Images of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha hobnobbing with world leaders like United States President Joe Biden, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres at the COP26 Climate Summit in Glasgow sparked mixed feelings at home.
On the one hand, it was nice to see Thailand back on the global stage, as COP26 was the first in-person global gathering held during the Covid-19 pandemic. On the other hand, however, Thailand didn't go far enough once the conversations started between Gen Prayut and his counterparts.
The international scrutiny of Thailand's domestic shortcomings shows the government can't have it both ways -- it can't enjoy the international limelight and engage effectively in a global setting while not conforming to international norms, rules and standards on issues such as human rights and civil freedoms. As Gen Prayut found out once again, the international community simply won't accept it. China, along with other states with a similarly autocratic political system, may not care about Thailand's repressive laws, but China's leader was absent from Glasgow.
Besides, the legitimacy and prestige Thailand's current administration craves the most comes from being counted among the pecking order of Western societies, attracting global media attention from the likes of CNN and BBC, which are wired into households worldwide, not China's CCTV or CTGN, which are more limited.
The main sticking point in Thailand's foreign relations and international standing is Section 112 of its Criminal Code. Otherwise known as the lese majeste law, the draconian law carries with it harsh punishments of between 3-15 years' imprisonment, and it has a high conviction rate.
More progressive voices favour its amendment, at least to ensure the law isn't used to go after anyone, with some urging an aggrieved party to file the charge themselves.
To the left of the progressives are more radical Thais who have had enough of the law and its abuses, and who are demanding its abolition.
Conservative elements want its continuation, while the most extreme among them argue for the law to be enforced even more aggressively.
Centrists seek a potential compromise, favouring neither abolition nor harsher application but their views have been pushed around by both sides for being either too soft or too hard.
Some have noted that the royal defamation law is not problematic and it was hardly used in the past. Others, meanwhile, have insisted that the way the law has been manipulated as an instrument to pursue political opponents and settle scores is the problem, not the law itself.
Yet it is clear that Thailand's socio-economic changes in recent decades have spawned new and younger voices who want a freer and more open path into the 21st century, compared to many of their forebears.
Abroad, however, the fault line is different. Foreign governments either ask a lot or a little about Thailand's controversial Criminal Code, which has been used on hundreds of dissenting voices, especially youths. More democratic countries which prioritise basic rights and fundamental freedoms, such as Western governments, tend to be more openly concerned and critical, whereas Asian democracies like Japan and South Korea often convey a similar stance, but behind closed doors. Countries like China, Russia and other authoritarian regimes naturally turn a blind eye.
The problem now is that the current Thai government wants to do business and gain the acceptance of democratic governments, more so than with its authoritarian peers. This is why Thailand's foreign policy is at its nadir -- stuck in passive-defensive mode. And Gen Prayut's Glasgow performance is a case in point.
At the summit, conversations he had with key world leaders ultimately turned around towards the royal defamation law, and media questions about Thailand's harsh laws and outright suppression of youth protesters who demand change and reform of the monarchy were more blunt. Gen Prayut kept insisting that Section 112 is here to stay, as it is sacrosanct and untouchable on national security grounds.
Keeping things this way effectively means the "securitisation" of Thailand's foreign relations. Thailand's international engagements and diplomacy can be wide-ranging, with depth and breadth, as long as Section 112 and related questions about rights and freedoms are not raised.
Thailand can and wants to do a lot more on the global stage as long as other governments do not press hard on the place and role of Section 112, which has become an obstacle in Thailand's dealings with the rest of the world.
In their calculation of the mix between values and interests, many partner governments that Thailand wants to do business with are unlikely to stand idly by while rights and freedoms are being denied systematically. If they do not vouch for Thais who have been oppressed without due process and justice under the law, then few can stand up for what is right and wrong, as repression has stifled domestic dissent and opposition.
It has taken nearly two decades to see in full focus what is at stake in Thailand's future. While it is the most divisive issue at home, Section 112 is akin to a straitjacket when Thailand goes abroad.
Thai leaders from the government, business and diplomatic fields cannot fully pursue Thailand's interests because of the need to evade criticisms and rationalise this untenable law.
Thailand's gifts of geography, critical mass and hospitable people make it impossible to be ignored in any geostrategic jigsaw puzzle of other countries. But unless the royal defamation law is reformed in ways that are workable at home, Thailand will continue to underachieve and underperform abroad.