When Asean foreign ministers met in Singapore in 1994, they all concurred that dialogue and consultations on political and security issues among major powers and Asean members would be essential in preserving peace and stability in the Asean region. A year later, the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) held its inaugural meeting, which took place in Bangkok and had 18 members, including the Asean 10.
Since then, the ARF has served as the premier regional forum for both great powers and regional players to interact and exchange views on mutual and broader concerns.
Over the past three decades, the ARF has also facilitated regular dialogue among members, helping to reduce trust deficits and mutual suspicion. While the forum has yet to reach the conflict solution stage, its platform for high-level dialogue and face-to-face contact has contributed positively to raising comfort levels and reducing tension.
During the first Myanmar crisis in 1988, this Asean-led mechanism promoted confidence among various stakeholders to search for acceptable solutions in later years. However, the new situation in Myanmar in the wake of the February 2021 coup has posed a serious challenge to Asean and its effectiveness, especially the ARF platform, regarding whether it can still have a similar impactful outcome by achieving peace.
However, given today’s global strategic complexity, forum members must evaluate what should be done to make the ARF more effective and relevant to the fast-changing world. Last year, during the Indonesian chair, the Asean leaders asked the Asean Secretariat to conduct an overall review as part of the ARF’s 30th anniversary.
Looking back, when the ARF idea was broached, there were initial concerns, particularly from the United States. Washington was wary that such a forum might jeopardise its existing bilateral military alliances in the region formed during the Cold War. At the time, a new regional security platform could weaken the US influence and presence in the Asia Pacific. Washington was still happy with and relied on its five allies — Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand — in the Asia-Pacific for its global security guarantee.
Initially, the members perceived the ARF as a safe space to engage China, which had not yet risen to its current prominence. Since its establishment, the ARF has been the region’s only forum to engage all major powers, including the US, China, India and Russia, to attend alongside Asean and other leaders from the Asia-Pacific.
During the 1990s, the geographical spread of the ARF was an issue of contention as the membership reached West Asia, including Pakistan and Mongolia in Northern Asia. Under the current circumstances and due to geopolitical competition and complexities, the ARF members have become more diverse and cover broader geographical locations.
Today, the ARF has expanded from its original 18 members to 27, including the EU. Sri Lanka was the last country to join the ARF before the 2007 moratorium.
In retrospect, the Asean region has enjoyed relative peace in the past three decades, allowing member countries to focus on economic and social development.
However, recent geopolitical shifts and unpredictability have had unavoidable repercussions on the region. As active members of the international system, Asean countries increasingly feel the impact of global strategic changes emanating from tense strategic competition among major powers, especially between the US and China. Asean does not want to become a pawn in the great powers’ gameplans.
Concerning Southeast Asia, Western strategists often view the region as two separate entities: mainland versus maritime Southeast Asia. Following the end of the Indochina War, mainland countries such as Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand enjoyed peace dividends with rapid economic growth. Myanmar remains an exception due to its internal problems and continued in-country fighting. Maritime Southeast Asia, meanwhile, has garnered global attention as its maritime zones crisscross the Pacific Ocean, facilitating international trade.
Western efforts have focused on the maritime region due to its critical role in trade connectivity, particularly in the energy sector. Issues surrounding the South China Sea and the safety of sea-lane communications have been perennial challenges to the stability of this maritime sphere as they have dominated the discourse on regional security for decades.
Current issues, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, the Myanmar crisis, the Korean Peninsula, counterterrorism, and cyber security, have also created challenges that the ARF must navigate. The Gaza crisis will be high on the ARF’s agenda this year, with the safety and security of Asean citizens at stake in the Middle East.
In more ways than one, some of these hot issues have created a stalemate in pushing the ARF forward. Despite having clear procedures and approaches, the ARF has primarily been engaged in confidence-building measures. It is true that some members still mistrust others, especially over the Korean Peninsula, but suffice it to say that the forum has enabled its members to build a certain level of confidence and trust.
Now, the question is whether the ARF can move towards the upper tier of preventive diplomacy.
At the 31st ARF in Vientiane on July 27, the issues related to revitalizing ARF will be discussed “in a holistic and comprehensive” manner. As the ARF serves as a foreign ministerial platform to address security issues affecting the region and beyond, the quality and transparency of discussions are crucial. Enhancing interactions among ministers is essential for better understanding and awareness.
Other ideas to enhance the ARF’s effectiveness have also been discussed, such as improving the structure of senior official meetings, including inter-sessional meetings, to enable a frank exchange of views. Certain inter-sessional meetings could be streamlined to promote action-oriented implementations, especially issues dedicated to disaster relief, counter-terrorism, maritime security, etc.
Furthermore, there should be more interaction and utilisation between track 1 and track 1.5 in the ARF with track 2 mechanisms, such as the members of ARF Experts and Eminent Persons, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, to get additional inputs and insights on emerging security issues through regular consultations. Indeed, after 17 years of moratorium, it is also high time to reconsider the request for new memberships.
At 57, Asean has matured and can make bolder decisions. The bloc must work closely with its ARF partners to shape “more predictable and constructive post-Cold War regional relations in the Asia-Pacific”.