After two decades marked by two military coups in 2006 and 2014, Thailand is supposed to be a "reformed" country by now. While all kinds of reforms were promised with each military takeover -- from political parties, parliament and constitution to the bureaucracy, military and police -- none has taken place. In fact, pledged reforms have gone in the opposite direction in the past. Nowhere is this reaction and restoration of old power and interests more evident than in Thailand's media industry.
A quick glance at Thai politics since the 2014 putsch, which came on top of its 2006 forerunner, reveals political decay and deterioration in all of the major institutions. Political parties are run-of-the-mill, purpose-built to serve the powers-that-be. The Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) is a case in point, as a party of convenience and vested interests that was set up to back Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha as prime minister, working together with the coup-appointed Senate. The only party that dared to call for, and act on, political and economic reforms, namely the Future Forward Party, was duly dissolved by the Constitutional Court. Its successor vehicle, the Move Forward Party (MFP), is also at risk of disbandment because it keeps calling for reforms of outdated institutions that rule this land.
Instead of undergoing institutional reforms, the armed forces and the police have become more entrenched in their abusive and unaccountable ways, while the bureaucracy steers Thailand's ship of state at a glacial pace, characterised by nepotism, patronage, and a lack of ideas in moving the country forward. But under the radar and less conspicuous is the media.
Two decades ago, a media reform movement had flourished. Media reformers from civil society comprising academics and journalists stood up to a newly elected politician, a brash and flamboyant leader of a new party called Thai Rak Thai who galloped into town like a cocky cowboy as if he could do anything and knew more than anyone else. His name was Thaksin Shinawatra.
He promised to kick out the International Monetary Fund (IMF), restore Thai pride, move the economy forward with cluster development projects and niche industries, impose "social order", make Thailand a regional hub, eradicate poverty, and so on. He was full of himself, brimming with ideas, surrounded by acolytes and business associates, with former classmates in the police and military. Within weeks of taking power in 2001, he began to exert influence over all of the major institutions mentioned earlier, including the media.
Thaksin's family-owned Shin Corp had bought iTV, a local independent TV channel spawned by the military coup and political crisis in 1991-92. The spirit of reform in the 1990s called for a new TV channel outside the control of the state machinery and the military more directly. To be sure, the Thai army owns most of the terrestrial TV stations, operating them directly or leasing them to private operators for profit and income. The same goes for radio stations. Of 506 radio frequencies, the armed forces and the police own nearly half, with the rest under the control of state agencies. These TV and radio channels were (and are) operated and leased out for cushy income like cash cows.
Back in Thaksin's time, media professionals, civil society activists and academics fought back as state agencies used TV and radio channels in favour of government policies and posture. A major "media system reform project" was set out in 2003, headed by a local research institute and included a team of reform-minded academics and journalists who wanted to liberalise the media landscape. The aim was to make the electronic media independent and in service of society, rather than supervised by state agencies in favour of the government of the day.
When Thaksin's cousin became army chief in 2003 and media channels increasingly became government mouthpieces, the media reform project became more vociferous as if they were on the right side of history, fighting a civilian-led and abusive authoritarian regime. Ultimately, the media reformers under this project helped undermine the Thaksin government's legitimacy and expose its wrongdoings. The project's participants later joined the anti-Thaksin movement that led to the coup in September 2006. The Shin Corp-owned iTV was converted into a public broadcasting service (PBS) in the process.
Yet the state of Thailand's media industry has remained the same, still owned and run by the very same armed forces and state agencies. TV and radio channels still put out pro-government news in support of the ruling royalist-military regime, but no one is taking them to task. In the Thaksin era, reformers who stood up to him may have been liable to increased scrutiny from the tax department, while vocal newspapers could see pricey advertisements by Thaksin-related companies withdrawn. Now reformers get a knock on the door from security officers and slapped with charges and summonses under suppressive censorship laws.
Not only are these media reformers nowhere to be seen -- some have joined the other side, as in membership of the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission, a body approved by the Senate. When you apply for an important public sector position in Thailand these days, the search committee does not look only at your merits and qualifications; they look to see who you are, whether you will rock the boat, and how much you will get on with their programme.
The implication is that the longer the military is in power, the more Thailand will suffer. Media reformers were so defiant against Thaksin because they could get away with it. The issue now is whether to be co-opted and rationalise for upward career mobility, or be left out with not much in return.
As the military's tentacles expand and extend to more places in Thai politics, economy and bureaucracy, longer-term structural damage is becoming evident. For example, the state-enterprise sector has seen more top brass joining boards of directors than ever. It will take a long time to undo this damage, and only a civilian-led government can get the job done.
For media reformers who have seen the political vicissitudes of the past two decades, the fight was little more than a power contest all along. That it was the good guys versus the bad guys was a concocted myth.