowed for more institutionalised cooperation, the necessary preparation would take a couple of years.
Thus, Nay Pyi Taw should start the membership application as soon as possible to be ready in time. It is probably not required for the Htin Kyaw's administration to perform a radical shift in foreign policy. However, it needs to be more proactive and have a wider pursuit in international relations that can contribute to the achievement of peace and development in the country. In a game of chess, even a pawn can become a queen if strategically played!
Than Tha Aung is programme coordinator of Innovation and Technological Connectivity, Programme Department, Mekong Institute.