How sanguine should the international observer be towards the relationship between China, peace and security? While the country's integration into the international commercial system via the World Trade Organization has opened the door to rules-based discourse and a multilateral dispute settlement system, despite major commercial rivalries, the domain of peace and security presents a more precarious and ambivalent affair. Yet, here again, there is variability in that relationship, which militates against too broad of a generalisation.
Historically, it should not be forgotten that in the 19th century, China was victimised by the Opium Wars, when outside powers imposed stipulations in favour of the opium trade, while the country itself wanted to suppress the consumption of that addictive drug and end the trade.
In the first part of the 20th century, the country was classified pejoratively as "semi-civilised" by the surrounding powers of the day, which led to its subjection to external influences. Numerous atrocities were committed before and during WWII against the Chinese population. With the emergence of the new administration after that war, the rise of China as a superpower has led to its more assertive position internationally, impliedly as a re-validation of itself in the global spectrum.
There is then the question: how to enable that assertiveness to energise rather than undermine the international system based on rules-based multilateralism and peaceful dispute resolution in the field of peace and security. China's narrative on this matter can be seen in its national policies, including its Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative, which favour international law and the UN umbrella from the angle of cooperation.
Yet, those developments need to be tested substantively on various fronts. How does the country fare at the apex of the international system, namely in the UN Security Council (SC)? The answer is contextual, depending upon the situation and its competition with some of the other superpowers. On the Ukraine war, the country is clearly closer to the protagonist who is waging the war against Ukraine and which is geographically next door.
On other conflicts, it varies in its signals. Interestingly, China is not the superpower which casts the veto most frequently to block decision-making on international peace and security. It is two of the other superpowers which wield the veto the most. China tends to abstain from some key issues, perhaps as a lever to be seen as an intermediary and to bridge with developing countries that do not have a voice in that supreme UN organ.
What about the reform of the Security Council? Earlier this year, the co-chairs of the negotiations on Security Council reforms visited the country, and the message from the latter was to increase the representation of developing countries in that organ.
What are some options, then? It is expected that some directions will be visible from the forthcoming Global Summit of the Future this month. Its final declaration will have a section on global governance and related reforms, including the council.
A possible adjustment is to add some non-permanent seats to the council, reflecting the geographical representation of developing countries. This would mean a revolving system providing shared opportunities to participate.
The touchy issue of the veto is intractable but not impossible to deal with. In recent years, a number of countries have put forward a non-binding code whereby the veto should not be exercised in regard to very serious human rights violations, such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Two of the members of the UNSC have already committed to this promise and China should follow suit. At least it should abstain, rather than to veto when faced with such a predicament.
Nearer home, there are the trenchant issues of the disputed South China Sea and areas further north, embodied in the Taiwan conundrum.
It should be recalled that one international dispute settlement mechanism -- the international arbitral tribunal in the Hague -- rejected the country's claim of historic rights over the area around the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea in 2016. The country has repudiated that arbitral award, and conflicts have escalated. Its claim to that island further north is also extremely delicate, bearing in mind the democratic aspirations of the latter.
Good neighbourliness can help to defuse tensions, and it is hoped that the forthcoming Asean-based Code of Conduct on the South China Sea can entrench a rules-based position based on International law (especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) and de-escalation modalities.
The latter can include conflict prevention channels such as early warnings and hotlines between military leaders to prevent misunderstandings, mutual confidence building through humanitarian rescue operations, disaster response operations and shared programmes to protect the marine environment and promote people-to-people links.
Lessons are to be learned from the multilateral commercial setting where China and Chinese Taipei can coexist well on matters of common interest, with flexibility based upon international rules and peaceful dispute settlement. Bilateral forum/fora and regional frameworks, with peer supports, can help to address humanitarian matters without debilitating politicisation.
On a related front, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) closely aligned with China should be mobilised to move away from the focus on national and regional security -- to cover more the portals of peace, democracy, human rights and sustainable development.
An innovative stepping stone was its commitment in 2023 to ecological issues, including renewable and clean energy, low-emission channels, and energy containment systems.
The 2024 Astana Summit of the SCO resulted in commitments on trade, energy, and finance, including energy cooperation and anti-drug strategy.
However, its programme to counter insecurity, terrorism, extremism and separatism needs to be responded to with caution -- to follow international standards and comply with the substantive elements of multilateralism, objectively tested under the UN framework.
As a final note, on the most controversial issues, there is an instructive and patient Chinese maxim offering a guiding light, anchored on the fulcrum of moderation and self-restraint: Tao guang yang hui, or "be calm and keep a low profile".
Vitit Muntarbhorn is a Professor Emeritus at the Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University. He has helped the UN as an expert, adviser and consultant. This article is the second part of his series on 'Deciphering China in a Multiplex World'. The first part was published by the 'Bangkok Post' on Aug 29 under the title 'Unpacking China's Global Influence'.