Apart from India's withdrawal from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the other memorable outcome of the recent Asean Summit and 14th East Asia Summit was the second consecutive absence of US President Donald Trump.
Instead of bringing himself to Bangkok, as when he travelled to the Philippines for the 12th EAS in 2017, Mr Trump has turned the tables by inviting all 10 Asean leaders to meet him in the United States early next year. Mr Trump's gamesmanship is likely to soon become brinkmanship as Asean leaders grapple with the dilemma of going or not going to America. Either way, Mr Trump has unnecessarily raised the stakes and incurred geostrategic risks for both the US and Asean. If Asean-US relations sour in the near term, China will be a major beneficiary, putting Asean at a disadvantage.
It would have been diplomatically smoother and sensible for one US leader to join 10 Asean counterparts in Bangkok where Thailand was the rotational chair of the 10-member Southeast Asian regional organisation. Now it will be more difficult to arrange for 10 Southeast Asian leaders to travel to the US at the same time. Perhaps Mr Trump was thinking of his predecessor, former President Barack Obama, who broke new ground by hosting the first Asean-US summit in Sunnylands, California, in early 2016. But doing the same under Mr Trump's date and terms may be difficult this time.
To be sure, Thailand had been eager to stage the Asean-US summit along with the EAS. But not only did President Trump wait until the last minute to announce the appointment of a relatively junior delegation comprising National Security Adviser Robert O'Brien and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross -- he also arranged for his invitation to Asean leaders to be read aloud. Doing so was a breach of diplomatic etiquette. To the smaller Asean states, a mercurial move like this from a superpower may also have been construed as an insult. Overall, the US engagement during the latest Asean summitry was disappointing, marked by an unpleasant surprise after another.
Yet it may be unsurprising. President Trump likes to get things done and to make decisions with bargaining and negotiating tactics. The Asean-related summits are fundamentally processes of diplomacy, full of talks upon talks. Sometimes these lead to a significant agreement, sometimes they lead to more consultations and dialogues. But they are Asean's way of keeping the peace and maintaining the prosperity in its neighbourhood. There were no decisions to be made, no deals to be struck. This may be why Mr Trump shrugged off the latest Asean summit season.
If the US president was not interested in attending Asean's most important meetings at the leaders' level, why invite Asean heads of government to America? Perhaps it is a face-saving measure from the Trump administration. It could also be Mr Trump's deal-making style, luring Asean leaders to his turf for home court advantage. The agenda to be discussed would have to be set up in short order to hold the Asean-US talks within the first quarter next year. The Trump administration would also be the main agenda setter, apart from being host in charge of proceedings.
Whatever Mr Trump's motive for not joining Asean leaders on Asean soil, his invitation for Asean to visit the US poses a conundrum. If Asean does not take up the offer, it will be turning down the most established and powerful superpower. If Asean leaders do go, they risk bargaining from a position of relative disadvantage in the face of Mr Trump's potential entrapment.
Asean's dilemma is that they should not dance to Mr Trump's tune but they also cannot afford to shun the US. Whatever they decide to do, Asean leaders should act in unison. If not all the 10 leaders go, then a troika-type comprising the last, current and next chairs should turn up. This troika was tweaked to meet with the lower US delegation last week, consisting of Thailand, Vietnam as next chair, and Laos as the Asean-US coordinator.
The mix of Asean representation will be crucial. All 10 leaders will mean a full force, commensurate with Mr Obama's initiative, goodwill and effort. For Mr Trump, going in full numbers may be a disadvantage but Asean has to be sufficiently represented at the leaders' level to satisfy the US side in holding the bilateral meeting.
Asean's dilemma is compounded by the US election cycle. As Mr Trump runs a re-election bid next year, he is likely to miss the Asean summit season again. So if Asean leaders do not travel to see him in the US, they may not have a chance to meet him in a bilateral setting over the next year. If Mr Trump is re-elected, he may decidedly remember how Asean responds in the weeks ahead to his overture.
For some Asean members and the Trump administration, an Asean-US summit on American soil also may be complicated by domestic politics. For example, the large Cambodian diaspora in the US is likely to criticise and demonstrate if Prime Minister Hun Sen, who has systematically decimated and persecuted Cambodia's opposition, shows up. Similarly, opponents of other Asean regimes may also voice their grievances and condemnations against attending Asean leaders.
Mr Trump has got himself caught one step behind the regional geostrategic curve by skipping the Asean-related meetings where his counterparts took part. If he was too consumed by domestic political controversies, such as the ongoing impeachment probe against his rule, then he should have sent his number two. In truth, Mr Trump miscalculated, and is trying to make up for it by having Asean leaders visit him. Whether this attempt works, Asean-US relations have been undermined to the detriment of both sides in view of other major powers in Southeast Asia who have their act together.