The worst thing one can do in Thai politics is to run for office and win by a landslide. When this happens, the knives will come out and the massive election winner will be overthrown before long -- one way or another -- because the real source of power in Thailand is unelected. Such was the fate of Thaksin Shinawatra when he spearheaded the Thai Rak Thai Party to win two landslide poll victories in January 2001 and February 2005, first a near majority and later a thumping 75% of the lower house of parliament.
After ups and downs over the past two decades, Thailand has found a new political juggernaut in Chadchart Sittipunt, who was recently elected Bangkok governor by an overall majority, or more than 52% of voters. Much of how Thai politics will be shaped ahead of the next general election, which must be called by March 2023, depends on how Mr Chadchart runs the capital and how the unelected centres of power deal with him.
Observers of Thai politics will remember what happened to Thaksin before and after his big election wins. A flawed and polarising figure, Thaksin rose to an elected office with a technocratic team and policy platform that captivated the vast majority of Thais, featuring universal healthcare, rural microcredit, internationalisation of village handicrafts, cluster development projects, upgrading of targeted industries and foreign policy initiatives. In his first term, Thailand was increasingly noticed in Asia, a high point of political stability, government effectiveness and innovative development in the country.
But just six months after his resounding re-election, "yellow-clad" street demonstrations were organised to destabilise his unrivalled one-party government. To be sure, Thaksin's blatant and glaring conflicts of interest, nepotism and collusion among the country's new set of capital markets-based big businesses fuelled the backlash against his rule, eventually leading to a military coup that dislodged him into self-exile in September 2006.
Thereafter, Thai politics became cyclical in search of a breakout and way forward, getting up and falling down time and again through two constitutions in 2007 and 2017 and two elections in 2007 and 2011, more "yellow" and pro-Thaksin "red-shirted" street protests, and political party dissolutions, and repeated bans on Thaksin-aligned politicians to prevent the ousted premier from keeping elected office through proxies. Chief among them was his sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, who was also ejected and exiled by another putsch in May 2014, led by Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha.
This time, the same set of coup-making generals, interventionist judges, and election-related agencies hunkered down for the long haul through the military-contrived 2017 charter, relying on a junta-appointed Senate to maintain parliamentary supervision. The last poll in March 2019 resulted in another pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai party's victory, but the winning margin was not sufficient to keep Gen Prayut's military-backed Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) from cobbling together a weak coalition government with small- and medium-sized parties through enticements and coercion. Gen Prayut has thus led Thailand for eight years, the first five under military government and the rest with an underwhelming rickety coalition.
As the monarchy shifted from the ninth to the 10th reign in 2016, Gen Prayut is understood in the unwritten code of Thai politics to hold a "green light" to govern, partly reflected in his cabinet's incomplete oath of office in July 2019. Over this post-coup period, Thailand has seen growing signs of political decay, economic stagnation, and social angst and frustration at a lack of a promising future. Catalysed by the judicial dissolution of the anti-establishment Future Forward Party (FFP) in February 2020, these deteriorating circumstances came to a head on the streets with a youth-led protest movement for monarchical reform and constitutional change.
The movement was dispersed and suppressed through a combination of water cannon, legal instruments, intimidation and coercion but its discontents and grievances are simmering under the lid of repression. The voices and expectations from below that were unwittingly unleashed during the Thaksin years are gaining ground and refusing to go away. Thailand seems headed for an inevitable reckoning in the medium term.
This is the context of Mr Chadchart's surging popularity and political momentum. At the rate he is going, Mr Chadchart may soon be seen as a threat because of his sheer popularity and ability to govern. In the eyes of the powers-that-be, he is setting a bad example by operating outside the established box within the existing power hierarchy.
A man of the people from the polling booth is a dangerous man to top elites who need to keep Thai politics divisive, fragile and unwieldy, dominated by squabbling and corrupt politicians rather than accountable and effective representatives. The televised no-confidence debate this week is a case in point of how established centres of power prefer to see Thailand's democratic institutions divided and lacking in credibility, characterised by dramatic corruption allegations and personal scandals rather than a focus on policy ideas and substance.
If democratic institutions from the popular mandate are weak, the upper hand will go to the elite establishment. These have been the dynamics and contours of Thai politics for decades. Thaksin and his side were thus politically eliminated, and so was FFP leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit. Mr Chadchart could be next.
It does not matter that he is seen as honest and straightforward. As a Thai adage goes, one can be "good" but don't be "outstanding". Mr Chadchart's problem is that he cannot help being a standout, which incurs resentment and opposition from the highest echelons of the Thai political order.
Despite the fact that he has been accommodating to the ruling regime, he may end up not kowtowing enough to please them. Thaksin had the same problem of immense popularity with the public, but an awkward and later unworkable relationship with palace insiders.
Even though Mr Chadchart is not an anti-establishment leader per se, and does not have the baggage of Thaksin's corruption and cronyism, it may not be enough to save his tenure. What happens to Mr Chadchart will be indicative of what will take place in Thai politics.