Thai global standing at all-time low

Thai global standing at all-time low

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Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha poses as he arrives for the Asia-Europe Meeting in Milan in 2014 — at his first outing on the world stage after launching a coup in May that year. (Photo: Reuters)
Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha poses as he arrives for the Asia-Europe Meeting in Milan in 2014 — at his first outing on the world stage after launching a coup in May that year. (Photo: Reuters)

Although it will not lead to a no-confidence vote, the general debate in Thailand's parliament this week has further weakened the coalition government of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, undermining its chances of re-election as the next general election looms. Among the many bombshell allegations of corruption, cronyism and sheer incompetence tabled by opposition parties, Thailand's international credibility and reputation have come into focus. Compared to its past role and performance, it appears that Thailand's global standing is at an all-time low.

It is not difficult to trace the downward trajectory of Thai foreign policy and its declining regard among global peers and partners. The starting point for analysing Thai foreign policy stems from the military coup in May 2014.

There have been a series of putsches in the past, 13 successful among the 20 coup attempts since 1932. Yet in previous coup periods, Thai foreign policy tended to operate autonomously under capable and professional hands at the helm.

For example, during the 1991–92 military takeover, Thailand's foreign relations were at a high point. Professional diplomats were in charge and facilitated the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, shoring up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' unity and beginning the path of Asean's expansion from six to 10 member states in the 1990s. Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also instrumental in the formation of the Asean Free Trade Area in 1992 under a caretaker government.

The main achievement of the 2006-07 coup period, of which the junta government lasted only 15 months, was that Thai diplomats were deployed to steady the ship of state to defuse and deflect international criticisms against the seizure of power. Thailand also managed to form a free-trade agreement with Japan. The short duration, with policy autonomy and the professionalism of senior diplomats, was the key to maintaining Thailand's pride in its place in the global pecking order under previous military rule.

The May 2014 coup was fundamentally different because it was intended to stay for the long haul. This meant Thai foreign policy officials had to spend the initial post-coup years explaining to allies and partners why the military had to take power by force and when an election would take place to restore democratic rule.

Having to constantly justify why Thailand had to step back into military authoritarianism was costly to the country's international standing. Instead of moving forward in its regional role as an Asean founder and birthplace that has a unique set of relations with the major powers, Thai diplomats were always on the back foot, having to explain the coup and reassure that elections would take place.

When a poll finally took place in March 2019 with a newly elected coalition government taking office three months later — an altogether five-year coup period — Thailand's foreign relations became stuck in a kind of military-authoritarian complex.

Although there was an election, everyone knew that there was something fishy because the enabling 2017 constitution was designed to prioritise military-authoritarian supervision over the political process, owing to a junta-appointed senate, which formed one-third of parliament with authority to elect the prime minister.

Consequently, Thailand further lost its way in foreign affairs. The Prayut regime, under civilian guises, was compelled to kowtow to like-minded governments with varying autocratic characteristics, led by China.

On the flip side, Thai foreign relations with the broader international community in Western countries and also Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were unnecessarily problematic because of Thailand's latent and disguised military-authoritarian rule, as reflected in rights violations and restrictions on civil liberties that became thorny issues with pro-democracy governments.

To make matters worse, Gen Prayut can be fairly said to be completely unseasoned in foreign affairs and diplomatic prowess. Unlike other leaders around the world, Gen Prayut did not bother to set up a foreign policy advisory team but instead relied on Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai. Under a prime minister who knows little about global goings-on and a foreign minister who has personalised Thai foreign policy without proper checks and balances, Thailand has sunk to a diplomatic nadir.

Its response to Myanmar's own military coup in February 2021 has been short-sighted and unbalanced, siding with the junta without due regard for international condemnation and local resistance. Thailand's position on the Myanmar coup is even at odds with some of the other Asean members that are calling for dialogue and restoration of the democratic process.

As Thailand has the highest stakes among all countries concerned in view of the long and porous Thai-Myanmar border and the associated drugs, human trafficking, illicit trade and other crimes, it needs to pursue a balanced policy between dealing with the junta and the opposing resistance coalition in Myanmar's civil war.

Thailand's lopsided Myanmar policy and the detriment to Thailand's long-term interests are attributable to Mr Don's unilateral and personal appointment of a special envoy on Myanmar, who is a convicted lobbyist in the United States justice system. It is outrageous and scandalous that Thailand's Myanmar policy is effectively run by this pair.

This powerful handful of foreign policy officials also appears to have had a hand in Thailand's loss of face and standing at the United Nations. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Feb 24, 2022, Thailand voted with the majority of UN members in early March to condemn Russian aggression. But when a follow-up vote to condemn Russia's annexation of eastern Ukraine came up in October, Thailand somehow chose to abstain with the ludicrous logic that voting with the majority would prevent the country from standing out. Voting to abstain was, therefore, more noticeable.

This was the first time that Thailand pursued what looks like an attention-seeking foreign policy.

Unsurprisingly, morale at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been near rock bottom, although certain diplomats may have opted for expediency and rationalisation for career mobility. Fortunately, Thailand's accumulated international reputation and diplomatic credibility are so immense that they can be renewed and rejuvenated in short order if a new government with a new foreign policy team can come into place after the upcoming election.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Senior fellow of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University

A professor and senior fellow of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science, he earned a PhD from the London School of Economics with a top dissertation prize in 2002. Recognised for excellence in opinion writing from Society of Publishers in Asia, his views and articles have been published widely by local and international media.

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