During the Asean-Australia Post-Ministerial Conference in Vientiane last month, Indonesia's foreign minister Retno Marsudi once again highlighted the critical role partners like Australia must play in easing the region's food insecurity.
In recent years, overlapping crises -- from pandemics, supply chain disruptions, great power competition and regional tensions to increasingly devastating climate change impacts -- have caused havoc for regional food supplies and trade.
Food import-reliant Southeast Asian and East Asian countries are among the most affected. And the prospect of additional supply chain disruptions to food imports is undeniably alarming for governments. While some like the Philippines import more than 25%, others like Singapore import over 90%.
The food security of Southeast Asia and that of Northeast Asia is linked. Figures for food import dependence in Northeast Asia for key agricultural products are even more alarming. For instance, Japan, which imports about 62% of its food, relies on imports for wheat (83%), soybeans (78%) and edible oils (97%).
Boosting domestic agricultural production seems like the obvious answer. Yet the severity of challenges that countries face (like land and water constraints) cannot be solved overnight. Instead, a regional approach is needed.
Some steps have already been undertaken. Notably, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (Asean APTERR) with China, Japan and South Korea provides a collective rice reserve for use in emergencies or natural disasters. However, the current environment shows that stronger measures, drawing on leading food-producing partners like Australia, are needed.
To achieve this, Asean, Australia and New Zealand could jointly form an Asean Plus Five collective emergency reserves and food-sharing platform. The inclusion of Australia and New Zealand -- dual agricultural powerhouses and exporters -- could create a food-sharing platform of about 2.2 billion people across 15 countries. Doing so would bring together leading food exporters and the major importers.
Australia and New Zealand are leading exporters of grains, dairy, meat and oilseeds. The former is the world's biggest sheep and mutton exporter and supplies over 13% of global wheat exports. A leading beef and barley exporter, Australia also exports more modest quantities of oilseeds (like canola).
New Zealand, for its part, is the world's biggest dairy exporter and second-largest global lamb and mutton exporter. It is also a major beef exporter.
Southeast and Northeast Asian countries are major importers and consumers of these agricultural products. For instance, during the 2022–2023 marketing year, most Australian wheat was exported to China (a record 6.4 million tonnes) and Indonesia (3.49 million tonnes). Other leading buyers included Vietnam (2.38 million tonnes), South Korea (2.26 million tonnes) and the Philippines (2.22 million tonnes).
Food demands in the region will continue rising due to growing populations, expanding middle classes and higher incomes. This will further strain current food production and trade. Yet increasing demands are unlikely to be met by Asian agricultural producers/exporters alone.
Australia and New Zealand are well-placed to help. Participating in the proposed Asean mechanism could turn them into the region's much-needed "food bowl", boosting exports and intra-regional trade.
There are other benefits for Canberra and Wellington. Stronger economic ties reflect the governments' interests in Asia, including pivots to Southeast Asia. For Canberra in particular, the security and prosperity of both Australia and Southeast Asia are interlinked, as the Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040 points out.
However, challenges lie ahead. Aside from lingering tensions between China and Australia and tensions in hotspots like the South China Sea, other concerns like climate shocks and natural resource competition, which exacerbate food inflation and damage agricultural production, should be noted.
Broader concerns about the viability of and resilience in the Australia-Asean partnership as well as Australia's bilateral relations with states in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia should be considered too. In recent years, Canberra's food export policies at times have raised the ire of its trading partners.
Notably, in 2011, Australia imposed a temporary six-month ban on live cattle exports to Indonesia following the release of footage showing animal cruelty in Indonesian abattoirs. This move was a pivotal moment in Australia's agricultural and diplomatic relations with Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, which is a key importer of Australian livestock.
The temporary ban and sudden loss of a key export market also had significant economic repercussions for Australian stakeholders including farmers and exporters through the adverse impact on economic activity and cash flows. Estimates at the time of the ban suggested that the suspension of all live cattle exports to Indonesia could cost the industry as much as AU$320 million (7.3 billion baht).
On the diplomatic front, the ban strained Australia-Indonesia relations. Indonesian officials condemned the decision, viewing it as an interference in their domestic affairs and economic interests.
The live export dispute between Australia and Indonesia was later resolved through negotiations and commitments to improve animal welfare standards.
Australia learned significant lessons from this episode. In particular, the dispute helped Australian policymakers better understand local conditions and the importance of working in consultation and collaboration with Southeast Asian partners.
For any food security grouping to work, Australia must also consider potential challenges with Northeast Asian partners. For instance, its barley trade with China has been marred by significant disputes. The most prominent occurred in 2020 when China imposed 80.5% anti-dumping tariffs on barley imports, effectively blocking exports to the Chinese market. China's Ministry of Commerce claimed that Australian barley was being sold at unfairly low prices, which they argued harmed the domestic barley industry in China.
The tariffs impacted the Australian barley industry. Between 2014 and 2015 and 2018 and 2019, Australian barley exports to China averaged approximately AU$1.2 billion a year. However, Australian farmers and exporters were forced to find alternative markets such as Saudi Arabia and Vietnam. Concurrently, the average value of barley exports dropped from AU$407 per ton in 2019–20 to AU$310 per ton in 2020–21.
Since the lifting of the tariffs in August last year by Beijing, however, the overwhelming majority of Australian barley exports -- 78% -- have been exported to China.
To help restore trust with Beijing, Canberra may engage in sustained diplomatic dialogue. Establishing regular high-level meetings between trade representatives could help address misunderstandings as well as provide a platform for resolving food import/export-related disputes within the proposed Asean Plus Five mechanism.
Amid an increasingly fractured geopolitical environment, stronger intra-regional trading and wider emergency food reserves could support greater regional stability and resilience to transnational challenges.
And there is a need to do so -- food is too important to leave off the region's policy menu.
Genevieve Donnellon-May is an independent researcher. She is a fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center and sits on the advisory board member of Modern Diplomacy. She is a 2023 CSIS Pacific Forum Young Leader.