Parties jostle to extend the life of NCPO

Parties jostle to extend the life of NCPO

Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and his key deputy Somkid Jatusripitak exchange greetings at a meeting of the National Digital Economy and Society Committee. (File photo by Chanat Katanyu)
Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and his key deputy Somkid Jatusripitak exchange greetings at a meeting of the National Digital Economy and Society Committee. (File photo by Chanat Katanyu)

Three groups of political players are on the move in setting up parties to extend the life of the National Council for Peace and Order (NPCO) and support Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha to continue as prime minister after the election. All three are working separately, but in essence are moving towards building leverage in the political numbers game.

First is Paiboon Nititawan, a former member of the National Reform Council, who has been outspoken in support of Gen Prayut all along. And he is not coy about his tactics. At a press conference to announce the formation of the People Reform Party, Mr Paiboon declared he will find at least 125 members of parliament, which when combined with the 250 "selected" senators, will open the door for an "outsider", or unelected person to become prime minister.

Suranand Vejjajiva was secretary-general to the prime minister during the Yingluck Shinawatra government and is now a political analyst.

This is in accordance with the constitution which stipulates that if the elected House of Representatives fails to agree on who will become prime minister from a list that each party nominates, then at least 375 members of the House and Senate can ditch the list. Two thirds of both chambers, 500 out of 750 members, can then vote in an outsider.

The "outsider" of course is Gen Prayut.

Mr Paiboon does not expect to get 125 seats by himself, but probably hopes to get enough to become the organiser of the coalition with other parties that would create a deadlock in the selection of the premier in the House.

He has to bet also that the animosity between the Pheu Thai Party and the Democrat Party will remain intense and cannot join forces. Pheu Thai is expected to get 200-plus seats and the Democrats more or less around 100. The other smaller parties await to see how the political wind blows. He could pick and plough the field for votes, and since members are also not bound to vote in the same direction as the party, breakaways are possible.

The senators, however, might not be a "bloc vote" of 250 as Mr Paiboon expects. Even though ultimately the selection process lies in the hands of the NCPO, there could be many who break ranks. The lobbying power of ex-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatrwa is notorious. It could sway many towards Pheu Thai, tilting the attempted balance.

A lot will depend on public sentiment during and after the election. It will determine how the parties and then selected senators would react towards the attempted manipulation of the election outcome by the NCPO regime. All Mr Paiboon does now is set the preconditions.

The same can be said with veteran politician turned street protester, Suthep Thaugsuban.

As leader of the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), Mr Suthep was instrumental in weakening the elected Pheu Thai government through street protests, providing an excuse for the military to stage the coup in 2014. After that he established the Muan Maha Prachachon Foundation, a political vehicle to keep his support base, which many believe will be transformed into a political party.

But Mr Suthep is reluctant. He is torn between the idea of challenging for the Democrat Party leadership or setting up an entirely new party. He knows that as long as Chuan Leekpai remains the soul of the party and supports party leader, Abhisit Vejjajiva, he cannot fully control the party. Mr Suthep has reached the point where he no longer feels he has to answer to anyone in the Democrat political circles.

A new party, however, poses a different set of problems. Without the political infrastructure of an established party, it is very difficult to win elections. And by declaring support for Gen Prayut, who nowadays is not as popular, it will be tougher. Mr Suthep will be fighting for the Democrat base in the South and Bangkok which would be a costly task. He could end up with only a few pocket constituencies. Under this constraint, he leaves the third option open. He said he could back "a party of the people" which "will make the ideology of the PDRC come to fruition". No actual party name has been mentioned yet. Another benefit of this option is Mr Suthep can keep his troops alive for use in case street politics return, as the NCPO regime is now under pressure from pro-democracy movements.

"The party of the people" could be Mr Paiboon's party, or it could be the supposed party which Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak is rumoured to be forming -- the Palang Pracharat Party, named after the current regime's populist programme. Mr Somkid deflected questions from reporters, pointing to Industry Minister Uttama Savayanaya and Commerce Minister Sontirat Sontijirawong -- speculated by the media to be party leader and secretary-general, respectively. Both are close to Mr Somkid with clean records and close ties to the business sectors.

Mr Somkid also expressed support for Gen Prayut, who in one scenario would remain an "outsider", and in another scenario, chairman of the advisory board of Pracharat. The latter means Gen Prayut's name will be nominated by the party as one of the three candidates for premier, and eventually make him legitimate as an "elected" prime minister.

There is a change in the model for setting up parties to support a person to continue in the top job. In the past, military leaders have relied on politicians to organise a party. This time Gen Prayut can claim he has the support of the Thai business community with close ties with Mr Somkid. Economic stability will be the selling point of this party. Continuity with a long-term strategic plan of reform and large infrastructure investment projects, together with pro-business programmes, will be able to maintain support from the business community. Funding for the party's war chest would not be a problem.

The government's Pracharat programme is also in full swing, bringing the private sector to promote projects at village level coupled with the usual welfare handouts similar to the so-called populist programmes of the past -- which propelled widespread support for then prime minister Thaksin. With time, it is hoped they could substitute this for the populist nostalgia and their political patrons.

Together with the pockets of provincial politicians switching from other parties, Pracharat is expected to win a few seats, taking them from Pheu Thai, while the urban masses could turn to Mr Somkid as both Pheu Thai and Democrats falter in the capital, Bangkok.

The risk for the Somkid party is the perception that it is designed to back Gen Prayut's prolonged stay in power, which could end up backfiring on the party. Mr Somkid is betting that selling the face of a competent economic team and an economic stability agenda will lead the debate in the election and not the political liability of supporting a coup leader to retain power.

At this early formation stage, the NCPO and the coalition that brought down the Thaksin and Yingluck governments are repositioning themselves into democratic entities. Will the public accept that storyline or not? It will take a master of marketing like Mr Somkid all the energy he can muster.

Suranand Vejjajiva

Former secretary-general to the prime minister

Suranand Vejjajiva was secretary-general to the prime minister during the Yingluck Shinawatra government and is now a political analyst.

Email : info@bangkokvoice.com

Do you like the content of this article?
COMMENT (17)