Thailand is proudly a hub for United Nations (UN) agencies and programmes, and this adds weight to its leverage in international relations. Inevitably, the UN presence has to address key issues of sustainable development, human rights, democracy and peace. A key question is thus whether a viable balance is being struck between national practices and international aspirations.
New directions were set by the UN secretary-general himself in 2021 when he submitted to the world his vision titled "Our Common Agenda". Although overshadowed by the Covid-19 pandemic, it provides various emphases which invite effective responses from the national level. They underline the need to implement more effectively the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2015-2030) with their 17 global goals, such as to overcome poverty by 2030, which are accepted by all countries.
The Common Agenda adds the call for solidarity to respond to those challenges, with more emphasis on a social contract between states and their peoples, protection of the planet by targeting climate change, and promotion of peace and conflict prevention such as to reduce strategic risks including nuclear weapons, cyber warfare and autonomous weapons. It underlines action against discrimination, key roles for women and youth, regulation of AI, development of a Global Digital Compact to ensure fair play, and inclusive multilateralism.
The agenda is complemented by the 2020 Call for Action on Human Rights which calls for implementation of the recommendations from various international mechanisms, including the human rights treaty bodies (such as the UN's Human Rights Committee), the Universal Periodic Review of each country's human rights record under the UN's Human Rights Council, and the UN Special Procedures such as the various Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups on human rights. Importantly, the UN presence in the country is now called upon to be better informed about developments in the country.
There are 40 UN entities in Thailand and about half comprise the UN Country Team (UNCT) . Examples include the UN Development Programme, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Children's Fund and International Labour Organization. Examples of the former include the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and the World Bank.
Locally, key directions were set most recently by the adoption of the Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (2022-2026) agreed upon between Thailand and the UNCT. It is interlinked with the country's 20 Year National Strategy (2018-2037) and the forthcoming 13th National Economic and Social Development Plan (2023-2027). At the heart of that partnership is the emphasis on economic recovery after the pandemic, equitable improvements to overcome poverty and inequality, environmental protection, and enhancement of key enablers, such as education and digitalisation.
A key concern is the linkage between sustainable development, human rights, democracy and peace in Thailand. The national setting is still shaped by the 2014 coup, preceded by the 2006 coup. The country's 20th constitution is a consequence of that power play and the country is still ruled by a state of emergency under its overused Emergency Decree, which has been criticised heavily by UN human rights treaty bodies, as well as by comments during the Universal Periodic Review of the country and by UN Special Procedures. The 20 Year National Strategy is an offspring of that situation, perpetuating the power base with a vision of state-based security anchored in "harmony" and "unity", which leaves little room for diversity and dissent.
The UN presence has to bear in mind that anomaly which challenges the current accent on SDGs and the said Cooperation Framework. It would be wise to adopt a five-pronged in-house strategic approach to ensure more balance between international standards and national practices. First, the UN should undertake periodic dialogue with key stakeholders with a view to adopting a UN country-focused agenda to motivate shared UN action in the country. Inevitably, it should address economic, social and cultural rights to help the post Covid-19 recovery, especially to reverse the trend of social deprivation and to strengthen social protection. It should tackle the challenge of civil and political rights, such as the call for return to democratic rule and to open up the civic and political space. There are then the issues of environment and sustainability, vulnerabilities, including the concerns of women, children, human rights defenders and political alternates, and checks and balances, such as an improved justice system.
Second, the UN presence should aim for more access and accessibility to local people. While a UN presence near conflicts by the border is relevant to this country' s western front, more access is needed to assist civilians in southern Thailand and to help pluralise and civilianise the governance of that region.
Third, there is the issue of circulation and mobility. There is a great need to de-concentrate UN personnel from New York, Geneva and Vienna to render service at the field level. This can be enhanced by circulating UN staff to help non-governmental organisations and vice versa. There is also room for more youth to participate as UN interns, but they should be paid for their work.
Fourth, the UN presence should foster civil society stakeholdership. Each UN entity should have a civil society focal point and the UN presence should pool some resources to help civil society participate in UN-related dialogues and action. A key need in the region today is to help build the capacity of civil society on digital security to ward off intrusive surveillance emanating from less than democratic rule.
Fifth, a tactful relationship is needed between the UN presence and the military, law enforcers and civilians. It should encourage Thai uniformed personnel to participate more in UN peace-keeping in other countries. These operations are based on UN mandate which is not interventionist but geared to conflict prevention and containment, aspiring to resolution. By encouraging more frontline fieldwork, it also nurtures more empathy for local predicaments, humanising the UN presence and its partners here and elsewhere.
Vitit Muntarbhorn is a Professor Emeritus at the Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University. He has held several pro bono UN positions, including as Special Rapporteur, Independent Expert and member of UN Commissions of Inquiry on human rights. He is the 2004 recipient of the Unesco Human Rights Education Prize.