Nearly three and a half years since the military coup in February 2021, the crisis in Myanmar shows no signs of resolution. The internecine war between the military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), and the various ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) continues unabated, with no endgame in sight.
The situation has also become increasingly dire, with fighting among the EAOs themselves. Following the Northern Alliance's offensive 1027 late last year. the Tatmadaw, as Myanmar's military is known, has gradually lost control of territory, especially in areas bordering China, Thailand and India. Over the past ten months, the EAOs have been bolstered by military victories through joint and individual offensives.
As Vientiane prepares for the Asean Ministerial Meeting (AMM) from July 21-27, the bloc is grappling with the harsh reality of how to approach the Myanmar crisis. As the current Asean chair, Laos strictly adheres to the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) as the guidepost on how the bloc will proceed with Myanmar. However, some Asean members are pushing for more optional approaches towards all stakeholders, intending to jumpstart political dialogue in the future.
Laos has scheduled an informal consultative meeting between the current, past, and future rotating chairs on July 24 to review the implementation of 5PC. Thailand first proposed it after the coup in 2021, but no consensus was reached back then. Early this year, the troika idea was revived following the implementation of the Thai-Myanmar humanitarian assistance plan.
However, the resignation of former deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Parnpree Bahiddha-Nukara in May caused a hiccup in Thailand's efforts to advance the aid plans. As of now, Thailand has yet to name a new chief for the special committee to scrutinise the Myanmar crisis, which used to be headed by Mr Parnpree.
The rotational chairs' meeting is crucial to further maintain the progress under their respective leadership. It will indicate the scope and scale of Indonesia and Malaysia's involvement in the future. Last year, Indonesia held more than 100 meetings with Myanmar's stakeholders. Both countries have been critical of Nay Pyi Taw since the coup. Furthermore, the meeting can decide if they wish to expand the troika formula to troika-plus.
On humanitarian assistance, Thailand wants to see the assistance plan extended to include other dialogue partners and UN special agencies, especially those related to food and health security. The new UN special envoy on Myanmar, Julie Bishop, has been travelling throughout Asean to learn firsthand about the situation in Myanmar. During her latest visit to Thailand, she told Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa that she intended to work with all concerned parties and Asean while keeping a low profile and avoiding publicity. She reiterated that Thailand is a significant player in finding solutions to the situation in Myanmar.
Ahead of the upcoming AMM, Alounkeo Kittikhoun, the current Asean special envoy, has been trying to extract further concessions from the SAC, such as the release of additional political prisoners, stopping violence against civilians, and expanding humanitarian assistance programmes. Without "substantive progress" in these areas, it will be difficult for the Asean chair to invite a senior Myanmar official to attend the bloc's annual conferences. In January, Laos invited an acting permanent secretary for foreign affairs to attend the retreat. Myanmar has already been stripped of the chairmanship in 2026, which will be assumed by the Philippines.
Meanwhile, some Asean members have increased their contacts and communications with the overseas representatives of the National Unity Government (NUG), the civilian government formed in opposition to the military coup, to heap pressure on the SAC. However, they are not ready to recognise the NUG, although some have threatened to do so.
Looking forward, the 5PC remains the effective framework to which all concerned parties must adhere, including the bloc's four powerful dialogue partners--the US, China, India, and Russia. Lately, these great powers have intensified their engagement with various stakeholders, keeping their agendas in mind.
Recently, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Daniel Kritenbrink, held a second meeting in Hanoi with senior Myanmar officials, signalling Washington's willingness to engage the SAC. The first meeting, in February, took place in an airport hotel in Bangkok with junior officials from Myanmar. During the brief democratic period from 2011-2021, Washington normalised ties with Myanmar after a series of concessions from Nay Pyi Taw. The meetings with the SAC showed Washington's eagerness to leverage its role with other great regional players.
With their common borders, China and India have long been engaging with the SAC and EAOs straddling their adjacent territories. At the end of June, China invited former Myanmar's president Thein Sein to attend the 70th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. His visit was followed by the junta's Commander-in-chief, Gen Soe Win, who was in Qingdao, Shandong province, to participate in a sustainable development forum. These high-level visits came amid intensified fighting in Myanmar's Northeastern region. In the future, these two powerful figures could be on invitation lists of key Asean members.
Last week, at the Bimstec foreign minister (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) retreat in New Delhi, Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar met with his Myanmar's counterpart, U Than Swe, reiterating India's support for Myanmar to return to democracy in Myanmar. India has been a strong supporter of track 1.5 meetings, initiated by Bangkok, to address other key issues of illegal narcotics, arms trade and displaced persons for the countries bordering Myanmar. On the sidelines of the retreat, foreign ministers from Thailand, India and Myanmar also held a meeting to discuss their mutual concerns.
Of late, Asean has closely watched Russia's role in Myanmar's conflict. Lest we forget, Moscow has not meaningfully endorsed the 5PC. Russia remains an outlier. With ongoing international isolation imposed after the invasion of Ukraine, Russia is strengthening ties with the developing countries in the Global South, especially Southeast Asia.
These powerful dialogue partners can also pressure the SAC to implement the 5PC fully. At this crucial juncture, some of their activities and schemes, including the so-called "non-lethal" assistance, could directly impact the Asean centrality and the current peace efforts. It is imperative that Asean collaborate and work on the same page to prevent the SAC from playing one power against the other.
With the geopolitical shifts, the SAC must recognise that now is the time to act positively to the Lao chair's suggestions, as the fatigue level within Asean is kicking in. Time is running out for the SAC as its economy is worsening by the hour, and public outrage against the junta's atrocities is growing by the day.
For Asean, the stakes are high. If the crisis is not contained and resolved, outside players can assert their influence and turn the situation into a proxy war, as has happened in other parts of the world. The region must avoid this predicament at all costs.